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Preface
”Denn das ist eben die Eigenschaft der wahren Aufmerksamkeit, dass sie im Augenblick
das Nichts zu Allem macht” (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Wilhelm Meisters
Wanderjahre)
This thesis establishes that attention is a very important, though ironically often
neglected, element of economic theory. Receiving attention and being perceived is a
fundamental requirement of any personal or corporate development as it stands at the
beginning of all human interaction with others. In this respect I would like to devote
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become reality. My special thanks go to my two supervisors, Josef Falkinger and Armin
Schmutzler. Professor Falkinger accepted me as a member of his chair and unleashed
my fascination for the field of limited attention. I am very grateful to him for numerous
intriguing and illuminating discussions on general economic and non-economic topics. I
wish to thank Professor Schmutzler for his many inspiring, motivating and supportive
comments from the time where I was a graduate student up to the present. I also thank
Diethard Klatte for his repeated and generous willingness to discuss all kind of mathe-
matical problems and also Rainer Winkelmann with whom I had the pleasure to combine
alpinism with economic reasoning. Moreover, I thank the members of the chairs of Armin
Schmutzler and Josef Falkinger, especially my fellow students Sandra Hanslin, Timo Bop-
part, Donja Darai, Iryna Stewen and Victoria Galsband for many valuable discussions
and pleasurable moments. Andreas Haller and Silvie Gernet provided excellent research
assistance. I also would like to express my gratitude to my father, who inspired me to
search for my own answers and my mother, who gave me the enthusiasm not to give up
in such a struggle. Finally, I express my unlimited thanks to my fiancee, Ines Brunner,
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for her endless support during harder times, her love, her kindness, her patience and her
faith in me.
Andreas M. Hefti
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1Introduction
1.1 Superabundant information and scarce attention
In a seminal paper Herbert Simon revises the notion of the “rational economic man” by
introducing ”internal constraints” which account for the fact that besides the conventional
budget constraint that represents economic scarcity an agent also faces physiological and
psychological limitations to which he must obey (Simon (1955)). Consecutively, much
theoretical and empirical effort was undertaken to comprehend what the admission of
such bounds might imply for economic models (see Conlisk (1996) for a survey). In many
cases bounds on the information processing capabilities of agents have been found of
central importance. The claim of these models usually is that acquiring and processing
information imposes some cost on the agent. The existence of such deliberation costs
then leads to a trade-off in decision-making (see Payne et al. (1993)): better decisions are
available only at the expense of purchasing more information.
However, the information problem in a modern economy might be less one of getting
information but one of receiving too much information. Maybe the central phenomen
of the digital age is that ”Information has gone from scarce to superabundant1”. One
reason for this abundance can be seen in advertising efforts of firms. The following two
figures illustrate real annual advertising expenditure for the U.S. from 1980 - 2008.2
1Cited in: The Economist, ”Data, data everywhere. A special report on managing information” Feb
27th 2010, p.3.
2Source: Magna Global (published by Television Bureau of Advertising:
http://www.tvb.org/nav/buildframeset.aspx).
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Figure 1.1: Real annual advertising expenditure (U.S.): 1980-2008
We see that overall real advertising expenditure has increased over time. Further we
note that the composition of advertising expenditures remains constant over time with
two important exceptions. First, we see that the share of expenditures on newspaper
advertising tends to diminish over time. Second, we see that the share spent on online
advertising rapidly increases after its introduction around 1996. The figure suggests that
after 1996 online advertising may be responsible for the relative decline of the share
spent on newspaper advertising. Figure 1.3 shows the decomposition of online advertising
expenditures: We see that initially the expenditures on online advertising were dominated
by on site advertising. In more recent years this dominance has been overthrown by
the expenditure for paid search. To get some sense of the magnitude of advertising
expenditures figure 1.4 depicts the ratio of U.S. advertising expentitures to consumption
expenditures3. We see that this share is rather constant around 1% until mid seventies
but then increases steadily for about two decades and stabilises around 3%.
As a general fact we see that real advertising expenditure in the U.S. has more than
doubled in the last thirty years and that the slope of the advertising-consumption share
changes remarkably around 1975. Online advertising constitutes a comparably small share
3Source: Consumption data stems from the Penn World Table 6.3. Advertising expenditure stems
from the Historical Statistics of the United States database.
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Figure 1.2: Advertising expenditure (U.S.): Decomposition
of overall advertising expenditure at the moment but appears to become more and more
important which appears to be driven mostly by the expenditures on paid search.
But the increase of advertising in the last thirty years is only one example of the glut
of information that characterises a modern economy. The virtual explosion of information
flow is well documented by the omnipresence of the internet with its ever-increasing
number of web sites. The next figure shows that the fraction of U.S. internet users
increased more than four times during the last 15 years.4 But also more traditional
sources of information have become a lot more voluminous. For example, Davenport
and Beck (2001, p.4) report that the Sunday New York Times contains more factual
information in one edition than was available to a reader in all the written material in
the fifteenth century.
Recent work in psychology highlights the importance of limitations on perceiving mul-
tiple stimuli for making decisions, storing information, planning actions and other mental
processes (Pashler (1998)). Together with such limitations the modern ”wealth of infor-
mation” then implies a ”scarcity of attention” (Simon (1971)). Managing scarce attention
is seen to be the central task of modern business: ”If you want to be successful in the cur-
4Source: World Development Indicators Database.
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Figure 1.3: Online advertising expenditures (U.S.)
rent economy, you’ve got to be good at getting attention” (Davenport and Beck (2001),
p. 8). What are the consequences of scarce attention for economic theory? It is the
main task of this thesis to theoretically investigate the implications of limited consumer
attention in the context of oligopolistic theory of competition.
1.2 Stylized facts from psychology and marketing sci-
ence
In this section I discuss the relevant literature on attention from perceptual psychology,
marketing research and economics and work out the main stylized facts which will serve
as building blocks for the later chapters. One central question of psychological work on
attention is ”whether attention is goal-driven, controlled in a top-down fashion, or stimu-
lus driven, controlled in a bottom-up fashion” (Yantis (1998), p. 223). This distinction of
attention as an active or passive part of perception is also reflected in the dichotomy of the
modern economic literature on attention where a vast part of the literature is concerned
with goal-driven rather than stimulus-driven allocation of attention. For example, in mod-
els of rational inattention (Reis (2006a) and Reis (2006b), also Gifford (2005)) information
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Figure 1.4: Advertising share of consumption expenditure (U.S.)
acquisition is costly and a part of the agent’s maximization problem. In the dynamic con-
text of these models the consumers only sporadically update their information which is
interpreted as an agent being inattentive for some time concerning further information.
Sims investigates the implications of rational inattention on macroeconomic topics such
as the permanent income hypothesis using Shannon’s information theory (Sims (2003)).
Gabaix and Laibson develop a cost-benefit model that endogenously explains how sub-
jects allocate their limited mental resources to different elements of a decision problem
and provide experimental evidence in support of their directed cognition effect (Gabaix
et al. (2003) and Gabaix et al. (2006)). In finance limited attention of market actors
has been taken into account by different researchers. For example, Mondria et al. show
that the magnitude of home bias in investments can be explained substantially by the
allocation of investor’s limited attention (Mondria et al. (2010)). In their model investors
use their limited mental capacity to process information about the future payoff of risky
assets. As capacity limitations impose an upper bound on the possibility of the investors
to reduce their uncertainty the investors have to decide which assets from which coun-
tries deserve closer attention. Using a three-month AOL dataset from 2006 that contains
all web search queries of the AOL users these authors show that i) investors allocate
more attention (as measured by search queries and clicks) to countries of which they al-
ready hold assets and ii) investors favor assets from already familiar countries. Gifford
6 1. INTRODUCTION
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Figure 1.5: Fraction of internet and broadband subscribes in the U.S.
presents a dynamic principal-agent model of venture capital where the venture capitalist
(the agent) must decide in each period how much attention (or time) to allocate towards
managing a current venture or towards funding new ventures (Gifford (1997)). As the
venture capitalists’ allocation problem is not taken into account by an entrepreneur (the
principal) the venture capitalist allocates too little time towards managing the venture
from the perspective of the entrepreneur but also from the perspective of limited venture
partners. Using an NYSE dataset from 2002 Corwin and Coughenour show that the abil-
ity of specialist traders to provide liquidity to a stock is negatively correlated with the
attention required by the other stocks in the portfolio (Corwin and Coughenour (2008)).
Peng shows that investors allocate their limited attention across sources of uncertainty to
minimize total portfolio uncertainty (Peng (2005)), and Huberman (Huberman (2001))
as well as Barber and Odean (Barber and Odean (2008)) provide evidence that investors
tend to focus on familiar stocks and that information may not be incorporated into prices
until it attracts sufficient investor attention.
The smaller part of the economic literature on attention focuses on stimulus-driven
attention allocation. If attention is stimulus-driven this naturally moves the behaviour
of the information sender into the centre of interest. As the main example of this liter-
ature Falkinger (Falkinger (2007), Falkinger (2008)), derives two macroeconomic models
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where consumer attention is not a decision variable and attention is being allocated pas-
sively by the strength of the signals a consumer receives. In his view attention allocation
only matters if there is an abundance of information in the economy (what he calls the
information-rich economy) so that the limited mental capacity of consumers becomes a
scarce resource. Then the relative salience of its messages are the main information prob-
lem of a firm (the information sender) as salience determines whether a message among
many other messages is perceived or not. In the information-rich economy an economic
interaction between a sender and a receiver previously requires that the attention of the
receiver has been attracted by the sender, i.e. that the sender wins a competition for
attention before competing for economic resources. From the viewpoint of a firm being
on an attention-limited consumer’s mind is important for two reasons: 1) the consumer is
informed of its product and 2) she also is not (or at least less) thinking about rival prod-
ucts. On the contrary, if there only is little information in the economy (the economy is
information-poor) then information and not attention is scarce and relative salience of a
message is far less important than whether the message is actually received by a consumer
or not. Falkinger shows that whether an economy is information-rich or information poor
is determined by fundamentals such as preferences, budget, information technology and
production technology. Further, it is shown that in an information-rich world interna-
tional integration tends to reduce global diversity (as measured by the total number of
items an impartial observer would count) and so does media intermediation. Hirshleifer
and Teoh construct a model of security trading where some investors are inattentive which
in their model means that these investors only consider a subset of all publicly available
information whereas attentive investors consider the entire information (Hirshleifer and
Teoh (2003)). They show that equilibrium prices reflect the different believes of attentive
and inattentive investors in a simple model of security trading. Further, these authors
illustrate the implications of limited investor attention on stock prices if the manager of
a firm can influence the perception of a financial report by disclosing additional material.
They show that managers have an incentive to include additional pro forma (non-GAAP)
measures on earnings to improve the perception of the firm as inattentive investors treat
pro forma earnings as if they were adjusted by the manager to be maximally informa-
tive. This failure of the inattentive investors to account for the strategic incentive of the
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manager implies that i) pro forma earnings are upward biased predictions of terminal
cash flows and ii) stock prices are too high compared to a situation were reporting of pro
forma earnings were forbidden. Compared to the case where all investors are attentive
the existence of inattentive investors implies average overvaluation of a stock and hence
also more negative average stock return should the abnormal (or bad) state occur.
The modern literature on experimental psychology provides evidence for both the
active and the passive role of attention in the context of visual stimulus processing5: ”goal-
driven” and ”stimulus driven” attention are important in explaining how subjects perform
during visual search experiments. Nevertheless ”stimulus-driven attentional control is
both faster and more potent than goal-driven attentional control” (Yantis (1998), p. 251-
252) - especially in experiments where attention cannot be focused on a certain region in
advance. This literature argues that attention operates as a gating mechanism if multiple
stimuli use the same neural pathway by ”restricting the amount of information that is
processed at once” (Mozer and Sitton (1998), p. 342) because parallel processing of
information is not possible due to mental capacity limitations. Then the relative strength
of a stimulus that enters the neural network of a person determines whether or not it
is further transmitted into the neural network and eventually reaches the recognition
network (Mozer and Sitton (1998), p. 343-356). That capacity limitations impose a
”bottleneck” to visual stimulus processing is convincingly illustrated in experiments on
visual search: response time of subjects to a stimulus is flat if few objects are displayed but
increases exponentially with the number of displayed objects (Mozer and Sitton (1998),
p. 378-340). Hence perception gets distracted under many signals which ultimately slows
down response time. In explaining search time in visual search the ”relative salience of
a target” is much more important than ”the occurrence of specific features” (Nothdurft
(2000), p. 1184). Hence in order to generate a ”pop-up” or ”salience effect” the motion,
color or luminance of an object matters only relatively to the local and global surrounding
of the object. Experiments conducted to assess the spatial distribution of attention on
the visual field suggest that attention works as a ”spotlight”: once a location is selected,
all features at that location are processed and moved on to the recognition network (e.g.
5In such experiments subjects are usually required to identify the orientation of some geometric object
that e.g. briefly flashes up where there might also be distractive stimuli present and response time of
subjects is measured. See Yantis (Yantis (1998)) for an overview of such experiments.
1.2. STYLIZED FACTS FROM PSYCHOLOGY AND MARKETING SCIENCE 9
Kahneman and Henik (1981)) or at least ”receive enhanced processing” (Maunsell and
Treue (2006)). We may summarise the key messages of the psychological research in case
of visual attention as follows.
P1) In the case of multiple stimuli relative signal strength matters whether a signal is
processed or not.
P2) For a given spatial array of objects, if a region successfully attracts attention then
all features of this region are considered.
Note that P1) also means that in case of multiple overlapping stimuli certain signals are
inhibited6 and not processed to the recognition network.
While the general economic model I develop in chapter 3 of this thesis is in principal
capable of handling both cases - active (or ”goal-driven”) and passive (or ”stimulus-
driven”) attention allocation, I will follow the Falkinger-Simon approach and consider the
case where consumer attention is passive in its nature and the distribution of attention
will depend on the distribution of signal strength.
In the marketing literature it is a well-documented fact that the placement of a link on
the screen of some online search site is a crucial determinant of the number of clicks that
a site receives. For example using a dataset of a price listing service Baye et al. find that
”a firm receives about 17% fewer clicks for every competitor listed above it on the screen”
(Baye et al. (2009), p. 938) but that the relationship between clicks and screen location
is far from being linear. That ranking matters for clicks on search pages is also confirmed
by Smith and Brynjolfsson (Smith and Brynjolfsson (2004)) in the context of online book
markets and by Ghose and Yang in the context of sponsored search advertising (Ghose and
Yang (2009)). Having sales data in case of memory modules Ellison and Ellison (Ellison
and Ellison (2009), p. 442) report that on a price search engine ”moving from first to
seventh on the list reduces a websites sales [...] by 83%”. Dreze and Zufryden, using data
on the web traffic of Amazon and Ebay, point out that a site can increase its visibility
to potential consumers most by altering its linkage in the web and thereby improving its
indexing by search engines (Dreze and Zufryden (2004), p. 35). Most noteworthy is the
6See Milliken and Tipper (1998), p. 204-206 for experiments on the importance of inhibition in
selection experiments.
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finding that the first three positions get about 75% out of all clicks of the first ten positions
on the screen (Baye et al. (2009), p. 945) and positions with rank larger than three do not
differ substantially from each other. This finding is also confirmed by Ghose and Yang
who additionally document a non-monotonic relationship between rank and profitability
(Ghose and Yang (2009), p. 1614). This is explained by the fact that both costs and
clicks decrease with a higher rank (a lower on-screen position) but that clicks decrease
slower than costs. Hence it may be of less importance to be the first on the list but what
matters is to be among the first few entries. A related finding of Smith and Brynjolfsson
is that in case of the market for books being on the first page of a search page is of central
relevance for receiving a high number of clicks and might even be more important than
being the overall first in the list (Smith and Brynjolfsson (2004), p. 548-549). First-page
dominance is also found by Jansen et al. (Jansen et al. (2000), p. 215). Finally, Pan et
al. show in an eyeball-tracking experiment that the first entries on a Google search page
get by far most viewing-time but there is no statistical difference between the first and
the second item on the list (Pan et al. (2007), p. 814). In their online experiment Pan et
al. further show that people frequently select the upper items of a list in a quality based
search experiment even if these upper items systematically are of inferior quality. Hence
the Pan finding suggests that people consider the first few alternatives in making their
decisions independent of the overall quality of these alternatives.
The literature on marketing has recognised the empirical fact that consumers make
their decision conditional on a subset of all possible alternatives. In such models consumers
are believed to phase their decision in two parts using simple heuristics to screen all
possible alternatives and then make a more thorough analysis of the reduced consideration
set (Manrai and Andrews (1998); see Payne et al. (1993), Chapter 2, for an overview of
different decision strategies). Hauser and Wernerfeld (Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990))
provide an overview of marketing studies that find empirical evidence for the existence
of such consideration sets and emphasise that these sets usually are very small (a size of
3− 6 alternatives) compared to the complete set of possible alternatives7. Moreover, the
consideration sets of supermarket shoppers seem to depend heavily on what is promoted
7In case of shampoos the mean consideration set contained only four shampoos out of more than 30
(Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990)).
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strongly (Fader and McAlister (1990), p. 330-331). This is also supported by Mitra who
reports that advertising does not alter the average size of the consideration set but it
does influence which alternatives are in the consideration set in an experimental setting
(Mitra (1995), p. 91). Mehta et al. use a structural model of quality-adjusted price search
to estimate in-shop brand selection in case of liquid detergents and find that consumers
frequently purchase low quality products ”simply because they fail to notice the prices
of the other brands” (Mehta et al. (2003), p. 76) and, at the same time, it is ”the
most feature-advertised and displayed brand”. Similarly, Alba and Chattopadhyay find
experimental evidence that higher salience of a brand inhibits the recall of other brands
(Alba and Chattopadhyay (1986), p. 365). The key messages of marketing and internet
research are:
M1) The on-screen ranking of links determines the clicking distribution and is sale rele-
vant.
M2) There appears to be a discontinuity and non-linearity between the clicks of the first
few entries and the later entries of search pages and there is first-page relevance.
M3) Consideration sets of consumers exist and are small. The size of the set is not
affected e.g. by advertising. Firms can influence their chance of consideration e.g.
by means of promotion.
Note that P1) and P2) can explain M1) in the sense that people cannot process all
information on a search screen in parallel and thus perceive the links from top to bottom.
That flashy links by means of position or different color attract attention and hence clicks
(the finding of Ghose and Yang (2009)) coincides with Nothdurft’s (2000) observation that
the relative salience of objects determines the speed of their detection and also is reflected
by the fact that sponsored search advertising (purchasing advertising space and a different
link color in the Google top- and sideframe) has become ”the largest source of revenues
for search engines” (Ghose and Yang (2009), p. 1605, also see figure 1.3). Further P2)
and M2) seem related as the empirical evidence suggests the clicking behavior to cluster
around the first search page and the first entries of a page. Finally, M2) and M3) are
related as the discontinuity could be explained by the fact that people consider only a
small subset of all information and their selection rule follows a simple top-down logic.
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1.3 Outline
The facts documented in the last section suggest that:
1. Decision-makers have limited attention: They focus only on a subset of all available
information.
2. Relative salience of the information (e.g. its on-screen ranking) crucially determines
which information receives attention.
These findings are incorporated by Falkinger in a general equilibrium framework with
a clear macroeconomic thrust (Falkinger (2007) and Falkinger (2008)). In his models
firms have no mass and hence no strategic interaction exists. A natural alternative to his
approach is to integrate limited attention into a model of oligopolistic competition that
allows for strategic interactions of information senders. My thesis presents an attempt
to accomplish this goal by developing a game-theoretic setting that combines attention
competition with economic price competition. One advantage of my approach is that we
can investigate how the competition for limited attention affects the strategic choice of
prices and attention efforts of the competing firms. That is, we can understand in greater
detail how the market forces under limited attention eventually establish an equilibrium.
At the positive level I show in chapter 3 that under reasonable assumptions a strategic
equilibrium exists in the symmetric price-attention game and discuss how limited attention
affects market structure, attention efforts and prices. I provide some examples of standard
models of oligopolistic price competition that satisfy these assumptions in chapter 4 and
use one of them, the Salop-Grossman-Shapiro model of circular product differentiation
(Salop (1979), Grossman and Shapiro (1984)), to discuss the consequences of attention
competition at the normative level. I now present the outline of my thesis in greater
detail.
The second chapter of this book integrates the first finding - consumers have limited
attention - into the Grossman and Shapiro model of informative advertising and circular
product differentiation (Grossman and Shapiro (1984)) by assuming that consumers are
only capable of considering a certain subset of all alternatives they are informed of. In
this model firms and consumers are located symmetrically around the unit circle and the
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overall number of firms may be interpreted as a measure of diversity: more firms mean
more diversity. The basic finding is that perceived diversity and not effective diversity (as
measured by the total number of firms) matters for the economic equilibrium, which leaves
firms with considerably more market power and implies that higher equilibrium prices and
a higher degree of diversity can be sustained than predicted by the conventional model of
unlimited attention capacities.
In the third chapter I combine the second observation - that ranking matters - with an
abstract model of price competition. The possibility of information-senders to influence
their chance of perception triggers a competition for consumer attention which, depending
on the severity of this competition, may increase or decrease equilibrium profits compared
to the solution under the special assumption of unbounded attention. In this chapter I
also develop a concrete and intuitive functional form of the attention competition - the
attention contest function - which because of its analytically nice properties can easily be
implemented in symmetric models of economic competition from oligopoly theory. The
third chapter has a prolonged technical section in which I derive conditions that assert
existence and uniqueness of the symmetric price-attention game. The game-theoretic
tools required are developed in the fifth chapter of this thesis.
The fourth chapter of this book first embeds attention competition as developed in the
third chapter in a standard model of price competition from oligopoly theory. I show that
this model of simultaneous price-attention competition satisfies the main general prereq-
uisites from the third chapter that assert existence and uniqueness of a price-attention
equilibrium. Then I use this model to discuss the issue of asymmetric access to attention
technology. The main and also worrisome finding is that firms with substantial advan-
tages in the possibility to attract attention (e.g. because of a previous investment into
marketing research) can crowd out more efficient competitors in terms of production costs
that fail to get sufficient attention. Then I use the circular model of Salop (Salop (1979))
and include attention competition as developed in chapter 3. One important feature of
the Salop model is that it allows to discuss the welfare implications of attention com-
petition because the distance between the location of the consumer and the location of
the firm determines the utility a consumer experiences by purchasing at the location of
the firm. The further consumer and firm are apart, the higher are transportation costs
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burdened on the consumer and the lower is his utility from the transaction. Without
limited attention there is a negative relationship between transportation costs and diver-
sity (as measured by the total number of firms on the circle). More diversity decreases
average transportation costs because if more firms are located symmetrically around the
unit circle the distance between the firms then must decrease. But under unlimited at-
tention consumers may perceive the entire market and hence can benefit from the firms
moving closer together. A very intriguing finding is that limited attention reverses the
conventional negative relationship between transportation costs and diversity which is
also worrisome as attention competition implies equilibrium diversity to be a lot larger
than under the conventional solution. It then comes only at little surprise that under
limited attention a planning authority would primarily focus on cutting back extensive
diversity. The last part of chapter four combines attention competition in the circular
model with informative advertising. Using numerical methods I show the basic results on
transportation costs and inefficiency of the attention equilibrium also to be true in this
more general case.
As mentioned before the fifth chapter of this book is methodological and deals with
uniqueness and stability of general differentiable symmetric games. In this chapter I derive
two criteria that, if both are satisfied, imply uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium.
On advantage of my approach is that, despite being very general, it is simpler to work
with than the univalence or the index theorem approach. The basic application of this
theory can be found in chapter three. But it is also worth mentioning that this is the
first contribution that separately discusses the scope of multiple symmetric equilibria and
the scope of asymmetric equilibria in symmetric games. I show e.g. that my approach
gives a new interpretation to the conventional two conditions that assert uniqueness of
equilibrium in the Cournot game. Therefore I attribute this chapter an interest in itself.
Finally, this thesis should also make clear that my contribution stands more at the
beginning and less at the end of a new and contemporaneously very important line of
research. In this sense the final chapter provides a brief overview of further research
projects and research questions that are not part of this thesis.
2Informative Advertising and Limited
Attention
In this chapter I investigate the implications of the first stylized fact from the introduction
- consumers have limited attention - for the equilibrium of a symmetric oligopolistic model
of informative advertising and imperfect economic competition.
I begin by relating informative advertising to the concepts of persuasive and com-
plementary advertising. Then I formulate the general problem of an advertising firm.
After discussing advertising technology I integrate limited attention as an upper bound
on how many distinct items a consumer may perceive into the model of Grossman and
Shapiro (Grossman and Shapiro (1984)). I derive the symmetric equilibrium and discuss
the implications of limited attention for equilibrium price, advertising and the degree of
diversity.
2.1 Informative advertising
How does advertising affect a firm’s demand function? Generally, the literature recognizes
three possibilities how advertising interplays with economic competition: advertising may
be i) persuasive, ii) informative or iii) complementary in nature (see Bagwell (2007) for
a survey). The persuasive view holds that advertising influences consumer’s tastes and
for example creates brand-loyalty or spurious product-differentiation. Hence advertising
tends to make demand more inelastic which leads to higher prices and generally to less
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competitive markets as advertising may act as an entry-barrier (e.g. Comanor and Wilson
(1974)).
The informative view reaches precisely the opposite conclusion. From this perspective
advertising does not interact with consumer preferences as the ads convey direct infor-
mation (e.g. price or location information) to consumers. Advertising hence improves
information of consumers which makes demand more elastic and may also facilitate entry
as a new firm can broadcast its existence.
The complementary view points out that advertising may be complementary to the
advertised products in the sense that although advertising does not change the preference
relation the consumption experience of the good may be reinforced by the perception of
related advertising (see e.g. Stigler and Becker (1977)). This paper entirely builds on the
informative approach to advertising and any reference to advertising refers to informative
advertising.
Since Kaldor (Kaldor (1950)), Ozga (Ozga (1960)) and Stigler (Stigler (1961)) the
economic importance of advertising was recognised as a mean of information provision
which can reduce consumer search costs (Stigler (1961), p.216), increase the adoption
rate of new commodities (Kaldor (1950), p. 8) or generally increase information trans-
mission in a society (Ozga (1960), p. 34). Telser (Telser (1964)) was the first to provide
empirical evidence that advertising ”is an important source of information” (p. 558) and
that it promotes competition between advertising firms (p. 550). Nelson (Nelson (1974)),
introducing the divison of commodities into search goods and experience goods, also em-
phasises the informative role of advertising. But in case of experience goods, which require
consumption prior to evaluating their quality, advertising also works as a costly signal of
product quality. In case of homogeneous goods Butters (Butters (1977)) explores the
implications of costly informative advertising on the equilibrium distribution of prices. In
the basic model sellers need to advertise in order to sell their goods, as consumers have no
information and do not search. Ads are purely informative as they only convey the price
of the good to the consumer. In the case where consumers receive ads of more than one
firm consumers behave as Bertrand players: they choose the lowest price good and in case
of equal prices randomise their choice. As Butters shows this induces firms to play mixed
strategies when the number of firms is finite which in the limit case, i.e. if there is an in-
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finity of firms and consumers, leads to a continuous distribution of advertised equilibrium
prices. When taken to a model of horizontal product differentiation the complication of
mixed strategies does not arise and equilibrium price and advertising are uniquely deter-
mined (Grossman and Shapiro (1984)). Their model nicely reveals the pro-competitive
potential of informative advertising as firms in markets with greater advertising face more
price-elastic demand which leads to lower equilibrium price levels. Price, advertising and
entry (market structure) are endogenously determined. In a recent paper, Goeree uses a
dataset from the PC industry to show that standard estimation techniques, which assume
that the consumers are fully aware of the entire market, systematically and severely over-
estimate the price-elasticity of demand and underestimate markups and market power
of firms (Goeree (2008)). Although Goeree does not incorporate the possibility that
consumers have limited attention her estimation results clearly show the importance of
understanding how information and economic competition interact with each other.
2.1.1 The general problem of an advertising firm
In this section I state a general version of the problem of an advertising firm that is
engaged in imperfect price competition. I assume that consumers receive information
by attending to different information channels, e.g. by watching different channels of
television, reading different magazines, listening to the radio etc. The countable set of
all channels is denoted by M and |M| ≤ ∞. Every channel i has a non-empty audience
δ(i) with size δi ≡ |δ(i)|. There are n active firms indexed by j = 1, ..., n and Mj denotes
the advertising campaign of firm j, i.e. Mj ⊂ M denotes the subset (media mix) of
channels that firm j acquires to broadcast its information. Let P(n) denote the power
set of {1, ..., n} and Ii ∈ P(n) denotes the information set of consumer i where Ii is the
set of all commodities consumer i is informed of. According to the theory of informative
advertising firms advertise, i.e. communicate their existence and their price, in order to
become a part of Ii. If a firm does not advertise it is not contained in any information
set.
Suppose firm j is engaged in imperfect price competition for the budget of those
consumers that are informed about j but also of some other firms. The firm must decide
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how much to advertise and which price to set given the decisions of its competitors. In
models of informative price advertising the profit function of firm j takes on the form1
Πj = (yj − cj)Q˜j ({Mk, yk} : 1 ≤ k ≤ n)− Fj − Cj(Mj) (2.1)
where cj are unit costs of production, Fj is a fixed cost that summarises infrastructure
costs for production and advertising, Cj(Mj) is advertising expenditure for campaignMj,
M−j denotes the campaigns of all firms other than j, yj is the price chosen by firm j and
y−j are the prices chosen by all other firms. Q˜j is the market demand of firm j. If the
firm is not a pure monopolist (see Dorfman and Steiner (1954) for the monopoly case)
but an oligopolist Q˜j depends on advertising and price choices of all other active firms.
I will use the model of Grossman and Shapiro (Grossman and Shapiro (1984)) to obtain
a specific functional form for Q˜j and show when and how limited consumer attention
affects the demand function. In the model of this chapter each active firm simultaneously2
and non-cooperatively chooses its price and its advertising campaign. I will also consider
the two-stage game where firms decide whether to enter the market or not at the first
stage. Those firms who decide to enter then play a simultaneous advertising-pricing
game at the second stage. I will discuss how and when limited attention affects the
strategic equilibrium of the model. Throughout this chapter I restrict myself to the case
of symmetric firms. In the next section I specify advertising technology.
2.1.2 Advertising technology
Suppose firm j chooses campaign Mj. Then the audience of firm j is given by
⋃
i∈Mj
δ(i). I
define Φ(Mj) ≡
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃i∈Mj δ(i)
∣∣∣∣∣ to be the size of the audience of campaign Mj. Hence Φ(Mj)
depends on the overlap of the audiences δ(i) for all i ∈ Mj. To illustrate this consider
the following two extreme cases. Suppose first that δ(i) = δ(i′) = δ for all i, i′ ∈ Mj.
Hence the audience is the same for all channels of campaign Mj. In such a case we
1See e.g. Dorfman and Steiner (1954), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Esteban et al. (2001), LeBlanc
(1998) and also Goeree (2008).
2It would be of significant interest to consider a two-stage version of the game where each active firm
chooses its advertising campaign at the first stage and its price at the second stage.
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have Φ(Mj) = |δ|. In the opposite case if δ(i) ∩ δ(i′) = ∅ for all i, i′ ∈ Mj, we have
Φ(Mj) =
∑
i∈Mj
δi. Suppose a firm chooses a collection of m channels. Let these channels
be indexed by the numbers 1, 2, ...,m. Then the reach Φ(Mj) of the information campaign
is
Φ(Mj) = |δ (1)|+ |δ (2\1)|+ |δ (3\1 ∨ 2)|+ ...+ |δ (m\(1 ∨ 2 ∨ ... ∨m− 1))| (2.2)
where δ (2\1) ≡ δ(2)\δ(1), δ (3\1 ∨ 2) ≡ δ(3)\ (δ(1) ∪ δ(2)) and so on. To keep the model
tractable I make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1. The following three assumptions are imposed:
i) Every channel i in M has the same audience size δ > 0. Consumers are randomly
distributed among channels.
ii) From the perspective of firm 1 ≤ j ≤ n the conditional probability of a consumer to
attend to channel i′ given attendance of channel i is the same for all channels:
P (i′ |i) = 1− aj ∀i 6= i′ ∈M (2.3)
iii) From the perspective of firm 1 ≤ j ≤ n given that a consumer attends channel
i ∈M attending to any two different channels i′, i′′ ∈M are independent events:
P (i′ ∧ i′′ |i) = P (i′ |i) · P (i′′ |i)
The next proposition shows that under assumption 2.1 the reach of an information
campaign of size m follows a geometric series.
Proposition 2.1. Under assumption 2.1 the size Φ(Mj) of the audience of campaign
Mj ∈M with |Mj| = mj is determined by
Φ(Mj) =
{
δ
1−(aj)mj
1−aj aj < 1
mjδ aj = 1
(2.4)
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Proof: Appendix (2.5.1)
Thus we have two parameters, δ and aj, that are relevant for firm j in determining
the size of the audience of its campaign Mj. Whereas δ quantifies the audience of a
channel, aj controls the overlap of the channels and a
k
j can be interpreted as the fraction
of consumers of a channel’s audience that become aware of the campaign if a campaign of
size k is extended by one additional channel. Hence the higher aj, the less the channels
overlap, the more uninformed consumers can be reached by extending the advertising
campaign. An interesting interpretation of the parameter aj is to view it as capturing the
ability of firm j to target its messages to previously uninformed consumers. Suppose that
for some reason firm j and firm g choose a campaign of size mj = mg = m (this does not
imply that Mj = Mg). This brings to each firm an audience of size Φ(Mj) and Φ(Mg).
Then aj > ag means that firm j can combine the media channels in a more efficient way in
the sense that firm j reaches a larger audience than firm g, i.e. Φ(Mj) > Φ(Mg), despite
of choosing the same campaign size. For simplicity I set aj = a ∈ (0, 1) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
The introduction of new media, such as the television or the internet, can be thought of
as exogenously increasing the parameter δ: more consumers can be reached per channel.
At the same it is reasonable to assume that the targeting abilities of the firms also have
increased. For example, the use of digital media has made it possible to store certain
client characteristics (”cookies”) which can be exploited by advertisers.3
An interesting case occurs if attending any two channels are independent events. Sup-
pose that every channel reaches a constant fraction r of an overall population of size ∆.
Hence δ = r∆.
Corollary 2.1. If P (i ∧ i′) = P (i)P (i′) and P (i) = r for any i, i′ ∈ M then (2.4)
corresponds to the constant-reach-independent-readership (CRIR) information technology.
Proof:
Because P (i ∧ i′) = P (i)P (i′) we have P (i′| i) = P (i). Because of P (i) = r we have
a = 1− r and with δ = r∆ equation (2.4) then reads Φ(m) = ∆ (1− (1− r)m).

3A well-known example is Amazon’s ”People who bought book X also bought ...” page, which a
shopper is forced to observe when purchasing book X.
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The CRIR technology was first considered by Grossman and Shapiro (Grossman and
Shapiro (1984), p. 66). By weakening the assumption of independent readership to
independent conditional readership we have gained a further parameter, a, that controls
the targeting abilities of firms and is independent of the audience size of a channel. Note
that the CRIR technology implies that per-channel reach r and targeting ability a are
not independent: a higher reach r automatically implies a lower targeting ability a which
seems problematic as the digitalisation of advertising rather suggest that both reach r
and targeting abilities a have increased over time. Throughout the paper I assume there
is a number of ∆ > 0 consumers that are interested in the commodities of firms 1, ..., n
and δ = r∆ with r ∈ (0, 1). Then we can define the fraction φ(m) of consumers that are
informed about a firm using a campaign of size m by
φ(m) ≡
{
r 1−a
m
1−a r
1−am
1−a ≤ 1
1 r 1−a
m
1−a > 1
(2.5)
where a ∈ (0, 1). From (2.5) we see that φ(1) = r. Hence for m = 1, 2, ... we have
φ(m) ∈ [r,K] where K = min{1, r
1−a
}
. Let φ(m) ∈ (r,K). Then from (2.5) we can
deduce that φ′(m) > 0 and φ′′(m) < 0.4 This means that increasing the reach φ of an
advertising campaign is only possible at a diminishing rate which holds because channels
overlap to some degree. It can also be shown (see the appendix) that φma > 0 for m ≥ 1
which means that the marginal change of reach by expanding the campaign is higher if
targeting abilities are improved.
Throughout this chapter I assume that all firms have access to the same advertising
technology. As Butters (Butters (1977), p. 466) and Grossman and Shapiro (Grossman
and Shapiro (1984), p. 66) I assume that channels have a cost proportional to their reach,
θr∆, and it is not possible for firm j to anticipate which channels a competitor chooses.5
Hence C(M) = C(m) = θr∆m which means that the cost a firm incurs from a campaign
M depends only on the size m of the campaign and on the exogenous parameters θ, r
and ∆. It will be analytically convenient to formulate the problem of the firm directly
in terms of φ rather than m. For this purpose I define the function A(φ) ≡ θr∆m(φ) as
4φ′(m) = −amrLn(a)1−a and φ′′(m) = −a
mrLn(a)2
1−a , where Ln(a) < 0 since a < 1.
5This makes sense as choices must be made simultaneously and all channels are identical.
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advertising costs of using m channels to reach φ consumers.6 Hence for any firm j the
choice of a certain campaign Mj with size mj uniquely determines the reach φj = φ(mj)
and also the costs, Aj = A(φj), of the campaign. Note that (2.5) implies that A
′(φ) > 0
and A′′(φ) > 0 for φ ∈ (0, 1).
2.2 Limited attention and informative advertising
Suppose a firm chooses a campaign of size m in order to inform a fraction of φ(m)
consumers of its commodity. Then the firm is present in φ∆ information sets and incurs a
cost of A(φ). The conventional model of informative advertising assumes that regardless
of the size |Ii| of the information set the consumer evaluates all alternatives he receives
information of - even if |Ii| is a large number. As this assumption clearly is inconsistent
with the evidence e.g. that consumers only consider the top-positions of search page
listings (see chapter 1.2 of this thesis) I henceforth assume that a consumer perceives at
most Ri > 1 alternatives in making his decision. For simplicity, I set Ri = R and assume
that R is commonly known. A consumer with |Ii| ≤ R perceives all alternatives in Ii
whereas a consumer with |Ii| > R perceives only an R-dimensional subsample A˜i ⊂ Ii of
alternatives when making his decision.
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis Falkinger developed a general equi-
librium model of limited attention and economic competition (Falkinger (2008)) with a
macroeconomic focus. In his model consumers also have an exogenously fixed threshold on
how many different items they can perceive. In both models limited attention may imply
that not all alternatives a consumer is informed of are taken into account.7 One difference
of my model lies in the fact that in his model active firms take as exogenously given how
many consumers are effectively reached by sending their information. In my model this
reach is endogenously determined by strategic advertising decisions of the firms. As in my
model the reach decision of the firms is endogenous we can study how limited attention
affects the firm’s decision to inform a certain amount of consumers.8
6In case of the specific form (2.5) we have m = m(φ, r, a) and hence A(φ; a) ≡ θr∆m(φ, r, a).
7As we will see this depends on how many senders survive and how strong they advertise and both
are determined endogenously by fundamentals.
8The other major differences to Falkinger’s model are that i) firms are of non-zero mass and engaged
in strategic price competition, ii) firms cannot directly influence their chance of perception and iii) my
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2.2.1 Limited attention in the Grossman-Shapiro model
I use the generalisation of the Salop model by Grossman and Shapiro (further refered to
as GS) to obtain a specific form for Q˜j in (2.1) under consideration of limited consumer
attention.
Consumers and firms are located uniformly around the circumference of the unit circle.
Consumption is a zero-one-decision and consumers have a linear utility function ui(j) =
v− twi(j)−yj where the preference parameter t measures transportation costs per unit of
distance and wi(j) is the shortest arc distance between the location of a firm j with price
yj and the location of consumer i on the circle. Among perceived varieties the consumer
always chooses the variety that leaves him with the highest net utility.
twi(j) quantifies the disutility a consumer experiences if he chooses to travel a dis-
tance of wi(j) and, following GS, I refer to twi(j) as consumer i’s transportation costs
of consuming at the location of firm j. We can think of t as determining the degree of
substitutability between the different varieties (firms) on the circle. In case of a large t
the consumer suffers strongly from moving around the circle and has a strong preference
of ”staying home” (consuming at a location close to his own location). If t = 0 then
transportation distance is completely irrelevant to the consumer and he will choose to
consume at the cheapest of all perceived locations independent of how far he needs to
travel. In this border case the varieties are perfect substitutes.
In the game we are about to solve the n active firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively
choose their strategy9, the price-advertising pair (yj, φj). I will only consider the case of
symmetric firms. Hence formally we have to deal with a static two-dimensional sym-
metric n-player game. The best way to find a symmetric equilibrium in such a game
is to derive the profit function of an individual firm j, which as GS I shall call the
representative firm. An interior symmetric equilibrium then can be found by setting
(y, φ) = (y1, φ1) = ...(yj, φj) = ... = (yn, φn) in the two first-order conditions of the
representative firm’s profit function and solving these equations for (y, φ).
model is of a partial and not general equilibrium nature. An implication of i) will be, different from
Falkinger, that equilibrium prices are a function of the attention threshold R. In chapter 3 I develop
a game-theoretic framework of attention competition which will enable me to study how the effort to
inform more consumers (to be present in more information sets) and the effort to increase the chance of
perception for those consumers that are attention-constrained are interrelated (see chapter 4.2).
9I only allow for pure stratgies.
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In the following I derive the demand function of firm j, the representative firm. To
simplify notation I drop the firm index j whenever there cannot be confusion and let
y = yj and yh = y¯ as well as φj = φ and φh = φ¯ for any h 6= j.10 The representative firm
takes its own location, the locations of the other firms as well as y¯ and φ¯ as given.
2.2.1.1 Favourity groups
Fort the rest of section 2.2.1 I will maintain the assumption that n ≥ 2 and φ¯ > 0. In
order to derive expected demand for the representative firm I follow the approach of GS
and partition the set of consumers into n favourity groups (from the perspective of the
representative firm), where group 1 ≤ k ≤ n encompasses all those consumers for which
the representative firm produces the k-th favourite variety in terms of net utility (i.e. for
fixed locations and given prices y and y¯) under full information. For example, a consumer
in group k = 3 would find the representative firm to be his third-best choice: there are
two other firms that offer a higher net utility to this consumer but n − 3 firms offer a
lower net utility. How many consumers are there in group k? For k = 1 all consumers to
which the representative firm offers a higher net utility than its closest neighbour11 will
find the representative firm to be their first best choice. Hence the indifferent consumer
is located at a distance12 of w1 to the representative firm, where w1 is determined by:
v − tw1 − y = v − t
(
1
n
− w1
)
− y¯
which gives w1 =
y¯−y
2t
+ 1
2n
. Hence all consumers at a distance of w ≤ w1 to the repre-
sentative firm would - if fully informed - choose to consume from the representative firm.
Counting consumers on either side of the firm there are N1 = 2∆w1 consumers in this
group. Repeating the argument GS (p. 67) then show that the indifferent consumer in
10The approach I pursuit here is described generally in chapter 5.2.1.
11Remember that we assume all competitors to set the same price y¯.
12I always assume that v ≥ max
{
t, 32
√
tF
∆
}
. As is shown by Salop (Salop (1979), p. 148) a lower bound
on v (v > 3/2
√
tF/∆) must be imposed in order to obtain the competitive equilibrium configuration
under full information. Further, v must be sufficiently large to assure that in the symmetric equilibrium
every informed consumer consumes somewhere (v − y∗ − t/2 ≥ 0). As we will see this holds if v > t.
Finally, all following formulas are valid only in the range y¯ − t/n < y < y¯ + t/n because then we have
Nk ∈ (0, 1) for all k.
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group k = 2, ..., n− 1 is at a distance wk determined by
v − twk − y = v − t
(
k
n
− wk
)
− y¯
Hence there are
Nk = 2∆ (wk − wk−1) = 2∆ 1
2n
=
∆
n
k = 2, ..., n− 1
consumers in these groups. Finally, Nn is the number of consumers not in the other (n−1)
groups:
Nn = ∆−
n−1∑
k=1
Nk = ∆− (n− 2)∆
n
−N1 = ∆
n
− ∆(y¯ − y)
t
2.2.1.2 Expected demand under limited attention
I now derive expected market demand of the representative firm under limited attention.
Let E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] denote the representative firm’s expected demand of a member of
group k conditional on j ∈ Ik.13 Because E [qk, R |j /∈ Ik ] = 0 and Prob(j ∈ Ik) = φ
the law of total expectations implies E [qk, R, φ] = φE [qk, R |φ ] where E [qk, R, φ] denotes
(unconditional) expected demand from a member of group k. Hence expected market
demand is
E[Q,R] =
n∑
k=1
φE [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ]Nk
= φ∆
(
y¯−y
t
+ 1
n
)
E [q1, R |j ∈ I1 ] + φ∆n
n−1∑
k=2
E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ]
+φ∆
(
1
n
− y¯−y
t
)
E [qn, R |j ∈ In ]
(2.6)
Note that expected market demand of the representative firm as defined by (2.6) is actually
a function of (φ, y, y¯,∆, t, n, R) but I will refer to this demand function by E[Q,R] to keep
notation simple.
The remainder of this section is concerned with deriving an expression forE [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ].
The formal derivation can be found in the appendix (see 2.5.3). In the main text I limit
13The notation j ∈ Ik means, in slight abuse of how I defined an information set, that the representative
firm has reached a member of group k, i.e. is part of this consumers’ information set. This notation is
succinct for j ∈ Ii where i ∈ group k.
26 2. Informative advertising and Limited Attention
myself to providing the basic intuition.
The fraction of consumers who are informed of all competitors of the representative
firm is φ¯n−1 > 0. Now suppose that n > R. Then there must be some consumers who
receive information of at least R competitors. If such a consumer receives an ad also from
the representative firm then this consumer’s attention constraint is binding and he is not
able to perceive all information. But there are also consumers who receive only little
information. For example, the fraction of consumers not informed about any competitor
of the representative firm is (1− φ¯)n−1 > 0. Consumers informed about the representative
firm but about less than R competitors are capable of perceiving all information they
received. The representative firm cannot deduce whether a specific consumer’s attention
constraint is binding or not. But for given φ¯, n and R the firm can form an expectation
whether a consumer has limited attention (a binding attention constraint) or limited
information (a non-binding constraint). This distinction is important because the firm’s
expected demand from a consumer depends on the probability of this consumer to be
attention constrained or not.
In the appendix (see 2.5.3) I show that if for those consumer with limited attention the
subset A˜k of perceived alternatives is randomly selected
14 from Ik then E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] is
determined by
E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] =
R−1∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− k
z
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1
+
n−1∑
z=R
k−1∑
s=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
k − 1
s
)(
n− k
z − s
) ( z − s
R− 1
)
(
1 + z
R
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2
(2.7)
where I set B2 = 0 if R ≥ n. In this expression B1 corresponds to the firm’s conditional
demand if the consumer has limited information (if he receives ads of less than R op-
ponents). B2 corresponds to the firm’s conditional demand if the consumer has limited
14In chapter 3 I develop the machinery required to incorporate the possibility that, given a consumer
has been reached by a firm, the firm can influence its chance of perception if the consumer has received
information of more than R firms. Equipped with these tools I shall return to this model in chapter 4.2.
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attention (if he receives ads of at least R opponents). Note that E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] does not
depend on y nor on φ but it depends on the reach of the competitors φ¯ and also on R, k
and n. We will see later that limited attention plays an important role for the strategic
choice of prices and advertising if the consumers are attention constrained on average.
For expression (2.7) this intuitively means that B2 is the predomiant term.
2.2.2 Equilibrium conditions
In this section I derive and discuss the two equilibrium conditions of the symmetric price-
advertising n-firm game. To gain as much intuition as possible I will discuss separately
i) how limited attention affects the equilibrium price if we take advertising of all firms
as exogenously given and ii) how the optimal choice of advertising for given prices of
the representative firm depends on φ¯. We will see that limited attention ceteris paribus
implies that a higher equilibrium price can be sustained for any exogenously given amount
of advertising and that the representative firm’s optimal choice of advertising, if all prices
are exogenously given and identical, does not depend on limited attention.
With E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] as defined by (2.7) and Q˜j = E [Q,R] as defined by (2.6),
Fh = F > 0 and ch = c ≥ 0 for all h = 1, ..., n and the definition of A(φ) the general
profit function in (2.1) simplifies to15
Π(y, φ) = (y − c)E [Q,R]− F − A(φ)
= (y − c)φ∆
[(
y¯−y
t
+ 1
n
)
E [q1, R |j ∈ Ik ] + 1n
n−1∑
k=2
E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ]
+
(
1
n
− y¯−y
t
)
E [qn, R |j ∈ Ik ]
]− F − A(φ)
(2.8)
The representative firm takes as given
(
y¯, φ¯, c, t, F, a, r, θ,∆, n, R
)
and simultaneously
chooses16 (y, φ) in order to maximise (2.8). From (2.8) and (2.35) we see that the price y¯
affects E[Q,R] and the profit in a linear way and that campaign choices of the opponents
matter only up to their size.17
To derive the equilibrium conditions I require the following lemma. If R′ > R ≥ n
we can see from (2.35) and (2.6) that E [Q,R] = E [Q,R′] = E [Q,∞]. To keep notation
15This gives the profit function in what I call the symmetric opponent form. See chapter 5.
16Note that (2.8) is twice differentiable in y and φ. Second-order conditions of this optimisation problem
are satisfied. See section 2.5.7 in the appendix.
17Because φ¯ = φ(m¯).
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simple I set E [Q] ≡ E [Q,∞] as the expected demand for given (y, φ, y¯, φ¯) that results in
the absence of limited attention.
Lemma 2.1. Let R,R′ > 1 and y¯ = y. Then E [Q,R′] = E [Q,R] and also ∂E[Q,R]
∂φ
=
∂E[Q,R′]
∂φ
with E [Q,R] = E [Q] = φ∆
nφ¯
(
1− (1− φ¯)n).
Proof: Appendix (2.5.5)
Lemma 2.1 simply says that for equal prices and given φ, φ¯ expected demand as well as
expected marginal demand (with respect to φ) of the representative firm are independent
of R. Intuitively, this must hold because A˜k ⊂ Ik consists of R randomly drawn firms for
those consumer with |Ik| > R. In case of identical prices the expected demand of the firm
cannot depend on R. If this were the case then some consumers would systematically
have to ignore the information of a certain firm which contradicts the assumption of
randomisation. Assuming that (1−φ¯)n ≈ 0 we see from lemma 2.1 that the representative
firm’s demand as well as marginal demand depend negatively on φ¯. If the competitors
of the representative firm advertise more ceteris paribus then the consumers that are
aware of the representative firm are aware of more competitors on expectation. Hence
in the groups with k > 1 the chance that the consumer perceives a superior firm is
increased which means that for given prices the representative firm realises fewer sales.
As a general comment it should be noted that there are important reasons why we could
expect informative advertising to impose a positive externality on firms. As Telser (Telser
(1964), p. 540) argues in the absence of significant product differentiation there will not be
much advertising as advertising does not shift own demand by much but nevertheless e.g.
a local bakery might profit from an overregional promotion of bread. The high availability
of information on the internet and search pages such as Google might also be a reason
why offline advertising might impose a positive externality. If someone who hears about a
new commodity over conventional channels enters a query in a search filter as Google then
this person may be confronted immediately with an abundance of related commodities
and end up by choosing a different brand or buys an additional related product he found
among the links.18
18The implications of this type of externality in the context of limited attention is subject to my current
research mimeo ”Attention markets”.
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2.2.2.1 The equilibrium price under exogenous advertising
Suppose all active firms simultaneously choose their price but take advertising as exoge-
noulsy given: φ = φ¯ > 0. In a symmetric equilibrium of this one-dimensional pricing
game the equilibrium price y can be found differentiating (2.8) with respect to y and
solving this equation for y. Using lemma 2.1 this gives
∂Π(y, φ)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=y¯
=
∆
n
(
1− (1− φ¯)n)+ φ¯∆(y − c)
t
(−E[q1, R |j ∈ I1 ] + E[qn, R |j ∈ In ]) = 0
(2.9)
I show in the appendix (see 2.5.6) that
y = c+
t
nφ¯
(
1− (1− φ¯)n)(
1− (1− φ¯)n−1 − λ) (2.10)
where
λ ≡

n−1∑
z=R
(
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−z−1
(
n− 1
z
)(
1− R
1+z
))
> 0 if R < n
0 else
(2.11)
with
1− (1− φ¯)n−1 − λ > 0 (2.12)
If R ≥ n (2.10) corresponds to the (unapproximated) price equation from GS (p.69).
From (2.11) we see that with limited attention we have λ ∈ (0, 1). A higher value of λ
reduces the denominator which means that the representative firm ceteris paribus chooses
to set a higher price under limited attention (if n > R) compared to a situation without
limited attention (R ≥ n). Also note that
R′ < R ≤ n⇒ y(R′) > y(R) (2.13)
This can be seen from (2.11) as a higher value of R means that the sum gets shorter
and the factor
(
1− R
1+z
)
gets smaller. Hence λ decreases and the denominator in (2.10)
increases. Why is the price higher under limited attention ceteris paribus? Under limited
attention consumers who are informed of the representative firm but also of at least R
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other firms do not compare all alternatives. This implies that demand must become
less price elastic: if the representative firm sets a (marginally) higher price it does not
loose as many consumers as under unlimited attention because some consumers might
ignore the superior firms (after the price increase). This intuitively explains why a higher
equilibrium price can be sustained for any given φ¯ under limited attention. Figure 2.1
depicts the price as determined by (2.10) as a function of φ¯ for given t, n and c.19 In
c+t/R
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c+t/R
c+t/n
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Figure 2.1: Pricing locus with limited (solid line) and unlimited attention
figure 2.1 the solid line represents the case where n > R and the dashed line represents
the case where R ≥ n. We see that in both cases y decreases in φ¯. This is the information
effect. To understand this effect intuitively note that a higher φ¯ means that consumers
who are informed about the representative firm are informed of more competitors. This
decreases the chance of the representative firm to be the perceived superior firm. Hence
the representative firm, for given y, looses some consumers. By lowering its price y the
representative firm can counteract this loss of demand as this increases the number of
consumers who find the representative firm to be their first-best choice. This explains
intuitively why the equilibrium price decrease in φ¯.
In figure 2.1 we see that the gap between the solid and the dashed line increases
as φ¯ increases which also makes sense intuitively. If φ¯ is small the fraction of people
who are informed about the representative firm and also about at least R competitors is
19I set t = 10, n = 10, c = 1 and R = 2.
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small as the firms do not advertise a lot. Many consumers have |I| ≤ R which means
that the representative firm is especially concerned with information-poor consumers. In
expression (2.7) this corresponds to the case where B1 is predominant and explains why
the solid and the dashed line are close together at small levels of φ¯. If φ¯ is large then
many consumers have |I| > R so that the demand from these consumers are the main
concern of the representative firm. Suppose we have φ¯ ≈ 1. Then (see the appendix for
the derivation)
y
(
φ¯ ≈ 1) = { c+ tR R < n
c+ t
n
R ≥ n (2.14)
If φ¯ ≈ 1 almost all consumers that are informed about the representative firm are also
informed about its n− 1 competitors. Suppose that R ≥ n. We see from (2.7) that
E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] =
n−1∑
z=0
1z0n−1−z
(
n− k
z
)
=
(
n− k
n− 1
)
Hence E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] = 1 if and only if k = 1 and E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] = 0 otherwise.
Intuitively, this occurs because φ¯ ≈ 1 and R ≥ n imply that, for given prices y and y¯,
the representative firm can only make a sale to his prime segment (the group k = 1)
as any consumer belonging to a different group must perceive a superior offer almost
surely. Then (2.6) becomes E [Q,R] = ∆
(
y¯−y
t
+ 1
n
)
which corresponds to the conventional
demand function of the Salop model (Salop (1979), p. 144). We see from figure 2.1 (or
from (2.10)) that y converges towards c + t/n if φ¯ → 1. However, if n > R we have
y = c+ t/R > c+ t/n. Intuitively, this must hold because what determines the markup if
φ¯ ≈ 1 is the perceived number of firms. If n > R and φ¯ ≈ 1 then most consumers perceive
R firms which means that the representative firm effectively has to compete only with
R − 1 competitors for the consumers who are informed about the representative firm. It
is as if the market consisted only of R firms which are located around the circle with an
average distance of 1/R between firms.
To approximate their solution GS assume that the expressions (1− φ¯)n and (1− φ¯)n−1
are negligible. If this is applied to (2.11) we get for n > R (see the appendix)
1− λ ∼= R
nφ¯
(2.15)
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Using the two GS approximations and (2.15) in (2.10) gives
y ∼=
{
c+ t
R
R < n
c+ t
nφ¯
R ≥ n (2.16)
If we use the approximation (2.16) we see that we possibly can have y(R < n) < y(R′ >
n). This contradicts the general finding of (2.13) and originates in the usage of the
approximation. Hence it makes sense to restate (2.16) as
y ∼=
{
c+ t
R
R < nφ¯
c+ t
nφ¯
R ≥ nφ¯ (2.17)
The approximation requires (1 − φ¯)n to be small. But if (1 − φ¯)n becomes smaller then
nφ¯ becomes larger. The expression nφ¯ approximately measures of how many varieties a
consumer is informed of on average. Hence the requirement that R < nφ¯, which if satisfied
always implies R < n, means that the attention constraint is binding on average. Then
scarce consumer attention and not scarce information is the regular case in the economy
and it intuitively makes sense to work with (2.17) instead of (2.16) and I will do so in the
remainder of this chapter.
2.2.2.2 Optimal advertising for given prices
Now suppose that prices are exogenously given and y = y¯. The representative firm can
only choose φ and takes prices as well as φ¯ as given. The first-order condition of the
representative firm then is
∂Π(y, φ)
∂φ
= (y − c)E[Q,R]
φ
− A′(φ) = 0 (2.18)
Lemma 2.1 implies
(y − c) ∆
nφ¯
(
1− (1− φ¯)n) = A′(φ)
or with (1− φ¯)n ≈ 0
(y − c) ∆
nφ¯
= A′(φ) (2.18’)
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Note from (2.18’) that limited attention plays no role for the optimal choice of φ as R
does not occur in this equation for exogenously given prices. The intuition of this result is
the same as the intuition behind lemma 2.1: if attention constrained consumers overlook
information at random then, for equal prices, more advertising by the representative
leads to the same increase of the representative firm’s expected demand for any choice of
R > 1.20
2.2.2.3 Limited attention and the Dorfman-Steiner theorem
From (2.8) we can deduce a simple relation between advertising and price. Let
εy ≡
∣∣∣∣∂E[Q,R]∂y yE[Q,R]
∣∣∣∣
denote price elasticity of demand and εA ≡ φA′(φ)A(φ) is the elasticity of reach costs A(φ).
Then using the two first-order conditions of (2.8) it is an easy exercise to show that
1
εyεA
=
A(φ)
yE[Q,R]
(2.19)
which can be considered a variant of the Dorfman-Steiner theorem (Dorfman and Steiner
(1954), p. 828) which relates price and advertising elasticity of demand to each other. If
the ratio of advertising expenditure A(φ) to (expected) sales revenue yE[Q,R] is inter-
preted as advertising intensity, then we see from (2.19) that if price elasticity of demand
decreases, ceteris paribus, then the optimal advertising intensity is increased.
If we evaluate (2.19) in case of our model for y = y¯ we approximately end up with
(see 2.5.10 in the appendix for details)
A(φ)
y¯E[Q,R]
=
{
t
εAy¯R
R < nφ¯
t
εAy¯nφ¯
R ≥ nφ¯ (2.20)
which shows that limited attention ceteris paribus implies a higher advertising intensity
because demand is less price elastic. From this expression we see that the GS conjec-
ture after which more average information (measured by a higher nφ¯) raises elasticity of
20As we will see in chapter 4.2 this statement may change if firms can effectively compete for consumer
attention.
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demand (p. 69) does not hold under limited attention.
2.3 The symmetric equilibrium
In this section I derive and discuss the symmetric equilibrium of the symmetric n-player
game if firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose price y and reach φ.
2.3.1 Equilibrium for given diversity
Suppose the number of active firms, n, is exogenously given. In the circular model n is
a measure of diversity in the economy (Salop (1979)). More active firms means a higher
degree of diversity.21
The model then has the following set of parameters: F = {F, t, n, R,∆, c, θ, r, a}. The
vector (y, φ) is endogenously determined in a symmetric Nash-equilibrium. As mentioned
in section 2.2.1 the equilibrium conditions that determine (y, φ) in a symmetric equilibrium
can be derived from the first-order conditions of the representative firm’s optimization
problem. Under the assumption that a symmetric equilibrium with φ ∈ (r,K) with
K = min
{
1, r
1−a
}
exists we can evaluate (2.17) and (2.18’) at φ¯ = φ and end up with the
following two approximate equilibrium conditions:
y =
{
c+ t
R
R < nφ
c+ t
nφ
R ≥ nφ (2.21)
(y − c) ∆
nφ
= A′(φ) (2.22)
The solution (y, φ) to (2.21)-(2.22) is a good approximation to the true equilibrium when-
ever (1 − φ)n ∼= 0 (or equivalently nφ is large). For simplicity I refer to (2.21)-(2.22) as
equilibrium conditions.
21If we randomly draw a consumer on the circle then the expected distance to the closest firm is 1/2n
as consumers are located uniformly around the circle. If n increases this distance is reduced. This means
that, on average, a higher n implies a better match between consumers and firms: the average distance
between the ”ideal” variety of a consumer (which corresponds to the location of the consumer on the
circle) and the closest variety decreases with n.
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Define a function ψ(φ) by
ψ(φ) ≡
{
t∆
Rnφ
− A′(φ) R < nφ
t∆
(nφ)2
− A′(φ) R ≥ nφ (2.23)
Proposition 2.2. Suppose ψ(r) > 0 and ψ(K) < 0 where K = min
{
1, r
1−a
}
. Then there
exists a unique solution to (2.21)-(2.22) and φ ∈ (r,K) is determined by
A′(φ) =
{
t∆
Rnφ
R < nφ
t∆
(nφ)2
R ≥ nφ (2.24)
Proof: Appendix (2.5.11)
Suppose a solution φ ∈ (r,K) to (2.24) exists. Then we either have nφ ≤ R or nφ > R.
I call the first type of equilibrium an information equilibrium22 and the second type an
attention equilibrium.23 Which type occurs is endogenously determined and depends on
the set of exogenous parameters in F . Suppose an economy has a set of parameters such
that an attention equilibrium occurs endogenously. I call such an economy an attention
economy. I call an economy with parameters such that an information equilibrium occurs
information economy. The following lemma shows how the parameters in F influence
whether an economy is an information or an attention economy. Consider the following
expedient system of equations
A′
(
φN
)
= t∆
(nφN )2
ΩN = φNn
(2.25)
Note that the first equation of (2.25) corresponds to (2.24) if R ≥ nφ.
Lemma 2.2 (Regime type). Suppose parameters in F are such that a unique solution
φ ∈ (r,K) to (2.24) exists. If (2.25) has a solution (φN ,ΩN) with ΩN ≤ R then an
information equilibrium occurs and φ = φN . If ΩN > R then an attention equilibrium
occurs and φ > φN . A necessary condition for an attention equilibrium is that n > R.
For fixed R we have
ΩN = Ω
(
t
+
, θ
−
, r
+
, a
+
, n
+
, R
)
(2.26)
22The information equilibrium corresponds to the conventional equilibrium of this model.
23Falkinger calls the first type of equilibrium ”information-poor” and the second type ”information-
rich” (Falkinger (2008)).
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Proof: Appendix (2.5.12)
I will discuss the causes of an attention equilibrium in more detail in the next section
where n is determined endogenously.
From (2.21) we see that in the model equilibrium prices depend on i) the preference
parameter t, ii) the technology parameter c and iii) the attention limit R. If t > 0
we have y > c. This is the case because t > 0 means that the varieties are not perfect
substitutes which implies that the firms are engaged in an imperfect economic competition.
The less the varieties are substitutable (the higher t is) the less severe is the economic
competition and the higher are equilibrium markups. This is a standard result of imperfect
competition. What is non-standard is the dependence of the equilibrium price on R, a
psychological parameter.24 If parameters are such that an attention equilibrium occurs
(nφ > R), then equilibrium prices are determined independently of nφ. Any change of
parameters other than c, R or t has no effect on equilibrium prices as long as the change
of parameters does not change the attention economy into an information economy. The
reason is that if consumer attention is scarce on average, the average perceived market
size is R and not nφ. But from the perspective of the competing firms only the market
as perceived by consumers is important. This indicates a fundamental difference between
an attention economy and an information economy. I will return to this point in the next
section.
To see the consequences of limited attention on equilibrium reach φ I investigate the
comparative statics of R. In figure 2.2 I depict φ and y as functions of R holding all
other parameters fixed. In this figure I assume parameter values such that for R < R˜
an attention equilibrium occurs. From the figure we see that limited attention, ceteris
paribus, implies that firms choose higher prices but also to inform more consumers25. But
R does not enter equation (2.22) directly. Hence the fact that φ′(R) < 0 if nφ > R is
explained only by the indirect effect of R on φ over y: because y′(R) < 0 the equilibrium
markup is higher under limited attention which implies a higher marginal revenue on
advertising (as on average more funds can be extracted from every additionally informed
24This is a difference to the model of Falkinger where equilibrium prices depend only on the demand
elasticity and unit costs irrespective of the scarcity regime (Falkinger (2008)).
25From (2.24) we get φ′(R) = − A′/RA′/φ+A′′ < 0 for R < R˜.
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Figure 2.2: The impact of limited attention on φ and y
consumer) which increases equilibrium advertising effort. In his paper Telser conjectures
that advertising is high if the firm is large with respect to the market as only in this case
profits can be increased by advertising more than expenditures (Telser (1964), p.540).
My contribution suggests that this statement must be revised under limited attention: if
consumers only consider a part of all their information this makes the relevant market
for a firm much smaller and the incentive to advertise may still be very high even if n is
large.
2.3.2 Endogenous diversity under free entry
Suppose now that equilibrium diversity n is endogenously determined by the zero-profit
condition. The set of exogenous parameters of the model then is B = {F, t, R,∆, c, θ, r, a}.
The approximate zero-profit condition (evaluate (2.8) at y¯ = y and φ¯ = φ and set (1 −
φ)n = 0) is
Π = (y − c)∆
n
− F − A(φ) = 0 (2.27)
But using (2.27) with (2.22) gives
Π(φ) = φA′(φ)− F − A(φ) = 0 (2.27’)
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The three equations26 (2.21), (2.24) and (2.27’) determine (y, φ, n) as a function of the
exogenous parameters in B. I refer to these equations as the equilibrium conditions of
the free entry game. The equilibrium φ is determined only by (2.27’) and hence by the
parameters {F, r, θ, a,∆}. Note that neither R nor n appear in (2.27’). If nφ ≤ R,
average information per consumer is scarce, the conventional equilibrium of GS occurs.
As in the last section I refer to an equilibrium with nφ ≤ R as an information equilibrium.
If however nφ > R, so that average attention per consumer is scarce, then an attention
equilibrium occurs. If φ as determined by (2.27’) is plugged into (2.24) the equilibrium
degree of diversity n is determined. Let Ω ≡ nφ. Then by (2.24) and (2.27’) we have
Ω (t,∆, F, θ, r, a, R). Consider the following expedient system:
φNA′(φN) = F + A(φN)
t∆
(nNφN )2
= A′(φN)
ΩN = φNnN
(2.28)
Lemma 2.3 (Regime type under free entry). Suppose (2.24) and (2.27’) have a unique
solution (φ, n) with φ ∈ (r,K) where K = min{1, r
1−a
}
. If the system (2.28) has a
solution (φN , nN ,ΩN) with ΩN > R then we have φn > R, i.e. an attention equilibrium
occurs. If ΩN ≤ R then we have φn = φNnN ≤ R, i.e. an information equilibrium occurs.
Moreover, we have
ΩN = Ω
(
t
+
,∆
+
, F
−
, θ
−
, r
+
, a
+
, R
)
(2.29)
Proof: Appendix (2.5.13)
Lemma 2.3 means that an attention equilibrium occurs whenever a conventional equi-
librium would imply more average information nφ per consumer than the consumer can
perceive. From (2.29) we see the causes of an attention equilibrium (for fixed R). From a
technological perspective more efficient or cheaper advertising technology (as caused by
lower reach costs θ, a higher reach per channel r or better targeting ability a), a larger
potential audience ∆ and lower overall setup costs F increase the likelihood that an at-
tention equilibrium occurs. A modern economy appears to satisfy these requirements.
26Formally, we now have a two-stage game where at the first stage firms decide to enter and pay the
setup costs F and then play a game according to section 2.3.1 given that n firms have decided to enter.
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For example, the introduction of modern information technologies, as satellite television
or the internet (see figure 1.5 of the introduction), certainly implies that a larger (e.g.
international) potential audience can be addressed or that the reach r per media chan-
nel is increased. It is also argued that the Internet may substantially decrease both the
cost of information provision and infrastructure costs: Wal-mart built 276 stores before it
reached one billion dollars in sales whereas Amazon needed six warehouses to service over
three billions in North American sales in 2003 (Ellison and Ellison (2005), p. 149). Con-
cerning economic competition the model suggests that less intense economic competition
(higher market power of the firms), because varieties are less substitutable (a higher t),
is more likely to induce an attention equilibrium. Generally, the causes of an attention
equilibrium are very similar to the causes of an information-rich economy as characterised
by Falkinger (Falkinger (2008), p. 1606).
I now discuss the implications of limited attention on the equilibrium vector (y, φ, n).
Proposition 2.3. If Π(r) < 0 and Π(K) > 0 (see (2.27’)), where K = min
{
1, r
1−a
}
,
then there exists a unique solution (y, φ, n) to (2.21), (2.24) and (2.27’) with φ ∈ (r,K).
If an attention equilibrium occurs (ΩN > R) then y′(R) < 0 and n′(R) < 0.
Proof: Appendix (2.5.14)
To discuss the consequences of limited attention for the strategic equilibrium I compare
two almost identical economies.27 Let E1 = {F, t,∆, c, θ, r, a, R1} and E2 = {F, t,∆, c, θ, r, a, R2}.
The only difference is that R1 < R2 =∞. Hence E2 corresponds to the conventional infor-
mation economy of GS which by assumption excludes limited attention. From proposition
2.3 and lemma 2.3 we know that φ1 = φ2 = φ
N , provided a solution to (2.27’) exists. Sup-
pose that a solution exists and φN ∈ (r,K). By lemma 2.3 we then have n2 = nN . Assume
R1 < Ω
N < R2 so that an attention equilibrium occurs endogenously in economy one.
I will refer to economy one as the attention economy and call economy two information
economy. Define
κ ≡
{
t∆
nRφ
n R < nφ
t∆
(nφ)2
R ≥ nφ
Figure 2.3 illustrates how equilibrium diversity n1 and n2 are determined in the two
economies. As nN > R1/φ
N an attention equilibrium occurs and n1 corresponds to
27In fact, the following is a comparative-static exercise over R.
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium diversity in the attention and the information economy
the equilibrium level of diversity of the attention economy. Because n1 > n
N we see
that limited attention, ceteris paribus, leads to a higher degree of equilibrium diversity
compared to the solution of the information economy. The number of informed consumers
per firm is the same in both economies (φ1 = φ2) but the exposure of a consumer to
information is larger in economy one (n1φ1 > n2φ2). From (2.21) we then see that
y1 > y2. Why do we have more diversity, higher per consumer information exposure and
higher prices in the attention economy? In an attention equilibrium attention is scarce
which means that perceived and not effective diversity matters for consumer choice. The
average consumer i compares only the R alternatives in A˜i and not the nφ alternatives in
Ii to each other. For this reason the strategically behaving firms can set higher markups
which translate into higher revenues. But increased revenues promote entry which means
more active firms and hence a higher degree of equilibrium diversity.
An important difference between the attention economy and the information economy
is that in the information economy more information per consumer (higher φ2n2) implies
a more competitive environment for firms which leads to lower prices (see (2.21)) and is
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beneficial for consumers.28 In the attention economy the equilibrium price is independent
of the per consumer amount of information. The conventional conjecture of the theory
of informative advertising is, that a better average amount of information per consumer
should reduces the market power of firms. This is satisfied in the information economy as
there is a negative relationship between equilibrium price and per consumer information
exposure (see (2.21)). Suppose the goal of a regulating authority were to reduce mar-
ket power of firms. A policy implication for the information economy then could be, for
example, to foster the incentives of firms to advertise by partly subsidising advertising
costs A(φ). This induces more competition and decreases prices. To see this suppose the
government decides to introduce a subsidy29 on advertising: A(φ) = θ(1 − τ)r∆m(φ).
Without the subsidy we have τ = 0. The introduction of the subsidy reduces the adver-
tising expenditure θr∆m(φ) at the firm level for given φ. In the information economy the
introduction of the subsidy increases equilibrium advertising per firm and also average
information exposure.30 Figure 2.4 illustrates the consequences of this subsidy for the
attention and the information economy As the figure shows the subsidy has the effect of
increasing equilibrium information per consumer in both economies. In the information
economy (the dashed line) we have y2 = y(t,∆, F, θ, r, a, c) and, because higher average
exposure to information decreases prices, the equilibrium price decreases under the sub-
sidy. However, the price locus of the attention economy (the solid line) is flat because we
have y1 = y(t, c, R). Hence the policy measure inferred from the information economy, or
more generally from the conventional theory of informative advertising, would not achieve
its goal of reducing markups under limited attention.31 This example suggests that policy
measures in an attention economy may have different impacts on the equilibrium than in
an information economy. Moreover, the example should make clear that simple measures
28This is not a complete welfare statement as consumer utility depends also on how close the firm and
the consumer are located apart. I will take into account the consumer’s cost of transportation in chapter
4
29As this is partial equilibrium analysis I assume that the subsidy is financed e.g. by raising a tax on
the nummeraire market (which is not modeled here).
30The proposed subsidy formally has the same effect as an exogenous reduction of θ. We have
sign (φ′ (θ)) = sign (Aθ (φ, θ)− φAφθ(φ, θ)). But as φAφθ(φ, θ)−Aθ (φ, θ) = φAφ(φ,θ)−A(φ,θ)θ = Fθ > 0 we
get φ′(θ) < 0. From lemma 2.3 we have ∂∂θΩ
N < 0.
31As we will see in chapter 4 a policy measure derived from the conventional theory, without taking into
account the consequences of limited attention, may even produce adverse results in an information-rich
economy.
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Figure 2.4: The effect of the subsidy in an attention (solid line) and an information
economy
such as the number of active firms in a market or information exposure per consumer may
be misleading measures of competition if limited attention is not taken into account.
A comparison of my model’s predictions to those of Falkinger’s attention model (Falkinger
(2008)) shows the following. In both models the equilibrium number of firms32 depends
negatively on the reach of a single firm and positively on the size of the potential number
of consumers. In my model the reach φ is endogenously determined whereas in Falkinger’s
model the reach is an exogenous characteristic of the firm. Other than in Falkinger’s model
the attention threshold (R) in my model negatively affects the equilibrium n whereas in
his model there is a positive relationship between the attention threshold (τ0) and the
measure of active firms. This difference originates from the fact that in the strategic
equilibrium of my model the perceived market size directly affects the markup which in
turn affects profits.
32By imposing that a firm can produce at most one commodity ”global diversity” (S) and the measure
of active firms (T ) coincide (Falkinger (2008), p. 1601).
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2.3.3 Advertising technology and equilibrium diversity
From lemma 2.3 we know that advertising technology is an important determinant of
whether a conventional or an attention equilibrium occurs. The parameters r and a
determine the reach φ for a given campaign size m (see (2.5)). From (2.29) we know
that higher r and higher a rather imply that an attention equilibrium occurs. In this
section I discuss the comparative-static effects of changes in a and r in greater detail. Let
A(φ, α) = θr∆m(φ, r, a) where α = r or a. In the appendix (see 2.5.15) I show that
sign (φ′(α)) = sign (Aα(φ, α) (1− β)) (2.30)
and
sign (n′(α)) = sign (Aα(φ, α) (ξ(β − 1)− ε)) (2.31)
where β ≡ Aφαφ
Aα
, ε ≡ Aφφφ
Aφ
> 0 and
ξ =
{
1 R < ΩN
2 R > ΩN
We have Ar, Aa < 0 (see 2.5.13 in the appendix.). An exogenous increase of r or an
exogenous increase of targeting abilities (an increase of a) ceteris paribus reduce the cost
of maintaing a certain reach φ. However, the equilibrium effects of such changes on φ
and n are not obvious. Suppose for a moment that α represents some general parameter
of a cost function A(φ, α). Assume that Aα < 0. Then if α increases advertising costs
decrease and profits increase (ceteris paribus). Thus we might expect that a higher α
leads to entry and more active firms in equilibrium. Expression (2.31) shows that this
conclusion may be incorrect: if β >> 1 we have φ′(α) > 0 but n′(α) < 0 is possible.33
The reason for this are strategic effects: if the reduction of advertising costs induces the
strategically behaving firms to increase their advertising effort by a large amount this
may lead to higher equilibrium advertising expenditure per firm despite the exogenous
cost reduction. In such a case profits decline and fewer firms survive in the market. If
we compare the consequences of a change of advertising costs in an attention economy to
33From (2.30) - (2.31) we see that we can also have φ′(α) ≤ 0 and n′(α) > 0 but we can never have
φ′(α) ≤ 0 and n′(α) < 0.
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an information economy34 we see that n′(α) < 0 is less likely to occur in the attention
economy than in the information economy because in the attention economy we have
ξ = 1. Intuitively, this must be true because in the attention economy the markups are
independent of information per consumer which reflects that strategic effects are of less
importance as firms are less exposed to competition.
I now investigate how n depends on α in the cases where α = r or a. All calculations
are in the appendix. Let Aˆ(φ, r) denote the CRIR-technology, i.e. the case where a = 1−r
(see corollary 2.1). We have Aˆr(φ, r) < 0 and β − 1− ε < 0 as well as 2(β − 1)− ε < 0.
Hence we get n′(r) > 0 in the CRIR case. If however r and a are independent then we
have n′(r) < 0 as well as n′(a) < 0.35 This also implies that φ′(r) > 0 and φ′(a) > 0.
As was suggested in section 2.1.2 in a modern economy it is reasonable to assume better
targeting abilities of firms (higher a) and hence lower costs of maintaing a certain reach
φ as well as higher per channel reach r. Numerical evaluations show that the negative
effects of a and r on n are much weaker in case of limited attention as is suggested
by figure 2.5: The figure compares equilibrium diversity as a function of a (left) and r
Out[3]=
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16
n
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Figure 2.5: n(a) and n(r) under limited (solid) and unlimited attention
(right) of two economies with identical parameter values except for R. The reason why
in an attention economy equilibrium diversity decreases by less than in an information
economy if target abilities of firms are increased (or r is increased) is the presence of
an additional negative equilibrium effect in case of the information economy. In the
information economy markups and thus profits depend negatively on average information
34As in the last section the two economies are alike up to the value of R.
35The general possibility that imposing higher costs of advertising on firms might lead to higher profits
(or more active firms) was already recognised by GS. The advertising technology of this chapter presents
an actual example were this is the case.
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nφ whereas in the attention economy profits are independent of the average information
and depend only on the scarcity of attention. Hence in the attention economy profits
respond less to an increase of either r or a which explains why equilibrium diversity
decreases by less.
2.4 Conclusion
Based on the model of circular product differentiation from GS I have developed a model
of informative advertising and limited attention with strategically behaving firms. Lim-
ited attention means that consumers are only capable of considering at most R distinct
alternatives. If on average the consumers receive information of more than R alternatives
an attention equilibrium occurs. This is more likely to happen if advertising is cheap
or technologically more efficient (such that more consumers can be reached), firms have
better targeting abilities or the varieties are less substitutable. For strategically behaving
firms only the market as perceived by consumers is relevant for their pricing and advertis-
ing decision. In an information economy the average perceived market size is determined
by average exposure of consumers to information (nφ). In an attention economy the av-
erage average perceived market size is determined by the attention threshold R. In my
model this means that in the attention economy the pricing decision depends on R and
not on average per-consumer information nφ which implies that the pro-competitive po-
tential of informative advertising is severely reduced under limited attention and effective
market size n or exposure of consumers to information can be very misleading measures
of competition.
At the moment two important issues remain unsolved. First, this model allows for
welfare evaluation and GS show that the average transportation costs of the consumers de-
creases if they receive more information. I will address the consequences of limited atten-
tion on average transportation costs in chapter 4. Also the fact that attention-constrained
consumers decide randomly among the information they receive seems unsatisfactory as
for example an ad posted on the front page of a newspaper or a TV-commercial at the
prime time might lead to stronger representation of the information on the consumer’s
mind which might increase the chance of making a sale to that consumer. Hence we need
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a formal way of describing this competition for a consumer’s attention. It is the task of
the next chapter to provide an analytically well tractable and intuitive formulation of how
strategic attention competition interacts with strategic economic competition.
2.5. APPENDIX 47
2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Proof of proposition 2.1
Because of P (i| j) = 1−aj we also have P (¬i |j ) = aj, where ¬imeans that the consumer
does not attend to channel i. Hence |δ (j\i)| = ajδ. Because of 2.1 iii) we can write
|δ (k\(i ∨ j))| = P (¬i ∧ ¬j| k) δ = P (¬i| k)P (¬j| k) δ = a2jδ
or generally for any i ∈M and any Mj ∈M with i /∈Mj and |Mj| = k
|δ (i\Mj)| = akj δ
Using (2.2) we get for aj < 1:
Φ(Mj) = δ
mj−1∑
k=0
akj = δ
1− amjj
1− aj
and for aj = 1: Φ(Mj) = mjδ

2.5.2 The sign of Φa and φma
Set aj = a ∈ (0, 1) and assume m > 1. Then differention of (2.4) yields
∂
∂a
Φ =
δ (a+ am (a(m− 1)−m))
(1− a)2a
Then we have ∂
∂a
Φ > 0 if ψ(a) = 1 + am(m − 1) − am−1m > 0. But ψ(0) = 1, ψ(1) = 0
and ψ′(a) = (m − 1)mam−2(a − 1) < 0 together imply that ψ(a) > 0 for a ∈ (0, 1) and
m > 1.
We have
φma =
a−1+mr (a− 1 + (a(m− 1)−m)Ln(a))
(1− a)2
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Hence
φma > 0 ⇔ (m(a− 1)− a)Ln(a) > 1− a
⇔ −aLn(a) > (1− a) (1 + Ln(a)m)
The right side of the last inequality decreases in m because Ln(a) < 0 as a ∈ (0, 1). Hence
it suffices to prove the inequality for m = 1. Then
−aLn(a) > (1− a) (1 + Ln(a)) ⇔ −Ln(a) > 1− a ⇔ ae1−a < 1
which is satisfied because ae1−a increases in a for a ∈ (0, 1) and lim
a→1
ae1−a = 1.
2.5.3 Derivation of (2.7)
Suppose n > R and the representative firm succeeds in informing a member of group k.
Suppose further that this member also receives information of z ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1} other
firms. In order to calculate E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] I separate the cases where z < R (limited
information) and z ≥ R (limited attention).
Case 1: z < R
If z < R then the consumer perceives all z + 1 firms36 in his information set. Hence the
representative firm gets this consumers’ demand (qk = 1) only if the z other firms in the
information set are inferior37 compared to the representative firm. For given n and k there
are (n − k) inferior firms. For example, let n = 10 and consider the consumers in group
k = 3. Then there are two firms that, compared to the representative firm, provide a
superior offer to these consumers. There are 7 firms that provide an inferior offer. Hence
the representative firm makes a sale to this consumer if the consumer only receives ads of
the inferior firms. Obviously, if R > z > n− k then qk = 0 because there must be at least
one superior firm in the information set of the consumer which is perceived (as R > z).
Because channel selection is random and all competitors choose φ¯, the probability that
the consumer is informed of z particular other firms is φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z. Then
Pk(S(z) |z < R, j ∈ Ik ) = φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− k
z
)
(2.32)
36Remember that I have assumed that the representative firm has informed this consumer.
37”Inferior” and ”superior” are relative to firm j, the representative firm, and are always measured in
net utility (for given prices y and y¯).
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is the conditional probability that firm j realises a sale to a member of group k given
j ∈ Ik and the consumer also received information of z < R competitors.38 To see (2.32)
let n = 10, R = 5 and k = 3. Suppose for the sake of illustration that firms g and h
are the two firms that provide superior offers to a member of group k = 3 if compared
to the representative firm. If z = 0, so that the consumer only has information about
the representative firm, then the probability to make a sale to a member of group k = 3
is (1 − φ¯)9 · 1: conditional on informing the consumer, the firm always makes a sale to
this consumer if no other firm reaches him (i.e. z = 0). This occurs with probability
(1− φ¯)9 ·1. If z = 1 this means that one competitor also managed to inform the consumer
and the other n−2 competitors have not. The probability for this to occur is φ¯(1− φ¯)n−2.
In this case the representative firm makes a sale only if the other firm is not either g or h
but one of the
(
7
1
)
= 7 inferior firms. Generally, there are
(
n− k
z
)
possibilities to
draw a sample of z firms out of the n− k inferior firms.
Case 2: z ≥ R
Now assume z ≥ R. Then the firm gets qk = 1 if it is perceived and no superior firm is
perceived. The calculation of the sale probability for a given z ≥ R naturally becomes
more involved as it depends on the probability that a consumer receives information
about exactly z competitors as before but also on the probability of being the superior
firm among all R perceived firms. Different than in the case of limited information the
representative firm may be able to realise a sale even if the consumer received information
about superior firms. For this to happen we first require j ∈ A˜k ⊂ Ik, which means that
the firm needs to be among the R perceived alternatives. Second, if the consumer receives
information of superior firms then qk = 1 only if the consumer overlooks the informations
of all superior firms. In section 2.5.4 I show that if the subset A˜k of perceived alternatives
38Note that z > n− k implies
(
n− k
z
)
= 0 by definition of the binomial coefficient (also see section
2.5.4 of the appendix).
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is randomly selected from Ik then
Pk(S(z) |z ≥ R, j ∈ Ik ) =
k−1∑
s=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
k − 1
s
)(
n− k
z − s
)  z − s
R− 1

 1 + z
R

(2.33)
where the index s = 1, ..., k − 1 counts the number of superior firms for a given group k.
Pk(S(z) |z ≥ R, j ∈ Ik ) is the conditional probability that firm j realises a sale to a mem-
ber of group k given j ∈ Ik and the consumer received information of z ≥ R competitors.
We can now calculate the firm’s expected conditional demand from a member of group
k for any given φ¯ > 0 and n > R by taking the sum over the two cases:
E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] =
R−1∑
z=0
Pk(S(z) |z < R, j ∈ Ik ) +
n−1∑
z=R
Pk(S(z) |z ≥ R, j ∈ Ik )
or
E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] =
R−1∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− k
z
)
+
n−1∑
z=R
k−1∑
s=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
k − 1
s
)(
n− k
z − s
)  z − s
R− 1

 1 + z
R

(2.34)
So far I have only considered the case where n > R. If R ≥ n, i.e. the number of
active firms is smaller than the attention threshold R, then limited attention does not
affect E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] because even a consumer who receives information of all firms can
completely process this information. In this case the representative firm can only make a
sale to a member of group k if this consumer has not received any information of one of
the k − 1 superior firms. For any R′ > R ≥ n we have
E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] = E [qk, R′ |j ∈ Ik ] = E [qk,∞|j ∈ Ik ]
=
n−1∑
z=0
φ¯z (1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− k
z
)
= (1− φ¯)k−1 (2.35)
See the proof of lemma 2.1 in this appendix for the last step. It is convenient to have one
single expression for E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] that is valid for any R R n. If R ≥ n the sum in B2
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is not defined and I set B2 = 0 in this case. Further R ≥ n implies
B1 =
n−1∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− k
z
)
(2.36)
because
(
n− k
z
)
= 0 if z ≥ n by definition of the binomial coefficient. Thus with
B2 = 0 and (2.36) we see that (2.7) exactly corresponds to (2.35) if R ≥ n. This means
that we can work with (2.7) independent of R R n.
2.5.4 Derivation of (2.33)
Regarding the binomial coeffcient I adopt the usual convention that
(
a
b
)
= 0 if b > a
and
(
a
b
)
= 0 if either a < 0 or b < 0.
Suppose a consumer in group k receives information from the representative firm and
also information from z ≥ R other firms. Let s denote the number of superior firms
(always in net utility) of which the consumer also receives information. Thus for given z,
k and s there are
(
k − 1
s
)
possibilities to draw s superior firms out of the total k − 1
superior firms. The other z − s firms the consumer is informed of then are inferior firms.
There are
(
n− k
z − s
)
possibilities to draw exactly z − s inferior firms from the total of
n− k inferior firms. Hence for given s, z and k I get a number of
(
k − 1
s
)(
n− k
z − s
)
possible combinations. Note that by the above convention this number always is zero if
s > z or n− k < z − s.
As an example suppose n = 10, k = 4,s = 2 and z = 4. Then there totally are
k − 1 = 3 superior firms out of which s = 2 have reached the consumer. There are
3 possible ways to combine two out of three superior firms. Further the consumer was
reached by z− s = 2 out of n− k = 6 possible inferior firms. There are 15 possibilities to
draw two inferior firms out of six. Thus we get 3 ∗ 15 = 45 possible combinations.
Suppose that the selection of the A˜k ⊂ Ik perceived items is completely random. Then
the representative firm is perceived, i.e. j ∈ A˜k, with probability R/(1 + z). In order to
make a sale the other R − 1 perceived firms must be inferior. As by presupposition the
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consumer received information of z − s inferior firms the chance of making a sale then is
R
1 + z
(
z − s
R− 1
)
(
z
R− 1
) =
(
z − s
R− 1
)
(
1 + z
R
)
by Laplace’s probability rule. Thus for fixed k, z ≥ R we get
Pk(S(z) |z ≥ R) =
k−1∑
s=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
k − 1
s
)(
n− k
z − s
)  z − s
R− 1

 1 + z
R

2.5.5 Proof of lemma 2.1
Suppose that y¯ = y. Then from (2.6) we have
E[Q,R] =
∆φ
n
n∑
k=1
E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ]
For given φ, φ¯ and n the expected number of consumers that consume somewhere must
be the same for any R under the assumption that every informed person consumes some-
where. Now suppose E[Q,R] 6= E[Q,R′]. This means that the expected number of
consumers served by the representative firm changes as R changes. But because the ex-
pected overall number of consumers that consume somewhere is independent of R there
exist attention constrained consumer whose expected choice of variety must vary with R.
This contradicts the assumption that A˜k is a random draw from Ik. Hence
E[Q,R] = E[Q] =
∆φ
n
n∑
k=1
E [qk,∞|j ∈ Ik ]
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for any given R > 1. Using the law of the binomial distribution gives
E [qk,∞|j ∈ Ik ] =
n−1∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− k
z
)
= (1− φ¯)k−1
n−k∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−k−z
(
n− k
z
)
= (1− φ¯)k−1
which further implies
n∑
k=1
E [qk,∞|j ∈ Ik ] =
n∑
k=1
(1− φ¯)k−1 = 1− (1− φ¯)
n
φ¯
Thus we have E [Q] = φ∆
nφ¯
(
1− (1− φ¯)n). The other claims follow as E[Q,R] is linear in
φ.

2.5.6 Derivation of (2.10) and (2.11)
From (2.7) we have that if k = n we must have B2 = 0 and B1 = (1 − φ¯)n−1. Hence
E[qn, R |j ∈ In ] = (1− φ¯)n−1 for any R > 1. Thus the representative firm can only make
a sale to a member of group n if this member receives no other information at all.
I now show that
−E[q1, R |j ∈ I1 ] + E[qn, R |j ∈ In ] = (1− φ¯)n−1 − 1 + λ (2.37)
From (2.7) we have
E[q1, R |j ∈ I1 ] =
R−1∑
z=0
(
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−z−1
(
n− 1
z
))
+
n−1∑
z=R
(
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−z−1
(
n− 1
z
)
R
1 + z
)
(2.38)
because (
z
R− 1
)(
1 + z
R
)−1
=
R
1 + z
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Use
1 =
R−1∑
z=0
(
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−z−1
(
n− 1
z
))
+
n−1∑
z=R
(
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−z−1
(
n− 1
z
))
in (2.38) to find
E[q1, R |j ∈ I1 ] = 1−
n−1∑
z=R
(
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−z−1
(
n− 1
z
))(
1− R
1 + z
)
With
λ ≡

n−1∑
z=R
(
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−z−1
(
n− 1
z
)(
1− R
1+z
))
> 0 if R < n
0 else
we get
−E[q1, R |j ∈ I1 ] + E[qn, R |j ∈ In ] = (1− φ¯)n−1 − 1 + λ
Using (2.37) in (2.9) and rearranging gives (2.10).
I now show that inequality (2.12) is true. If R ≥ n the claim is obvious so let n > R.
Note that λ is ceteris paribus maximal if R
1+z
= 0. Hence
1− (1− φ¯)n−1 − λ ≥ 1− (1− φ¯)n−1 −
n−1∑
z=R
(
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−z−1
(
n− 1
z
))
=
R−1∑
z=0
(
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−z−1
(
n− 1
z
))
− (1− φ¯)n−1
=
R−1∑
z=1
(
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−z−1
(
n− 1
z
))
+ (1− φ¯)n−1 − (1− φ¯)n−1 > 0
As a consequence λ < 1− (1− φ¯)n−1 and also
E[qn, R |j ∈ In ]− E[q1, R |j ∈ I1 ] < 0 (2.39)
2.5.7 Second-order conditions for problem (2.8)
From (2.8) it is easy to see that Πφφ = A
′′(φ) < 0 for φ ∈ (0, 1) as well as
Πyy =
φ∆
t
(E[qn, R |j ∈ In ]− E[q1, R |j ∈ I1 ]) < 0 because of (2.39). But Πyφ = 1φΠy = 0
because Πy = 0 by the first-order condition of y.
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2.5.8 Proof of equation (2.14)
For φ¯ = 1 (2.11) becomes
λ =
{
n−R
n
R < n
0 else
(2.40)
Now use (2.40) in (2.10).
2.5.9 Proof of equation (2.15)
Assume n > R and φ¯ > 0. Then
λ =
n−1∑
z=R
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− 1
z
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
−R
n−1∑
z=R
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− 1
z
)
1
1 + z︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(2.41)
But because of the binomial formula
n−1∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− 1
z
)
= 1
Hence (1− φ¯)n ∼= 0 implies
A = 1−
R−1∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− 1
z
)
= 1− (1− φ¯)n
R−1∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)−1−z
(
n− 1
z
)
∼= 1
Note that
n−1∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− 1
z
)
1
1+z
= 1
n
n−1∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n
1 + z
)
= 1
nφ¯
n∑
ζ=1
φ¯ζ(1− φ¯)n−ζ
(
n
ζ
)
= 1
nφ¯
(
1− (1− φ¯)n)
56 2. Informative advertising and Limited Attention
where the last equality follows from
n∑
ζ=0
φ¯ζ(1− φ¯)n−ζ
(
n
ζ
)
= 1. Then
B =
n−1∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− 1
z
)
1
1+z
−
R−1∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− 1
z
)
1
1+z
= 1
nφ¯
(
1− (1− φ¯)n)− (1− φ¯)n R−1∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)−1−z
(
n− 1
z
)
1
1+z
∼= 1nφ¯
Hence
λ ∼= 1− R
nφ¯
(2.42)
2.5.10 The Dorfman-Steiner Theorem
The price elasticity of demand evaluated at y¯ = y is given by
εy = −
φ∆
t
(E[q1,R|j∈I1 ]−E[qn,R|j∈In ])y¯
φ∆
nφ¯
= − y¯nφ¯
t
(E [q1, R |j ∈ I1 ]− E [qn, R |j ∈ In ])
= − y¯nφ¯
t
(E [q1, R |j ∈ I1 ]− E [qn, R |j ∈ In ])
Hence approximately (use (2.37) and (2.42) of the appendix and set (1− φ¯)n−1 = 0)
εy ∼=
{
y¯R
t
R < nφ¯
y¯nφ¯
t
R ≥ nφ¯ (2.43)
Using (2.43) in (2.19) gives (2.20).
2.5.11 Proof of proposition 2.2
Use (2.21) in (2.22) which gives (2.24). By presupposition ψ(r) > 0 and ψ(K) < 0. Note
that ψ(φ) is continuous on φ ∈ (r,K) and ψ′(φ) < 0 for all φ ∈ (r,K) except at φ = R/n.
Thus we may conclude that there exists a unique φ ∈ (r,K) such that ψ(φ) = 0 holds.

2.5.12 Proof of lemma 2.2
If equation (2.25) implies that φN ≤ R/n then because of (2.24) we must have φ = φN .
If we get φN > R/n then φN cannot be a solution to (2.24). Because ψ′(φ˜) < 0 for any
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φ˜ > φN (see the proof in 2.5.11) the solution to (2.24) must satisfy φ > φN .
If n ≤ R we can never have ΩN > R as φN < 1.
To see (2.26) suppose x is any parameter in F other than n or R. Then we have
sign
(
∂
∂x
ΩN(x)
)
= sign
(
∂
∂x
φN(x)
)
Hence by the Implicit Function Theorem we immediately get ∂
∂t
φN(t) > 0, ∂
∂∆
φN(∆) = 0,
∂
∂θ
φN(θ) < 0. For x = a we have sign
(
∂
∂a
φN(a)
)
= sign (mφa(φ, r, a)) and section 2.5.2
implies that ∂
∂a
φN(a) > 0. For x = r we have sign
(
∂
∂r
φN(r)
)
= sign (mφ(φ, r, a) + rmφr(φ, r, a)).
But
mφ(φ, r, a) + rmφr(φ, r, a) = − (1− a)
2φ
(r − (1− a)φ)2 Ln(a) > 0
which implies ∂
∂r
φN(r) > 0. Finally, I use the Implicit Function Theorem on (2.25) to find
∂
∂n
ΩN(n) =
φ2A′′(φ)
2A′(φ) + φA′′(φ)
> 0

2.5.13 Proof of lemma 2.3
If the solution to (2.28) gives ΩN ≤ R then (φN , nN) = (φ, n) as (φN , nN) solves (2.24),
(2.27’) and the solution of (2.24), (2.27’) is unique by presupposition. Thus a conventional
equilibrium occurs. If the solution to (2.28) gives ΩN > R then (φN , nN) cannot be a
solution to (2.24), (2.27’). But (2.27’) implies φ = φN . Then by (2.24) we must have
n > nN which implies φn > φNnN > R; an attention equilibrium occurs. To obtain (2.29)
we must derive the comparative statics of (2.28). Let reach costs be A(φ, α) where α =θ,
r or a denotes a parameter of the cost function. The coefficient matrix of system (2.28)
with respect to φ, n and Ω (the superscript N is dropped to ease notation) is given by
H =
 φAφφ 0 0− 2t∆n2φ3 − Aφφ − 2t∆n3φ2 0
−n −φ 1

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and Det(H) = −2t∆Aφφ
n3φ
< 0. Then by Cramer’s rule
Ω′(t) =
(−∆Aφφ)
n2Det(H)
> 0
Ω′(F ) = (φAφφ)
1
Det(H)
< 0
Further it is straightforward to show that sign (Ω∆) = sign (φAφ(φ)− A(φ)). But (2.27’)
implies φAφ(φ)− A(φ) = F > 0 Hence Ω′(∆) > 0. In now turn to the cases where α =θ,
r or a.
Ω′(α) = (φAαAφφ)
1
Det(H)
which implies sign (Ωα) = sign (−Aα(φ, α)). Hence Ω′(θ) < 0 because Aθ = r∆m(φ) > 0.
Note that (2.5) implies
m (φ, r, a) =
Ln
(
1− 1−a
r
φ
)
Ln(a)
We have sign (Ar) = sign
(
m(φ, r, a) + φ(1−a)
(r−(1−a)φ)Ln(a)
)
which is equivalent to
sign (Ar) = sign
(
m(φ, r, a) +
φ(1− a)
(r − (1− a)φ)Ln(a)
)
or
sign (Ar) = sign
(
r
r − b − e
b
r−b
)
b ≡ φ(1− a) ∈ (0, r)
But then we have Ar < 0 because e
b
r−b > r
r−b . This follows as b = 0 implies e
0
r = 1 = r
r
and
∂
∂b
(
e
b
r−b
)
= e
b
r−b
r
(r − b)2 >
r
(r − b)2 =
∂
∂b
(
r
r − b
)
Thus Ω′(r) > 0.
We have
sign(Aa) = sign
 φLn(a)
r − (1− a)φ −
Ln
(
1− (1−a)φ
r
)
a

This implies Aa < 0 as
φLn(a)
r − (1− a)φ <
Ln
(
1− (1−a)φ
r
)
a
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To see this rewrite the last inequality as
e
φa
r−(1−a)φ >
1− a
r
(r − φ)
This inequality is satisfied as φ > r by presupposition of lemma 2.3. Hence Ω′(a) > 0.

2.5.14 Proof of proposition 2.3
From (2.27’) we have Π′(φ) = φA′′(φ) > 0 Together with Π(r) < 0 and Π(K) > 0 this
implies that a unique solution φ ∈ (r,K) to (2.27’) exists. Moreover, φ is independent of
the regime type (see lemma 2.3). Hence φ′(R) = 0 for all R > 1. With φ determined by
(2.27’) we see that n and y are uniquely determined by (2.24) (also see figure 2.3) and
(2.21). Now suppose that parameters in B are such that an attention equilibrium occurs
endogenously. Then y′(R) < 0 and n′(R) < 0 follow directly from (2.21) and (2.24).

2.5.15 Comparative statics effects of r and a
Suppose a solution to (2.24) and (2.27’) exists and ΩN 6= R. The coefficient matrix H˜ of
(2.24) and (2.27’) with respect to (φ, n) is
H˜ =
(
φAφφ 0
−
(
ξAφ
φ
− Aφφ
)
− ξAφ
n
)
where
ξ =
{
1 R < ΩN
2 R > ΩN
Further let β ≡ Aφαφ
Aα
and ε ≡ Aφφφ
Aφ
. Applying Cramer’s rule gives, after some simple
manipulations,
sign (φ′(α)) = sign (Aα(φ, α) (1− β))
sign (n′(α)) = sign (Aα(φ, α) (ξ(β − 1)− ε))
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In the CRIR case (α = r) we have
Aˆr(φ, r) =
∆θ (r + (1− r)Ln(1− r))Ln(1− φ)
(1− r) (Ln(1− r))2
To see that Aˆr(φ, r) < 0 it is sufficient to show that g(r) = (r + (1− r)Ln(1− r)) > 0
for r ∈ (0, 1). But g(0) = 0, lim
r→1−
g(r) = 1 and g′(r) = −Ln(1 − r) > 0 together imply
that g(r) ∈ (0, 1) for r ∈ (0, 1). Further, the CRIR technology implies
(β − 1)− ε = −
1 + φ
Ln(1−φ)
1− φ
We get (β−1)−ε < 0 as g(φ) = 1 + φ
Ln(1−φ) > 0. This holds as g(0) = 1, limφ→1
g(φ) = −∞
and g′(φ) = 1− 1
1−φ < 0. Repeating this argument it is straightforward to show that also
2(β − 1)− ε < 0.
Now consider the case where r and a are independent parameters. If α = r we get
(β − 1)− ε = −
(1− a)φ+ rLn
(
1− (1−a)φ
r
)
φ(1− a) + (r − (1− a)φ)Ln
(
1− (1−a)φ
r
) = − 1− am + Ln(am)
1 + am(Ln(am)− 1)
where the second equality uses φ = r 1−a
m
1−a . Let x = a
m ∈ (0, 1). Then
− 1− a
m + Ln(am)
1 + am(Ln(am)− 1) = −
g1(x)
g2(x)
= − 1− x+ Ln(x)
1 + x(Ln(x)− 1) (2.44)
But forming limites shows that g1(0) = −∞, g1(1) = 0 and g′1(x) > 0 which implies
g1(x) < 0 for x ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, g2(0) = 1, g2(1) = 0 and g′2(x) < 0 implies g2(x) > 0
for x ∈ (0, 1). Consequently, we have (β − 1)− ε > 0 if α = r. Repeating this procedure
in the case where α = a gives
β − 1− ε = − (1− a)(a
m − 1− Ln(am))
a(1− am)Ln(a)− (1− a)amLn(am)
But
(1− a)(am − 1− Ln(am)) > 0 ⇔ ex > x x ≡ am ∈ (0, 1)
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which is true and
a(1− am)Ln(a)− (1− a)amLn(am) < 0 ⇔ a(1− am)− (1− a)amm > 0
To see that a(1− am)− (1− a)amm > 0 take the derivative with respect to m of
a(1− am)− (1− a)amm (2.45)
which gives Ln(a) (−a−m+ am) − 1 + a. But Ln(a) (−a−m+ am) > 1 − a holds
for m > 1. To see this let m = 1. Then the inequality reduces to a − Ln(a) > 1
which is true. For m > 1 the factor is smaller than −1. Hence we only need to verify
that a(1 − am) − (1 − a)amm ≥ 0 for m = 1. But evaluating (2.45) for m = 1 gives
a(1− a)− (1− a)a = 0 which proves the claim. Hence (β − 1)− ε > 0 if α = a.
As ε > 0 we have that (β − 1)− ε > 0 also implies 2(β − 1)− ε > 0.

3Attention Competition
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I integrate the second key observation from the introduction - the pos-
sibility of information senders to influence the chance of perception - into an abstract
oligopolistic model of price competition. The chance that an information sender is per-
ceived depends positively on his own effort to attract consumer attention but negatively
on the efforts and the number of all other senders. In my model economic competition
and attention competition are interdependent: On the one hand the effort to attract
consumer attention depends on the value of attention to the firm which depends on the
grade of economic competition among all perceived firms. On the other hand attracting
attention involves costs which must be covered by the earnings from competition. It is the
task of this paper to clarify the interaction between attention competition and economic
competition in order to give a prediction on how attention competition influences equi-
librium market outcome. Under limited attention the market as perceived by consumers
rather than the effective market is relevant for the firms. If consumers are less attentive
this means that the perceived market gets smaller which, as in chapter 2, translates into
higher equilibrium prices. At the same this intensifies the competition for attention which
leads to higher attention costs. I show that if attention competition is relatively inelas-
tic (equilibrium attention efforts do not react significantly to a change of the economic
environment) then the gains from consumer inattention outweigh the costs of attracting
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attention which leads to higher profits and thus to larger markets.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.1.1 I provide an informal description
of the model and translate these findings into a formal model in section 3.2. I will restrict
myself to the case of symmetric firms. This gives a static symmetric game where all active
firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their price and their attention effort.
In section 3.3 I show that a symmetric equilibrium of the price-attention game exists and
discuss the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria. I extend the model to a two-stage
game where firms must decide whether to enter at the first stage and then play a price-
attention game at the second stage. I turn to the comparative statics of the model in
section 3.4. In Appendix A I provide further conditions that assert contraction stability
and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium by ruling out the possibility of asymmetric
equilibria.
3.1.1 An informal description of the attention problem
In this section I illustrate the attention problem in a schematic and intuitive way. The
main part of this chapter formalises these schematics and derives a game-theoretic model
where firms (information senders) compete for consumer attention and consumer budget.
3.1.1.1 A simple consumer choice problem
Suppose for the sake of illustration that there are n = 4 firms. Each firm produces one
commodity and sets a price yj. Consumer i decides how much to purchase from each
commodity. ϕi is the choice function of consumer i. How much of which commodity the
consumer purchases (xij) depends on his preferences and budget v and on the prices of
the commodities. This standard decision problem is illustrated in figure 3.1.
3.1.1.2 Informative advertising and limited information
As we have seen in the last chapter the theory of informative advertising holds that
consumers are ex ante uninformed about existing commodities. They learn about the
commodities only by the information (ads) they receive from the firms and choose only
among the commodities they are aware of. Such a situation is depicted in figure 3.2.
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1 2
3 4
 x11 , x12 , x13 , x14i  y1 , y2 , y3 , y4 , v
Figure 3.1: A classical consumer decision problem
In the figure we see that only firms two and four managed to inform consumer i. That
1 2
3
42
4
1
2
4
3
0 , x12 ,0 , x14
I i

i  y
2 ,y
4 ,v
Figure 3.2: Limited information
is, the consumer received ads only from these firms but not of firm one and three and
he decides only among those firms he is informed of. If the firms can choose how many
consumers to inform (for example if they can decide in how many different newspaper to
put an ad) then the information set Ii is endogenously determined and depends on the
advertising efforts of the firms. In the figure this is suggested by the firm-specific variable
φj. The literature on informative advertising says that a consumer who considers a set of
alternatives that is smaller than the set of all existing alternatives has limited information
(see e.g. Goeree (2008)).
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3.1.1.3 Scarce attention
In the last chapter I presented a model of limited consumer attention. Limited attention
means that consumers are only capable of perceiving a certain amount R of alternatives.
Suppose for the sake of illustration that R = 2. If a consumer receives information of not
more than two firms then he considers all alternatives he is informed about in making his
decision. Such a situation is captured by figure 3.2. Now suppose consumer i received
information from firms one, two and four but not from firm three, as depicted in figure
3.3. Limited attention means the consumer bases his decision on a subset of Ii that
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Figure 3.3: Limited attention
contains R = 2 different alternatives. As figure 3.3 suggests there are three possibilities
to pick two alternatives out of the set of three alternatives and Piα for α = 1, 2, 3 with
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Pi1 + Pi2 + Pi3 = 1 denotes the probability with which consumer i observes a certain
attention set A˜iα. In this chapter I will argue, based on the evidence of the introduction
(see 1.2), that the firms which are a part of Ii have means to influence the probability
distribution (Pi1, Pi2, Pi3). That is, firms can influence their chance of perception. I think
that this properly reflects the way how people who use the internet, especially search
engines, make their decision: they are presented with a large list of alternatives and
consider (click on) only a few alternatives - especially those alternatives that have top
positions or are highlighted by some other means (e.g. in the Google sideframe).
Note that by the notion of the literature on informative advertising the consumer in
figure 3.3 also has limited information - but for a very different reason: the cause is not
that he received only little information but rather that he received more information than
he considers. My contribution essentially shows that if limited information is caused by
limited attention rather than scarce information this generates a very different strategic
environment and implies very different results compared to standard models of informative
advertising.
As figure 3.3 suggests in order to earn money from a consumer a firm must achieve
three goals: i) the firm must inform the consumer (e.g. receive an index by a Google search
bot), ii) it must be perceived by a consumer (e.g. because it has a high index and a top
on-screen placement) and iii) it must provide a satisfying offer in a conventional economic
sense compared to all other firms that the consumer perceives1. One contribution of this
chapter is to provide a specification of how the firms in Ii can influence their chance of
perception. This means that the probability distribution (Pi1, Pi2, Pi3) in figure 3.3 will
be endogenously determined and depends on the strategic attention efforts of the firms
in Ii. What I want the model to capture is that if in figure 3.3 firm one’s messages are
relatively conspicuous compared to the messages of firms two and four then we should
have Pi1 + Pi2 ≈ 1.
To make the difference between figure 3.2 and figure 3.3 as clear as possible suppose
firms can advertise only by posting ads in different newspapers. Consumers do not read
all newspapers. If a firm places its ads in more newspapers this increases the number of
1Suppose that consumer i perceives the set A˜i1 in figure 3.3. Then firm one competes with firm two
for the consumer budget v.
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people that could see the ad. Put differently, this increases the number of information sets
that contain the firm. Suppose now a consumer reads a newspaper that contains many
ads of different firms. Then it is reasonable to assume that a large or colorful ad or an ad
placed on the front page has a larger chance of getting the readers attention than a small
ad somewhere on the last pages. That is, contrary to the theory of informative advertising,
a firm that advertises in many newspapers but has very non-salient ads may go unnoticed
by most consumers. In essence, it is this struggle for attention which is the main concern
of this chapter. This is also the major difference to informative advertising as discussed
in chapter 2. In that chapter more advertising meant to inform more consumers (to reach
more information sets). More advertising of the competitors made consumers aware of
more alternatives which diminished demand of the representative firm. Limited consumer
attention implied this reduction to be a lot weaker than suggested by the conventional
model. In the model of this chapter higher effort to attract attention will mean that the
firm increases its chance of perception for a given number of consumers. This means that
the information competition between the firms in this chapter is a lot more aggressive
in its nature than in the last chapter because if a firm chooses a higher attention effort
it increases its own chance of perception while at the same time inhibiting perception of
some other firms.
3.2 A formal model of attention and price competi-
tion
3.2.1 The Internet economy
As was shown in the introduction of this thesis the usage of the internet has rapidly ex-
panded since its introduction (see figure 1.5). For many people the internet nowadays is
the main source of information and, as e.g. the stories of Google’s or facebook’s success
document, the internet also offers great business opportunities. But the internet, espe-
cially a search page such as Google, also provides the most convincing example of the
prevalence of limited attention. A typical Google search query usually results in an enor-
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mous number of hits2. As suggested by the observations documented in the introduction
of my thesis, the typical user of a search engine focuses on the first few entries (or on the
first few pages) instead of threading through the entire list. Moreover, this information
is accessible for any consumer in the world provided he has access to the internet. This
clearly illustrates that the contemporaneous (and future) information problem of an ad-
vertising firm is less one of reaching more consumers (more information sets) but one of
making its messages salient. In the Google example this e.g. means to be listed on the
first page of a search query.3 In this chapter I extrapolate this observation by assuming
that every active firm that pays a fixed cost F > 0 reaches the entire population ∆. Hence
all consumers have the same information set: Ii = I.
4 In the Google example this means
that if a firm designs a web page and puts it online (achieving this requires some fixed
amount of money) it is found and indexed by a Google bot. However, whether the firm
has a high or a low index (a top rank position or not) depends on further investments5 of
the firm. Setting Ii = I appears also to be adequate for mature product classes. For such
products, e.g. Coke and Pepsi, the role of advertising is not information provision about
the features but ”keeping a product top-of-mind” (Iyer et al. (2005), p. 464) for which
”these companies spend a significant amount of their budget on reminder-advertising”. I
simply call an economy where a firm is either in all or in no information set an ”internet
economy”. If a firm pays the setup cost F then I call the firm active. Suppose there are
n active firms indexed by 1, ..., n in the internet economy. Then n = |I|.
3.2.2 Attention and price competition in the internet economy
In this section I formalise the schematics of figure 3.3. First, I develop a model that
determines how the attention efforts of the active firms influence their probability of
being perceived by a consumer. Then I combine this model with a model of imperfect price
2For example, the keyword ”Hawaii” gives approximately 123’000’000 hits and the query ”Hawaii
vacations” gives approximately 8’160’000 hits (January 09, 2011).
3As a Web commentator puts it: ”Simply, you want to be found at the common meeting point...page
1 of a Google search” (see www.optimum7.com).
4In the model of Falkinger this corresponds to the case where r = R, i.e. a sender reaches the entire
population (Falkinger (2008)). In my model of chapter 2 if r = 1 we get φj = 1 for any firm j that
acquires one channel.
5For example, the firm can try to get more cross-links to its webpage or can bid for a placement in
the Google sideframe. In both cases there is some kind of variable cost involved.
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competition. I will provide a simple example that accompanies and illustrates the abstract
theory developed in this section. In the end of section 3.2 we will have a completely
specified model of n active firms that simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their
attention effort and their price. I will restrict myself to the case of symmetric firms. Thus
formally we will have to deal with a static two-dimensional symmetric n-player game.
3.2.2.1 Attention probabilities
Suppose there are n active firms in the internet economy and hence n = |I|. The power set
of I is denoted by P ≡ P(I) and I call an element A ∈ P an attention set. As in chapter
2 limited attention means that only attention sets not larger than some 1 < R < ∞
are considered by a consumer6. I denote the attention set of consumer i (the set of
alternatives that the consumer effectively perceives) by A˜i ⊂ I. Limited attention means
that
∣∣∣A˜i∣∣∣ ≤ R. The attention constraints of the consumers are strictly binding if and only
if n > R. If n ≤ R then we have A˜i = I for all consumers in the internet economy. If
however n > R then we have A˜i ( I and A˜i 6= A˜h is possible for any two consumers. In
case of a binding attention constraint literally spoken only some commodities can make
it into the attention set A˜i of a consumer and the next question is which alternatives
succeed in doing so. To answer this question we need to specify a rule that for a given
I tells whether j ∈ I implies j ∈ A˜i or not. The general way to map a larger set into a
smaller one is to specify a probability distribution on the set of all possible attention sets.
Define the indicator variable z by
z = min {R, n} (3.1)
Let A(I, z) ⊂ P be the set of all subsets of I with size z.7 For every consumer i I now
define a function Pi on A that assigns to every possible attention set A of A with size z
a probability8 of realising this particular set:
Pi : A → s|A| , A 7→ PiA (3.2)
6As in chapter 3.3 I let Ri = R for all consumers.
7Because by definition of the internet economy we have Ii = I for all consumers the set A of possible
attention sets is the same for all consumers. This would not be the case if we allowed for Ii 6= Ih.
8Of course, the probability of a certain set could also be one ore zero.
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where s|A| is the (|A| − 1)-dimensional simplex9 and A ∈ A is an attention set of size
z. Thus PiA is the probability that A˜i = A, i.e. PiA is the probability that consumer i
perceives the attention set A. Note that we have z = n if R ≥ n. But then we must have
A = I and |A| = 1. The only possible function satisfying (3.2) in this case is the unit
function which gives A˜i = I for all consumers. Hence the entire apparatus I am about to
construct only comes into play when we have n > R, i.e. when the attention constraints
of the consumers bind.
Before continuing it should be noted that by definition of (3.2) I only allow the atten-
tion sets to be proper sets (instead of multisets). This can be justified by the assumption
that attention-constrained decison-makers cannot be fooled in the sense that they always
recognize and consider R truly distinct alternatives.10
The probability pij that firm j is perceived by consumer i given that j ∈ I is calculated
by
pij =
∑
A∈A
PiA 1 [j ∈ A] (3.3)
where 1 [j ∈ A] is a variable indicating whether alternative j is in attention set A or not.
The following proposition establishes an aggregate relationship on Pi and pij.
Proposition 3.1. If Pi is a probability function as defined by (3.2) then
∑
j∈I
pij = z.
Proof: Appendix B (3.7.2)
Conversely, it generally only is possible to construct Pi from the set of pij where j ∈ I in
certain trivial cases.11 The vector pAi ≡ (pij)j=1,...,n for j = 1, ..., n can be interpreted as
the distribution of attention of consumer i. Likewise, if there are ∆ consumers then the
n-vector
pA ≡
∆∑
i=1
pAi
∆
is the average distribution of attention in the market. Then the j-th entry of pA corre-
sponds to the average fraction of consumers in the economy that consider an attention
9s|A| ≡
{
P ∈ R|A|+ :
∑
A∈A
PiA = 1
}
.
10This means that even if a firm j by some reason has a high chance of perception, i.e.
∑
A∈A:j∈A
PiA ≈ 1,
then for R > 1 this does not mean that it is the only firm that is perceived.
11A nice property of the symmetric game is that Pi can be deduced from pij .
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set containing j.
3.2.2.2 Limited attention and economic competition: the problem of the firm
From an economic perspective the function Pi becomes interesting if actions chosen by the
market agents such as advertising efforts by firms (or search efforts by consumers) affect
the probability distribution. Throughout this chapter I will maintain the assumption that
Pi is determined only by the attention efforts of the firms in I. Suppose every active firm
j can choose its attention effort fj ≥ 0. I denote by f−j the vector of attention efforts
chosen by all active firms other than j. Let F ≡ (f1, ..., fn) ∈ Rn+ denote the vector of
attention efforts. I assume that the attention probabilities PA depend on F . Further, for
any active firm j define the set Bj ≡ {A ∈ A : j ∈ A}.
Assumption 3.1 (Relative salience). For all consumers Pi = P where the function P
is defined by (3.2). If
∑
A∈Bj
PA < 1 then PA (F) is an increasing function of fj for all
A ∈ Bj.
The first part of assumption 3.1 means that all consumers have the same function P
which determines the probability that a particular attention set A ∈ A is perceived. This
assumption is mainly for simplicity. The second part of assumption 3.1 means that under
limited attention (n > R) a firm can positively influence the chance that a consumers
perceives an attention set A with j ∈ A.
Lemma 3.1. Under assumption 3.1 we have for any active firm j and any consumer i
that pij = pj. If R ≥ n then pj = 1 for any active firm j. If n > R then pj = pj(fj, f−j)
where pj(fj, f−j) is an increasing function of fj if pj < 1.
Proof: Appendix B (3.7.3)
To formalise the interdependence of economic competition and attention competition I
assume that every firm non-cooperatively chooses one variable yj, henceforth interpreted
as its price.
Let YA ≡ (yu1, ..., yuz) ∈ Rz with uk ∈ A denote the vector of prices of those firms
that belong to A. For every A ∈ A define a function V j(YA) : Rz → R1 with the property
that V j(YA) = 0 if j /∈ A. Then V j(YA) is the value of attention set A to firm j and
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summarises the value earned by firm j from the economic competition between the firms
in attention set A. As an example think of price competition with substitute products
and linear production costs. Then
V j(YA) = (yj − c)xj (YA) (3.4)
where xj (YA) is the demand function of a consumer facing attention set A with price
vector YA. The second assumption I impose with the goal of eventually writing down the
payoff function of firm j is the following:
Assumption 3.2 (Separability). For any active firm j and any A ∈ Bj the function
V j(YA) is independent of (f1, ..., fn).
This is a very important assumption. It means that conditional on an attention set
consumers make decisions independent of all attentional activities.12 Taken to the Google
example the assumption means that the rank of an alternative only influences its chance of
perception but does not convey more economically relevant information to the consumer.
Formally, this assumption enables me to separate the competition for an attention set
from the economic competition within an attention set and leads to an analytically highly
tractable structure of such a problem.
Under assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 the expected profit function of firm j is
Πj ((y1, f1), ..., (yj, fj), ..., (yn, fn)) =
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F)V j(YA)∆− F − C(fj) (3.5)
where C(fj) denotes the cost firm j must incur under effort level fj. The properties of C
will be discussed below. The fixed setup cost F > 0 can be thought of as summarizing
infrastructure costs for production and IT.
In case of (3.4) the profit function (3.5) becomes
Πj = (yj − c)
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F)xj(A)∆− F − C(fj) (3.6)
12This is a crucial difference between attention competition as understood by my contribution and
persuasive advertising: persuasive advertising would mean that the advertising effort of a firm could
influence the function V j . Attention competition means that the chance of perception depends on firm
actions but has no further influence on the choice behavior of consumers.
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Concerning the costs of attention I assume the following properties to hold for f ∈
[0,∞)
C(0) = 0, C(f > 0) ∈ (0,∞), C ′(0) ∈ [0,∞), C ′(f > 0) ∈ (0,∞), C ′′(f) ∈ [0,∞)
(3.7)
An example which provides useful later is given by
C(f) = θf η θ > 0 η ≥ 1 (3.8)
As the elasticity of the cost function will play a major role for the comparative statics
of the model it is appropriate to discuss the cost function in greater detail which is
accomplished in the remainder of this section. In case of sponsored search advertising
firms can purchase certain keywords (called adwords) by offering a cost-per-click (CPC)
rate in an ongoing online auction. For a purchased keyword the rank of the link within
the frame for sponsored ads depends on the relative bid and on the PageRank measure of
the page13. Thus for a given set of keywords and identifying attention probabilities with
the on-screen ranking we might expect constant unit costs to be reasonable. Imagine
a situation where all initial bids are the same for a fixed set of keywords. Assuming
that only relative bids determine the ranking the on-screen position then is random and
the probability to be among the first R ranks is R/n for every competitor. Then if all
competitors double their bids my firm can get the same chance as before (R/n) only if
I also double my bid which simply implies doubling advertising expenditure. However,
as Williamson and Rusmevichientong point out, sponsored search advertising is highly
complex as it is a multidimensional issue if the set of keywords is not fixed and novel
keywords are associated with an unknown number of click-through rates (Williamson
and Rusmevichientong (2006), p. 260). Nonlinear costs of attention may arise e.g. if
retrieving new click-generating keywords gets more difficult the more keywords are already
employed. Nonlinearity is more generally also supported by the finding of Nothdurft that
it gets increasingly difficult to generate a higher salience (pop-up effect) of some visual
stimulus at higher levels of salience (Nothdurft (2000), p. 1195): combining the salience
13In case of Google the CPC corresponds to the next highest bid plus one cent.
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of two features (e.g. color and movement of a visual object) does not lead to the sum
of the saliences of the two features for the same background. Finally, in case of adword
competition how narrow the set of possible keywords is might be a market-specific feature
which then implies different elasticities of the cost functions for different markets. The
market for a specialised set of screwdrivers might encompass less critical keywords than
the market of holiday destinations.
3.2.3 The symmetric price-attention game
Let Sy ≡ [c, ymax], Sf ≡ [0,∞) and S ≡ [c, ymax]× [0,∞). Further, I assume (3.5) to be
symmetric, i.e. (see chapter 5.2.1)
Πj ((y1, f1), ..., (yj, fj), ..., (yn, fn)) = Π
σ(j)
(
(yσ(1), fσ(1)), ..., (yσ(j), fσ(j)), ..., (yσ(n), fσ(n))
)
where σ is a permutation of {1, ..., n}All active firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively
choose their strategy, the pair (yj, fj) ∈ S in order to maximize (3.5) and take (y−j, f−j)
as given. Hence (n, Sn,Π) is a static symmetric game. In the main part of this chapter I
restrict myself to the case of symmetric equilibria.14 To establish a symmetric equilibrium
I apply the symmetric opponents form approach (SOFA, see chapter 5.2.1). In the next
section I derive the symmetric opponent form of (3.5). It is convenient to impose all
further assumptions relevant for the analysis of the symmetric equilibrium directly on the
symmetric opponent form.
3.2.3.1 The symmetric opponent form
To derive the symmetric opponent form of the profit function of (3.5) I take firm j as the
representative firm and set yj = y and yg = y¯ as well as fj = f and fg = f¯ for any g 6= j.
Then V j(A) = V j(A′) if A,A′ ∈ Bj and I define V (y, y¯, z) ≡ V j (YA : A ∈ Bj) (remember
14Appendix A explores the possibility of asymmetric equilibria in the symmetric game.
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that the number of arguments in V j is z) and15
p
(
f, f¯ , n, R
) ≡ { 1 n ≤ R
pj(f, f−j)|fg=f¯ ∀ g 6=j n > R
Lemma 3.2. If n > R the symmetric opponent form of (3.5) is
Π(y, f) = p(f, f¯ , n, R)V (y, y¯, R)∆− F − C(f) (3.9)
If R ≥ n the symmetric opponent form of (3.5) is
Π(y, f) = V (y, y¯, n)∆− F − C(f) (3.10)
Proof: Appendix B (3.7.4)
Note that p(f, f¯ , n, R)∆ is the fraction of consumers which perceive firm j. That is,
p(f, f¯ , n, R)∆ is the number of realised attention sets A˜ that contain j.
Because C(f) is an injective function of f it is possible to rewrite (3.9) directly in
terms of attention costs rather than in terms of attention effort f . For f = ρ(ω) with
C (ρ(ω)) = ω and f¯ = ρ(ω¯) with C (ρ(ω¯)) = ω¯ we get
Π(y, ω) = p (ρ(ω), ρ(ω¯), n, R)V (y, y, R)∆− F − ω
This reformulation makes sense as firms rather observe attention costs than attention
effort of their opponents. However, it is convenient to solve the model in terms of effort
f rather than in terms of attention cost and I continue to use this specification.
It is possible to establish a simple relationship between the probability p that firm j
is perceived by a consumer and the probability, p¯, that one of its opponents is perceived.
Let pg be the probability that g 6= j is perceived by a consumer. Then fg = f¯ for all
15For R < n the function p(f, f¯ , n,R) generally depends on R because there are |A| =
(
n
R
)
possible
attention sets and the probability assignment as defined by (3.2) depends on how many attention sets
there are.
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g 6= j implies that pg = p¯ for all g 6= j.16 Proposition 3.1 shows that
p¯ =
R− p
n− 1 R < n (3.3’)
3.2.3.2 Assumptions on the symmetric opponent form
In this section I impose and discuss the main assumption on the value function V (y, y¯, z)
and the probability function p(f, f¯ , n, R). I take these assumptions to be satisfied in the
main part of this chapter.
Assumption 3.3. The function V (y, y¯, z) is twice continuously differentiable in y, y¯ for
y, y¯ ∈ Sy and decreasing in z. V2(y, y¯, z) > 0.
The assumption V2(y, y¯, z) > 0 means that higher prices of the opponents ceteris
paribus increase the revenue that the firm can extract from its attention sets. In case
of (3.4) this means that higher prices of the opponents ceteris paribus increases demand
(as the opponents loose some consumers to the firm) and hence also revenue for the firm.
The assumption that V (y, y¯, z) decreases in z means that if consumers perceive more
alternatives then ceteris paribus the firm earns less value from the consumer. In case of
(3.4) a standard intuition for this is that consumers allocate their budget over the set of
all firms they perceive. If they perceive more firms then, for a fixed budget v, they divide
their budget over more firms which leaves less budget for a single firm.
As an example for a function that satisfies assumption 3.3 suppose consumers have
CES-preferences over all z commodities they perceive and c > 0. Then it is straightforward
to show that
V (y, y¯, z) = (y − c) vy
−σ
y1−σ + (z − 1)y¯1−σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
x(y,y¯,z)
(3.11)
where x(y, y¯, z) denotes demand of a consumer for commodity j who perceives j and also
z− 1 other firms. The parameter σ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution17 and v > 0
16Moreover, if we know p(f, f¯ , n) then we can determine PA(F) for all A ∈ Bj as well as PA′(F) where
A′ /∈ Bj (see the remark in section 3.7.4 of the appendix). This means that, if we restrict ourselves to
the symmetric opponent form, whenever we determine p(f, f¯ , n) then the probability set function P is
also determined which means that every possible attention set A ∈ A has a well defined probability of
being realised.
17V2(y, y¯, z) > 0 follows because σ > 1.
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is a consumer’s budget.
Assumption 3.4. Let p ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability of firm j of being in the attention
set of a consumer.
a)
p = p
(
f, f¯ , n, R
)
(3.12)
If n > R, f, f¯ > 0 and p < 1 then the following properties of the function p
(
f, f¯ , n, R
)
are postulated:
b) p
(
λf, λf¯ , n, R
)
= p
(
f, f¯ , n, R
)
for λ > 0.
c) p
(
f, f¯ , n, R
)
is twice continuously differentiable in f , f¯ and
p1(f, f¯ , n, R) > 0 p11(f, f¯ , n, R) < 0 p2(f, f¯ , n, R) < 0
Moreover, p(f, f¯ , n, R) is strictly increasing in R and strictly decreasing in n.
P1) of the introduction (chapter 1.2) implies that how successful a firm is in capturing
a consumer’s attention depends on its effort compared to total effort and is a relative
matter. Hence the effort level f should affect the probability to get attention, p, in a
relative way as is stated by b).18 Because of assumption c) p(f, f¯ , n, R) is an increasing
strongly concave function of f . Note that p1 > 0 directly follows from lemma 3.1 if we
assume the function p(f, f¯ , n, R) to be differentiable in f . The assumption that p2 < 0
means that attention efforts impose a negative externality of senders on each other.19 The
assumption that p(f, f¯ , n, R) is strictly increasing in R means that the probability to be
perceived ceteris paribus increases with the size of the attention set which is intuitively
18Falkinger was the first to embed the importance of relative signal strength for perception into an
economic model (Falkinger (2007) and Falkinger (2008)).
19Generally, a positive effect of aggregate attention effort, Σ =
n∑
j=1
fj on a market could be imagined if
∆ were not exogenously fixed but depends on Σ. Think of a market where by some reason fierce attention
competition between the firms for those consumers that are already aware of the market leads to a high
Σ. But this may imply that information about the market leads to a strong general coverage in the media
which may attract new consumers to that market without the firms explicitly wooing them. If there is an
aggregate effect of attention competition in the sense that louder markets attract more consumers (have
a higher ∆) then attention driven spillover effects between markets may exist. This is the subject of my
mimeo ”Attention markets”.
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clear: if people perceive more (less) alternatives then, ceteris paribus, the probability of
a single firm to be perceived should increase (decrease). Similarly, the assumption that
p(f, f¯ , n, R) decreases in n means that if there are more (less) active firms then, ceteris
paribus, the chance of a single firm to be perceived should decrease (increase).
If n > R and all active firms choose the same effort level f then the probability of
being perceived by a consumer is the same for all firms:
Lemma 3.3. If n > R and f = f¯ then p = p¯ = R/n.
Proof: f = f¯ implies p = p¯. The result then follows immediately from (3.3’).

3.2.3.3 An example: The Attention Contest Function
In this section I present an important example of a function p(f, f¯ , n, R) that satisfies
assumption 3.4. Besides having a nice intuition this function also has some analytically
convenient properties. Let
p(f, f¯ , n, R) = 1−
R∏
i=1
(
1− f
f + (n− i)f¯
)
(3.13)
Throughout my thesis I refer to (3.13) as the (symmetric) Attention Contest Function
(ACF).
Proposition 3.2. The symmetric ACF satisfies all properties from assumption 3.4.
Proof: Appendix B (3.7.5)
Note that we cannot partially differentiate the ACF as stated in (3.13) with respect to R
because the function is not continuous in R.20
The remainder of this section provides an intuitive derivation of the ACF. The follow-
ing derivation is from the perspective of firm j. Let
Fn =
fj
n∑
k=1
fk
(3.14)
20It is formally possible to extend (3.13) to a continuous function in R by using a Gamma function
expansion. See the appendix for details.
80 3. ATTENTION COMPETITION
measure the relative effort of firm j. Now assume that getting a consumer’s attention can
be described by a stochastic process similar to making random draws without repetition
in a simple urn model. Hence the consumer will draw R times from this urn which
corresponds to selecting R different alternatives. Firm j is in the attention set of a
consumer if it gets either the first, the second ... or the R-th draw. Fn corresponds to the
probability of getting the first of the R draws. This probability depends (positively) on
the mass of firm j’s ball (fj) versus the aggregate mass of all balls in the urn (
n∑
k=1
fk). If
fk = f¯ and fj = f then (3.14) becomes
21
Fn =
f
f + (n− 1)f¯
and 1− Fn corresponds to the probability of not getting the first draw. Similarly,
(1− Fn)(1− Fn−1) =
(
1− f
f + (n− 1)f¯
)(
1− f
f + (n− 2)f¯
)
is the probability of not getting the first and second draw (which obviously never is larger
than 1− Fn) and generally
R∏
i=1
(1− F1+n−i) is the probability of not getting any of the R
draws. Consequently, the probability of being in one of the R draws is given by (3.13).
3.2.3.4 Best response of the representative firm
In this section I discuss and illustrate the best-response function of the representative
firm. Suppose that n > R. Assuming an interior solution the two first-order conditions
of (3.9) are
V1(y, y¯, R) = 0
p1
(
f, f¯ , n, R
)
∆V (y, y¯, R) = C ′(f)
(3.15)
From (3.15) we see that y = y(y¯, R) and f = f(f¯ , y¯, n, R,∆). This means that the
strategic choice of price of our firm is independent of attention efforts but it depends on
the perceived market size (R) and not on the total amount of information that a consumer
receives (which is |I| = n). This is the same result as in the last chapter22 (see 2.3.1).
Also note that f depends on n because the marginal probability of perception depends
21In Appendix A (3.6.1) I discuss the ACF without imposing fk = f¯ . This is technically necessary
when dealing with the possibility of asymmetric equilibria.
22Note that in this chapter we did not require any type of approximation for this result.
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on n and f depends on R because both the marginal probability and the value function V
depend on R. This will have an important consequence for the comparative statics of the
symmetric equilibrium later. Because the marginal probability of perception decreases in
f (assumption 3.4) and V2(y, y¯, R) > 0 (assumption 3.3) we immediately get f
′(∆) > 0
and also f ′(y¯) > 0.23 More consumers (a larger audience) means more potential budgets
which increases the marginal value of attention and leads to a higher effort level. Similarly,
if y¯ increases this means that our firm can earn more value from every attention set that
it is contained in which increases the marginal value of attention and hence also effort
level f . In the CES-example (3.11) we get y′(y¯) > 0 and also y′(R) < 0 (see section
3.7.6, Part I, for the calculations). The last result means that, because consumers are less
attentive, our firm sets a higher price and originates from the fact that if a consumer has
a fixed budget but perceives less commodities then he spends his funds over fewer firms.
This means that, ceteris paribus, the demand for the commodity of our firm increases
and the optimal action of the firm then is to exploit this by setting a higher price.24 How
does f depend on f¯? Formally, the answer to this question depends on how f¯ affects the
marginal chance of perception p1(f, f¯ , n, R):
f ′(f¯) =
p12(f, f¯ , n, R)
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
V (y, y¯, R)∆
C ′′(f)− p11(f, f¯ , n, R)V (y, y¯, R)∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
Intuitively, we could imagine f¯ to have a complementary effect on f by a defensive-type
of argument: if all opponents increase their effort level then the representative firm must
also increase its effort level in order to remain salient. But we could also expect that more
”noise” means that it gets more difficult for our firm to influence its chance of perception.
In such a case we would expect that p1(f, f¯ , n, R) decreases in f¯ . It turns out that the
ACF incorporates both features which implies a non-monotonic relationship between f¯
and f . Figure 3.4 depicts f as a function of f¯ and n in case of the ACF with R = 2 and
23f ′(y¯) = p1V2∆C′′−p11V∆ > 0
24Note that such an effect cannot exist in Falkinger’s model of limited attention (which also uses the
CES demand function) as firms have no mass and the price does not depend on the measure of the
perceived market size (Falkinger (2008)).
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cost function25 (3.8). What these pictures generally tell us is that with the ACF if there
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Figure 3.4: ACF (n = 10 left, f¯ = 1 right)
is little aggregate attentional activity of the opponents (”low noise”), because f¯ is small
or n is small (close to R), then f increases in the noise whereas if the level of noise is
already high then the opposite occurs.
3.3 Existence of a symmetric equilibrium
In this section I derive the conditions which assert the existence of exactly one symmetric
equilibrium in the price-attention game as described in section 3.2.3. I start with the
case where n is given exogenously and then proceed to the case where n is endogenously
determined by the free-entry condition of the two-stage game. I show that the CES-ACF
example has exactly one symmetric equilibrium.
3.3.1 Symmetric equilibrium for exogenous n
The fundamentals of the symmetric game are the parameter set {n,R,∆}, the cost func-
tion C(f), the value function V (y, y¯, z) with z = min {R, n} as defined by assumption 3.3
and the probability function p(f, f¯ , n, R) as defined by assumption 3.4. In a symmetric
equilibrium all n firms choose the same strategy (y, f). To find a symmetric equilibrium
we can rely on the SOFA (see chapter 5.2.1).
25I impose V (y, y¯, 2)∆ = 10, θ = 1 and η = 2. The pictures do not change qualitatively if other
numerical values are used (or if R > 2).
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Suppose that n > R. Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions of the
representative firm’s optimisation problem are given by (3.15). Then, a solution (y, f) to
V1(y, y, R) = 0
p1 (f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y, R) = C
′(f)
(3.16)
corresponds to an interior symmetric equilibrium of the game.
If R ≥ n then it is easy to see from (3.10) and (3.7) that a symmetric equilibrium
(y, f) of the game with y ∈ (c, ymax) must have f = 0 and satisfies V1(y, y, n) = 0.
To summarise: for given R, n > 1 and ∆ > 0 a symmetric equilibrium (y, f) of the
price-attention game satisfies
V1(y, y, z) = 0
f :
{
p1(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y, R)− C ′(f) = 0 R < n
f = 0 R ≥ n
z = min {R, n}
(3.17)
Assumption 3.5. a) The following boundary conditions are satisfied:
i) For any z > 1 we have V1(c, c, z) > 0 and V1(y
max, ymax, z) < 0.
ii) If n > R we have lim
f→0
p1(f, f, n,R) =∞ and lim
f→∞
p1(f, f, n,R) = 0
b) For any z > 1 and y ∈ (c, ymax) we have V (y, y, z) ∈ (0,∞), V11(y, y, z) < 0 and26
V1(y, y, z) = 0 ⇒ − ∂
∂y
(V1(y, y, z)) > 0 (3.18)
c) For any R > 1 and any n with n > R and f ∈ (0,∞)
− ∂
∂f
(p1(f, f, n,R)) > 0 (3.19)
The boundary conditions exclude the possibility of symmetric boundary equilibria
which simplifies the comparative-static analysis later. The assumptions of monotony
(3.18) and (3.19) exclude the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria.
26Note that ∂∂y (V1(y, y, z)) = V11(y, y, z) + V12(y, y, z), i.e.
∂
∂y (V1(y, y, z)) is the total derivative of
V1(y, y, z) with respect to y. Similarly, ∂∂f (p1(f, f, n,R)) is that total derivative of p1(f, f, n,R) with
respect to f .
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Proposition 3.3. If assumption 3.5 is satisfied then for any R, n > 1 there exists a unique
vector (y, f) that solves (3.17). Hence there exists only one symmetric equilibrium. In the
equilibrium we have y ∈ (c, ymax). If R ≥ n we have f = 0 and y = y(n). If n > R then
y = y(R) and f = f(n,R,∆) ∈ (0,∞).
Proof: Appendix B (3.7.7)
Hence if R ≥ n then all active firms choose the minimal effort level f = 0. Because
in this case the consumer perceives all alternatives he is informed of there is no benefit
from choosing a higher level of f .
A nice property of the ACF is that this functional form for p(f, f¯ , n, R) satisfies the
boundary conditions in assumption 3.5 as well as condition (3.19).
Lemma 3.4. Suppose n > R and the function p(f, f¯ , n, R) is given by the ACF (3.13).
Then for f > 0
p1(f, f, n,R) =
n−R
nf
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i (3.20)
The ACF satisfies assumption 3.5. A good approximation to (3.20) if n is large relative
to R is given by
p1(f, f, n,R) ∼= n−R
n2f
R (3.21)
Proof: Appendix B (3.7.8)
Almost all results in this paper are proved by using (3.20) and not its approxima-
tion. In any case the results hold also if (3.21) were used instead and the proofs usually
are less technical. In applications we can use (3.21) rather than (3.20) because (3.21) is
differentiable also in R and generally simpler to work with. Because the ACF satisfies as-
sumption 3.5 then whenever we combine the ACF with a function V (y, y, R) that satisfies
assumption 3.5 we always end up with a single symmetric equilibrium (for n > R).
Corollary 3.1. If for n > R the function p(f, f¯ , n, R) is given by the ACF and V (y, y, R)
satisfies assumption 3.5 then there exists exactly one symmetric equilibrium (y, f) ∈
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Int(S). f is approximately determined by
n−R
n2f
R∆V (y, y, R) = C ′(f) (3.22)
Proof: Follows from proposition 3.3, lemma 3.4 and (3.21).

3.3.2 Free-entry equilibrium: existence and uniqueness
In the symmetric equilibrium the level of profits is determined by
Π(y, f, n) =
{
∆V (y, y, n)− F − C(f) n ≤ R
R
n
∆V (y, y, R)− F − C(f) n > R (3.23)
for any given R > 1. The entry game then is a two-stage game where firms first decide
whether or not to enter. A firm that chooses to enter pays the fixed costs F > 0. All
firms that chose to enter then play the symmetric price-attention game from the last
section. In a pure subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) given any decision in the first stage
a Nash equilibrium follows in the second stage. In a free-entry equilibrium each active
firm makes non-negative profits (Π(n) ≥ 0) and further entry would result in negative
profits (Π(n + 1) < 0). Concerning the Nash-equilibrium of the second stage we already
know that for any given n,R > 1 there exists a single symmetric equilibrium. Ignoring
the integer-value problem of n the free-entry equilibrium (y, f, n) then is described by
V1 (y, y,min {R, n}) = 0 (3.24)
f :
{
p1(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y, R)− C ′(f) = 0 R < n
f = 0 R ≥ n (3.25)
Π(f, y, n) = 0 (3.26)
With symmetry we can only hope to determine n, the number of active firms in a SPE
and not which firm enters and which firm stays out. I call a SPE unique if there only is
one vector (y, f, n) that solves (3.24) - (3.26). The fundamentals of the symmetric game
with free entry are the parameter set {R,∆}, the cost function C(f), the value function
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V (y, y¯, z) with z = min {R, n} as defined by assumption 3.3 and the probability function
p(f, f¯ , n, R) as defined by 3.4.
Assumption 3.6. The following properties are imposed:
a) The function V (y, y, z) is twice continuously differentiable in z and V3 < 0 as well
as V13 < 0.
b) The function p1(f, f, n,R) is continuously differentiable in n
c) For f > 0 we have lim
n→R+
p1(f, f, n,R) = 0
The assumption V3(y, y, z) < 0 is just the differentiable version of assumption 3.3 and
the last assumption means that the marginal value of an attention set decreases if more
alternatives are being considered. Let yˆ be implicitly defined by V1(yˆ, yˆ, 2) = 0.
Proposition 3.4. Let 2 ≤ R < ∞. Suppose that assumptions 3.5 and 3.6 are satisfied
and
∆V (yˆ, yˆ, 2)/F ≥ 1 (3.27)
If the condition
∂
∂f
(p1(f, f, n,R))
p1(f, f, n,R)
< p13(f, f, n,R)
n2
R
(3.28)
holds then the free-entry game has a single symmetric SPE (y, f, n) with 2 ≤ n <∞
Proof: Appendix B (3.7.9)
To understand intuitively why condition (3.28) excludes the possibility of multiple sym-
metric equilibria note that (3.28) is satisfied if p13 > 0. Suppose that p13 > 0 holds for any
n > n′ and assume that (y′, f ′, n′) is an equilibrium of the free-entry game with n′ > R.
From (3.16) it is not difficult to see that p13 > 0 implies that f
′(n) > 0 for n ≥ n′.
That is, equilibrium attention effort increases if we exogenously increase n. From (3.23)
we see that an exogenous increase of n has two effects on the value of Π(y(n), f(n), n):
equilibrium profits decrease in n because R/n decreases in n. This is the direct effect of n
on the profit level and originates from the fact that more senders means that equilibrium
chances of being perceived decrease for a single firm which means less (expected) revenue.
But there also is an indirect effect on the level of profits because C(f) depends on n in the
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equilibrium. f ′(n) > 0 implies that attention costs increase in n which means that profits
decrease in n also over this channel. Thus we see that p13 > 0 unambiguously implies
profits to decrease in n for n > n′. But as we have n′ in the free-entry equilibrium this
means that profits must be negative for any n > n′. Consequently, there cannot exist a
free-entry equilibrium with n > n′. This is illustrated in the left picture of figure 3.5. If
n' n0
 yn , f n , n
n ' n
 yn , f n , n
Multiple symmetric equilibria
0
Figure 3.5: The possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria under limited attention
however we have p13 < 0 then the indirect effect of a change of n on profits is positive as
a higher n means lower f and thus lower costs C(f). If this indirect effect is very strong
then profits might also increase in n. In this case we might have multiple symmetric
equilibria as is illustrated in the right picture of figure 3.5.
A very nice property of the ACF is that condition (3.28) holds.
Corollary 3.2. Let 2 ≤ R < ∞. The ACF (see (3.20)) satisfies assumption 3.6. If
V (y, y, z) satisfies assumptions 3.5 and 3.6, the function p (f, f, n,R) is given by the ACF
and condition (3.27) holds then the free-entry game has a single symmetric SPE (y, f, n)
with 2 ≤ n <∞
Proof: The ACF satisfies assumption 3.5 because of lemma 3.4. It is not hard to see
that the ACF also satisfies b) and c) of assumption 3.6. Finally, the ACF also satisfies
condition (3.28) (see lemma 3.7 in the appendix (3.7.1)). The claim then follows from
proposition 3.4.

88 3. ATTENTION COMPETITION
3.3.3 The ACF-CES example
Suppose that n > R is given exogenously. If p(f, f¯ , n, R) is given by the ACF and
V (y, y¯, z) by the CES example (3.11) then exactly one symmetric equilibrium (y, f) exists
and is approximately27 determined by (see 3.7.6, Part II, for the calculations)
y = c+
cR
(R− 1)(σ − 1) (3.29)
(n−R)Rv∆
fn2(1 + (R− 1)σ) = C
′(f) (3.30)
Moreover, we have
V (y, y, z) =
y − c
y
v
z
(3.31)
Hence V3 < 0 and V13 < 0 hold. Suppose that V (yˆ, yˆ, 2) =
v∆
1+σ
≥ F . Then by corollary
3.2 we may conclude that in the ACF-CES example there exists exactly one symmetric
SPE with n ≥ 2.
3.4 Comparative statics
In this section I discuss the comparative-static results of the symmetric price-attention
equilibrium. I begin with an exogenous number of firms and then proceed to the case
where n is determined endogenously in a free-entry equilibrium. I always take assumptions
3.5 and 3.6 to be satisfied. I extend the cost function from (3.7) by a parameter α, i.e.
C = C(f, α) with the property that C2(f, α) > 0 and C12(f, α) > 0. For notational
simplicity I set C ′ ≡ C1(f, α) and C ′′ ≡ C11(f, α).
3.4.1 Comparative statics for an exogenous number of firms
In this section I derive the comparative statics of the symmetric price-attention game
where n is given exogenously. I only discuss the case where n > R is given exogenously.
The equilibrium conditions are given by (3.16). The game has the following set of exoge-
nous parameters: {R, n,∆, F, α}.
27Note that (3.29) is exact and (3.30) follows from using (3.21).
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Proposition 3.5. The comparative statics of (3.16) are given by y = y(R
−
) and f =
f(R
?
, n
?
,∆
+
, α
−
).
Proof: Appendix B (3.7.10)
As in chapter 2 the only parameter that matters for equilibrium prices is the size of the
attention set. y′(R) < 0 results because V13(y, y, R) < 0. This assumption means that the
equilibrium marginal value that can be earned from an attention set decreases if people
compare more alternatives. This is a very intuitive assumption and many examples (such
as the CES example and the Salop-Shapiro-Grossman example from chapter 4.1) satisfy
this property. In the CES case this follows because consumers spend their fixed budget
v over more alternatives if they perceive a larger set which means that less budget is
available for the single firm. To offset this loss of demand the best-response is to decrease
the price which explains why equilibrium prices are lower if the perceived market is larger.
However, the fact that y is determined only by the perceived market size and does not
depend on other parameters implies that the aggregate level of attention competition nf
(e.g. advertising intensity) observed may be a bad predictor of market power. Suppose
we have two almost identical economies E1 = {R, n,∆, F, α1} and E2 = {R, n,∆, F, α2}
with α1 > α2. Then nf1 < nf2. The classical theory of informative advertising holds that
higher aggregate advertising levels should deteriorate market power of the firms which
in equilibrium manifests itself in lower prices (see chapter 2). The intuition behind this
theory is that limited information of consumers because of scarce information leaves the
firm with market power (see Goeree (2008)). In such a case means to increase advertising
intensity would be beneficial for consumers as competition is reinforced and prices are
decreased. We see that under limited attention this conjecture does not hold as consumers
have limited information because of their limited attention capacities and not because of
scarce information.
Search models usually predict lower equilibrium prices if search costs are reduced
and electronic marketplaces or the internet with its powerful search engines are generally
thought of dramatically lowering the search costs (e.g. Bakos (1997)). In such models
this usually means that people become aware of more (or better) alternatives. However,
in many cases the anticipated price-reduction was a lot smaller as suggested by these
models (Ellison and Ellison (2005), p.149) or on the contrary online prices even were
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found to be higher than offline prices (e.g. Lee (1998)). The model of this paper provides
an explanation why such gaps between theory and empirics exist. Search models do not
distinguish the information set from the attention set. If we agree to V13 < 0 then larger
attention sets will always imply lower prices in such models. If however the attention set
is a subset of the information set with fixed size then larger information sets have no (or
at least less) impact on equilibrium prices. The massive evidence on top-rank clicking-
behaviour and also on the fact that people often do not use more than one search query
(e.g. Jansen et al. (2000), p. 212) means that people concentrate their decision on just
a few alternatives which suggests that not search cost theories but an attention theory
adequately models the contemporaneous and future information problems.
As is shown in the appendix (see 3.7.10) we have sign(f ′(n)) = sign (p13) and sign (f ′(R)) =
sign
(
p1V2V13 − ∂∂y (V (y, y, R)) (p14V + p1V3)
)
. These expressions cannot be signed with-
out further assumptions. In case of a change of R there are two effects at work28. First, a
decrease of R increases the equilibrium value of an attention set because i) an attention
set must be shared with fewer competitors and ii) equilibrium prices are higher29. This set
value effect increases the marginal revenue of attention and increases attention levels f .
Second, the marginal probability of attention also depends on R. Depending on the sign
of p14 the effect of R on p1 may either reinforce or offset the set value effect. A sufficient
condition for f ′(R) < 0 is that p14R
p1
< −V3R
V
holds in equilibrium. If V (y, y, R) = V˜ (y)/R
with V˜ (y)′ > 0 then30 the RHS of this inequality is one. As for the ACF p1(f, f, n,R) is
a strongly concave function of R which goes through the origin (see (3.21) in case of the
approximation and lemma 3.6 in the appendix for the general case) we may conclude that
f ′(R) < 0 in such a case because p14R
p1
< 1. Hence less attention implies higher prices and
higher effort levels (stronger attention competition) in this example.
Suppose now that n increases exogenously. We see that the sign of f ′(n) depends
entirely on how the marginal probability p1 depends on n. This is different from the case
of an exogenous change of R as a change of n has no set value effect. In case of the ACF
28Recall the discussion of strategic behavior in section 3.2.3.4
29Formally: dVdy = V3 + V2y
′(R) < 0.
30This is a property that many demand functions share, e.g. demand derived from the circular ideal
variety model (see lemma 4.1 in chapter 4.1). Also the CES example has this property: V (y, y,R) =
v(y−c)
Ry =
(y−c)
y
v
R .
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it can be shown (see 3.7 in the appendix (3.7.1)) that p1(f, f, n,R) is a hump-shaped
function of n. Consequently, f(n) takes on a hump-shaped form in this example.
Summarising, we see that limited attention implies equilibrium prices to be indepen-
dent of the size of the information set (n) which is different from models of informative
advertising. In equilibrium, prices reflect the scarcity of attention in the sense that smaller
attention sets mean higher prices. On the other side limited attention implies that a com-
petition for attention emerges (f > 0 if n > R). If consumers are less attentive this means
that the firms can earn higher values. But this makes attention more valuable for the
firms which tends to increase attention levels - and attention costs. In case of the ACF
this is the dominant effect which means that less attention always leads to higher atten-
tion costs. In this case we have two effects on profits if consumers are more inattentive:
i) the set value effect which states that more inattention (lower R) increases profits and
ii) the fact that, because getting attention is more valuable, the competition for attention
is reinforced and leads to higher attention costs.
In the next section I investigate the implications of these two conflictive effects for the
equilibrium number of firms that survive the price-attention competition.
3.4.2 Comparative statics in the free-entry game
In this section I discuss the consequences of limited attention for the equilibrium (y, f, n)
of the free-entry game. The equilibrium conditions are given by (3.23) - (3.26). The
game has the following set of exogenous parameters: {R,∆, F, α}. In the entire section
I assume that (3.27) and (3.28) are satisfied and R ≥ 2. To understand intuitively how
n depends on the these parameters it is sufficient to understand how the profit function
depends on the parameters because sign (Π′(χ)) = sign (n′(χ)) for χ ∈ {R,∆, F, α}
3.4.2.1 Comparative statics and conditions for endogenous limited attention
An attention equilibrium (an equilibrium with n > R) occurs endogenously in the free-
entry game if the system
V1(y˜, y˜, n˜) = 0
∆V (y˜, y˜, n˜)− F = 0 (3.32)
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has a solution (y˜, n˜) with n˜ > R. If n˜ ≤ R then (y˜, 0, n˜) corresponds to the equilibrium of
the game; a conventional equilibrium occurs. If n˜ > R then there cannot be a conventional
symmetric equilibrium. But as exactly one symmetric equilibrium exists this implies that
an attention equilibrium must occur. To illustrate the situation graphically note that
n˜ = n˜(∆, F ) = R for fixed R ≥ 2 implies that d∆
dF
= − n˜2(∆,F )
n˜1(∆,F )
. If the Implicit Function
Theorem is applied to (3.32) it is straightforward to show that d∆
dF
= 1
V (y˜,y˜,n˜)
> 0. Figure
3.6 illustrates the situation. In the figure we see that lower infrastructure costs F or a
F
∆
n R>% n R<%
n R=%
( )
F
V y, y, 2% %
Figure 3.6: Attention equilibrium or conventional equilibrium?
higher market potential ∆ rather impose that an attention equilibrium occurs (n˜ > R).
Generally, the conditions that imply an attention equilibrium are very similar to the
conditions that imply an information-rich economy in Falkinger’s model (Falkinger (2008),
p. 1604-1605). If we use the CES-example we gain two further parameters: consumer
budget v > 0 and the elasticity of substitution σ > 1. Suppose that V (y˜, y˜, 2)∆ = v∆
1+σ
≥
F . Then v∆ > F . It is an easy exercise to solve (3.32) in the CES case for n˜:
n˜ =
v∆
Fσ
+
σ − 1
σ
Hence we have n˜′(v) > 0 and n˜′(σ) = F−v∆
Fσ2
< 0. This means that if the consumers have
a higher budget or the commodities are less substitutable then an attention equilibrium
is more likely to occur.
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3.4.2.2 Comparative statics for limited attention equilibria
In this section I discuss the comparative statics of the symmetric free entry equilibrium if
an attention equilibrium occurs endogenously. As in the previous section the comparative
statics can be signed unambiguously in many cases if the function p(f, f¯ , n, R) is given by
the ACF31. I show that both f and n increase in the market potential ∆. This means that
aggregate attention costs nC(f) also increase in market potential which is consistent with
the US-data on the number of consumers and advertising expenditure. Moreover, I show
that an increase of the cost parameter α has ambiguous effects on the equilibrium number
of firms. A positive relationship between equilibrium profits and the cost parameter α
is possible which means that higher costs of attention could lead to a higher number of
active firms which is an interesting result. Finally, I show that under the ACF the effects
of the attention parameter R on f are negative also under free entry, but the effects on
n are ambiguous and depend crucially on how much more value can be earned from less
attentive consumers compared to how much attention costs increase because of the higher
efforts to attract attention.
To simplify notation I set V ′′ ≡ ∂
∂y
(V1(y, y, R)) and p
′′ ≡ ∂
∂f
(p1(f, f, n,R)). For the
general calculations see the appendix (3.7.11).
Effects of limited attention on prices
Consider two economies E1 = {R,∆1, F1, α1} and E2 = {R,∆2, F2, α2}. Assume parame-
ter values such that in the free entry equilibria of these economies we have n1 > R > n2.
Hence in economy one an attention equilibrium occurs whereas in economy two a con-
ventional equilibrium occurs. Then it is straightforward to verify that y1 = y1(R) but
y2 = y2(F2
+
,∆2
−
). This difference occurs because in an attention equilibrium the competi-
tive entry effect on prices is absent. As in the last section we have y′1(R) < 0.
The sign of f ′(∆) and n′(∆)
We know from the last section that the f(n) equilibrium locus can be non-monotonic be-
cause of p13(f, f, n,R) Q 0 and hence the comparative statics of f in the case of free-entry
is not ex ante clear. It can be shown that sign (f ′(∆)) = sign
(
p1(f,f,n,R)
n
+ p13(f, f, n,R)
)
.
31See lemma 3.7 in the appendix (3.7.1) for the properties of the ACF.
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That is the sign of f ′(n) depends (positively) on the direct effect of ∆ on the marginal
value of perception but also on how the marginal probability of perception depends on n.
In case of the ACF it can be shown that f ′(∆) > 0 (see 3.7). Thus if the market poten-
tial increases so does the competition for attention. Further the ACF implies n′(∆) > 0
because sign (n′(∆)) = sign
(−R
n
p′′ − p21 + ωn
)
which is unambiguously positive (see 3.7).
Hence with the ACF the direct effect on equilibrium profits of a higher market potential
always dominates the increase of the costs of attention competition. We know from the
data that the number of US-consumers doubled from 1950 - 2005 (see chapter 4.2.3). At
the same time advertising expenditure more than doubled (see figure 1.1). This is in
line with the comparative static predictions of the model of this chapter as both f and
n increase with ∆ under the ACF. Hence aggregate advertising expenditure nC(f) (or
nF + nC(f)) unambiguously increases if ∆ increases.32
The sign of f ′(F ) and n′(F )
We always have n′(F ) < 0 unambiguously. In case of the ACF we have that f depends
in a hump-shaped way on F because sign (f ′(F )) = sign (−p13). The different ways in
which ∆ and F affect f under free-entry originate in the fact that ∆ also positively affects
the marginal revenue of attention which increases f . In the case of a change of F attention
efforts are only affected by the change of n according to the entry or exit decisions and
we know from the last section that f(n) is hump-shaped with the ACF.
The sign of f ′(α) and n′(α)
Let ε ≡ p′′f
p1
< 0, µ ≡ C′′f
C′ ≥ 0 and β ≡ C12fC2 > 0. Suppose that p(f, f¯ , n, R) is given by the
ACF. Then it is straightforward to show (use lemma 3.7 b)) that a sufficient condition for
f ′(α) < 0 is given by β + ε ≥ 0. In case of the ACF we have ε = −1 (see the proof of 3.7
b)). Hence if β ≥ 1 then f ′(α) < 0. If the cost function is of the type C(f, α) = αc(f) then
the sufficient condition for f ′(α) < 0 reduces to c
′(f)f
c(f)
≥ 1. But c(0) = 0, c′(f) > 0 and
c′′(f) ≥ 0 imply c′(f)f
c(f)
≥ 1. Hence the ACF together with C(f, α) = αc(f) unambiguously
imply that f ′(α) < 0. Further, it is possible to show that sign(n′(α)) = sign(µ− ε− β)
which is ambiguous. Hence it is possible to have n′(α) > 0, which means that increasing
32The same holds in the CES example if consumer budget v increases. See section 3.4.2.3.
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costs of attention might imply a higher number of active firms and is an interesting result.
This occurs if the reduction of f , due to the higher marginal costs of attention, lead to
lower equilibrium attention costs at the firm level. With the ACF and C(f, α) = αc(f)
we get sign(n′(α)) = sign(µ + 1 − β). If c(f) = fη and η ≥ 1 then we have µ = η − 1
and β = η. Thus in this case n′(α) = 0. Hence in this example α affects only the level of
f but has no effect on the equilibrium number of active firms.
The sign of f ′(R) and n′(R)
A decrease in R (consumers are more inattentive) leads to higher value of the attention sets
and thus also to a higher marginal return on attention which increases f . But the marginal
probability to make it into the attention set also depends on R. It is possible to determine
the sign of f ′(R) unambiguously if we use the ACF and assume that V (y, y, R) = V˜ (y)/R.
Then we get
sign (f ′(R)) = sign
(
V13RV2
(
p13 +
p1
n
)
− V
′′V˜ (y)
n
(
p14 − p1
R
))
and hence f ′(R) < 0 follows unambiguously also with endogenous limited attention (be-
cause p14 − p1R < 0 and p13 + p1n > 0, see lemmata 3.6 and 3.7 in the appendix).
To discuss the effect of limited attention on the equilibrium number of firms I set
V (y, y, R) = V˜ (y)/R and C(f) ≡ θf η with θ > 0 and η ≥ 1. Then with (3.21) the two
equilibrium equations (3.25) and (3.26) become
n−R
n2η
∆V˜ (y) = C(f)
∆V˜ (y)
n
= F + C(f)
(3.33)
Regarding the n(R)-locus two conflictive effects can be eyeballed from the second equa-
tion of (3.33) which originate from the interaction between attention competition and
economic competition. First, as less attentive consumers compare fewer alternatives this
loosens price competition which leads to higher equilibrium prices and higher revenues (see
lemma 3.5). Hence by the revenue effect we would expect profits and thus n to increase
under limited attention. Second, because getting attention is of more value to firms, the
competition for attention is intensified (f ′(R) < 0) and attention costs increase. Thus the
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cost effect suggests n to decrease under limited attention. Manipulation of (3.33) shows
that a single equation determines n(R):
∆V˜ (y(R))
n2η
(n(η − 1) +R) = F (3.34)
Using the implicit function theorem on (3.34) we can deduce that
sign(n′(R)) = sign (R + (R + n (η − 1)) εv) (3.35)
with v˜(R) ≡ V˜ (y(R)) and εv ≡ v˜′(R)Rv˜(R) < 0.33 Expression (3.35) nicely confronts the
two conflictive effects with each other. We see that the elasticity η and εv are important
determinants of the curve n(R). I first discuss the impact of εv. If εv ≈ 0 e.g. because price
competition is such that equilibrium prices respond only weakly to a change of R then
n′(R) > 0. In this case less attention increases the revenue from the attention sets only
weakly. At the same time competition for the sets is increased which implies higher costs
of attention. As the additional costs outweigh the additional revenue gains profits decrease
which leads to a smaller market. In the absence of price competition (V (y, y, R) = v/R)
we unambiguously get n′(R) > 0 (εv = 0 because in this case y′(R) = 0). In order for
the revenue effect to dominate the cost effect if consumer attention declines, the value of
the attention set must respond sufficiently elastic to R. If this is the case (e.g. because
commodities are strong substitutes and hence economic competition is intense, see section
3.4.2.3 below) then limited attention implies larger markets. To explain the impact of η
on n(R) note that a high value of η means that a change of f implies a strong change of
marginal costs which reduces the reagibility of f . In this sense η controls the elasticity
of attention competition: a high value of η means that f reacts less responsive to any
exogenous change. To see this use (3.33) to find
f =
(
n−R
n2θη
v˜(R)
) 1
η
=
(
τ
η
) 1
η
τ ≡ n−R
n2θ
v˜(R) (3.36)
Hence f ′(τ)τ/f(τ) = 1/η. A higher value of η means that the equilibrium f does not
react strongly to a change of R which also means that attention costs do not change much.
33The expression is negative because v˜′(R) = V˜ ′ (y(R)) y′(R) and y′(R) < 0 but V˜ ′(y(R)) > 0.
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Thus the revenue effect is more likely to dominate the cost effect if η is large. Moreover,
we can deduce from (3.34) that n′(η) > 0 which by (3.33) means that equilibrium costs
C(f) must decrease in η. From (3.34) we see that
lim
η→∞
n(η) =
∆V˜ (y)
F
Similarly, if θ = 0 such that attention competition is free we get f ∗ → ∞ and n =
∆V˜ (y)/F . In both cases equilibrium profits are only determined by the value of the
attention set. As in both cases C(f) = 0 this can be thought of an upper bound on the
market size (for given R).
To summarise we note that if the economic competition is weak (εv ≈ 0), e.g. because
of weak substitutes, then firms cannot extract much additional revenue from a decline of
attention and the cost effect tends to dominate which implies smaller markets if consumers
are less attentive. If however the economic competition is strong or attention competition
is inelastic (high η) then less attentive consumers might imply higher profits and larger
markets.
3.4.2.3 The comparative statics of the ACF-CES example
We can use the general results of section 3.4.2.2 to discuss the comparrative statics of
the ACF-CES example considered earlier. Suppose the parameter values are such that a
free-entry equilibrium with n > R occurs endogenously. From section 3.3.3 we know that
a single symmetric SPE exists in this example. As we use the ACF we immediately know
from the previous section that f ′(∆) > 0, f ′(R) < 0 and f(F ) is non-monotonic (hump-
shaped). Also n′(∆) > 0 and n′(F ) < 0 follow directly from the last section. Because in
the CES-example we have V (y, y, R) = y−c
y
v
R
(see (3.31)) we can use (3.35) to examine
n′(R) in the ACF-CES case. It is straightforward to show that v˜(R) = vR
1+σ(R−1) and
εv =
(1−σ)
1+(R−1)σ ∈ (−1, 0). Hence for η = 1 we get sign(n′(R)) = sign (R(1 + εv) and thus
n′(R) > 0. In this case less attentive consumers imply a very fierce attention competition
that involves high attention costs and leads to exit. However, if η is large we could also
get n′(R) < 0, i.e. the gains from consumer inattention more than cover the increased
attention costs. This leads to firm entry. Numerical evaluations of the ACF-CES example
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confirm that, depending on the parameter constellation34, both cases may occur as figure
3.7 suggests. Finally, it is clear that in the ACF-CES example consumer budget has the
2 10 20
R
2
10
20
n
R
 low
high
Figure 3.7: The ACF-CES example
same comparative statics as ∆, i.e. y′(v) = 0, f ′(v) > 0 and n′(v) > 0. A larger value of
σ means that commodities are stronger substitutes and hence the economic competition
is more intense. It can be shown that y′(σ) < 0, f ′(σ) < 0 and n′(σ) < 0 (see 3.7.6, part
III).
3.5 Summary and comparison to the literature
I have presented a model of simultaneous strategic attention-price competition. This is the
first contribution that develops a game-theoretic setting which allows to combine attention
competition with economic competition. The competition for attention is modelled as a
contest where the ”loudest” firm has the highest chance of perception. In the free-entry
equilibrium of the symmetric price-attention game prices, attention effort levels and the
number of active firms are endogenously determined. I derive general conditions which
assert that only one symmetric equilibrium exists and show that my main example of the
attention contest, the ACF, satisfies these properties. In my model firms can influence the
34It can be shown that in the CES case we have ε′v(σ) < 0 which means that if the varieties are stronger
substitutes (larger σ) then, as suggested in the main text, n′(R) < 0 is more likely to occur.
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chance of perception which depends on their own effort level but also on the effort level of
all competitors and is endogenously determined. Competition for attention emerges only
if the equilibrium number of firms (information senders) is higher than the exogenous
attention threshold R. This is a similarity to the macroeconomic attention model of
Falkinger (Falkinger (2008)), where an information-rich economy occurs if and only if
total signal exposure at the consumer level exceeds a given perceptional threshold τ0.
The important difference between the two models, besides the fact that my approach is a
game-theoretic one, lies in the way how attention competition is introduced. In his model
a firm must send at a minimum signal strength σmin in order to be perceived. Every
firm that sends at σmin is perceived by all consumers who receive information of the
firm. This threshold value is exogenous to the single firm but endogenously determined
in equilibrium and proportional to total signal exposure of a consumer. Sending at σmin
requires the firms to pay a fixed cost that depends positively on σmin. That is, the fixed
costs of attention increases in the minimal signal strength that asserts perception.
One prediction of his model is that, in an information-rich economy and if every firm is
restricted to producing one commodity, if the firms can reach all consumers35 by sending
at σmin, then the measure of active firms (T ) is a measure of the attention parameter τ0
because in this case T = τ0. This is completely different in my model as i) an attention
equilibrium requires that there are more information senders than the people can perceive
(n > R) and ii) as we have seen we may have n′(R) > 0 but also n′(R) < 0 can occur. The
reason why a negative relationship between the attention parameter R and n can occur
in my model follows only from the fact prices also depend on the attention parameter.
Actually, y′(R) < 0 is a necessary condition for n′(R) < 0. Hence my model predicts
that the number of active firms is not a suitable measure for people’s attention threshold.
Additionally, in my model the equilibrium price reflects limited attention which helps to
explain why e.g. online prices have not dropped as much as expected after the introduction
of the Internet - a fact that search models and models of informative advertising have
significant difficulties to explain.
35In his model this requires that r = R.
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3.6 Appendix A: On uniqueness and stability
In section 3.3 I have presented the assumptions on the value function V and the probability
function p which exclude the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria in the symmetric
price-attention game. I have shown that the ACF satisfies all assumptions on p.
In this section I ask the more ambitious question whether there can be asymmetric
equilibria in the symmetric game. Intuitively, the interaction of economic competition
with attention competition suggests reasons why we could expect asymmetric ”special-
isation” equilibria to exist. We can imagine some firms to specialise in the economic
competition. These firms set a low price and do not advertise a lot (i.e. choose a low
attention effort level). The other firms specialise in attention competition: they choose a
high price and high attention levels. A firm in the first group knows that its chance of
perception is smaller than the chance of an attention specialist but i) it needs less revenue
to cover attention costs and ii) it may earn more revenue than an attention specialist from
those attention sets both are in. The firms in the second group are in more attention sets
which could cover their higher attention expenditure.
I now derive the conditions that exclude the possibility of asymmetric equilibria in the
price-attention game. To achieve this goal we cannot work with the symmetric opponent
form of the profit function. But because of the complex nature of the price-attention
game (every profit function has his own ”context” Bj, see (3.5)) it is clear that stan-
dard approaches to uniqueness such as the univalence approach or the index theorem (see
chapter 5.3.1) are not feasible because we would have to evaluate at (2N)× (2N)-matrix!
Fortunately, there exists an approach to uniqueness that separates between the possibil-
ity of multiple symmetric equilibria and the possibility of asymmetric equilibria. This
approach is developed throughout chapter 5. The proof of the inexistence of asymmet-
ric equilibria in the symmetric price-attention game in this section is an application of
this methodology. Further, I briefly discuss stability of the symmetric equilibrium under
iterative adjustments.
The proof is organized as follows. First, I consider a reduced version of the game
where the attention distribution is given exogenously but prices are chosen simultane-
ously. I show that, under certain assumption, there only is one equilibrium in this pricing
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game, the symmetric equilibrium, where all firms choose the same price y independent
of the attention distribution. Then it suffices to find conditions that assert that the pure
attention game for given and identical prices y only has one equilibrium, the symmetric
equilibrium.
3.6.1 Uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium
First, I state the basic assumptions regarding price competition that are maintained
throughout appendix A. Let Sy ≡ [c, ymax] as before. Suppose that the attention distri-
bution P as defined by (3.2) is exogenously fixed with the property that PA > 0 for all
A ∈ A. A firm can only choose its price yj. I consider the following profit function:
Π(yj) =
∑
A∈Bj
PAV
j(A)∆ (3.37)
Suppose that all n firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their price according
to (3.37). Then
(
n, Sny ,Π
)
is an n-player pricing game. I impose the following assumptions
on the value functions V j(YA) with A ∈ Bj:
Assumption 3.7. Let A ∈ Bj ⊂ A and |A| = z > 1. Then
a) For all A ∈ Bj and j = 1, ..., n: V j(YA) = V σ(j)(Yσ(A)), where σ is a permutation of
A. V j(YA) > 0 if yj = yg = y ∈ Int(Sy) for all g ∈ A.
b) V j(YA) ∈ C2
(
Int(Szy),R
)
, V j(YA) is strongly quasiconcave in y and
∂V j(YA)
∂yg
> 0 for
g ∈ A.
c) ∂V
j(YA)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=c
> 0 and ∂V
j(YA)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=ymax
< 0.
d) For yg ∈ (c, ymax) with g 6= j:
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
= 0 ⇒
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂y1yg
> 0
The last assumption means that prices are strategic complements. In case of an equal
distribution of attention, i.e. P (A) = P (A′) =
(
n
R
)−1
for all A,A′ ∈ A, the symmetric
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opponents form of (3.37) is
Π(y) =
{
R
n
V (y, y¯, R)∆ R < n
V (y, y¯, n)∆ R ≥ n (3.38)
To see this in the case where R < n note that |Bj| =
(
n− 1
R− 1
)
. Then if yg = y¯ for any
g 6= j we have
∑
A∈Bj
PAV
j(YA)∆ =
1(
n
R
) ( n− 1
R− 1
)
V (y, y¯, R)∆ =
R
n
V (y, y¯, R)∆
Lemma 3.5. Let P (A) = P (A′) for all A,A′ ∈ A and take assumption 3.7 as well as
condition (3.18) to be satisfied. Then the interior symmetric equilibrium y∗ ∈ (c, ymax) is
the unique equilibrium of the pricing game.
Proof: Appendix B (3.7.12)
Note that because ∂
∂y
(V1(y, y, z)) = V11(y, y, z) + V12(y, y, z) the inequality in condition
(3.18) can be rewritten as −V11(y, y, z) > V12(y, y, z). If even
V1(y
∗, y∗, z) = 0 ⇒ −V11(y∗, y∗, z) > |V12(y∗, y∗, z)| (3.39)
holds then the symmetric equilibrium y∗ is locally contraction-stable36 (stable under iter-
ative adjustments).
Lemma 3.5 implies that if R ≥ n the general proof of uniqueness in the symmetric
price-attention game is already finished because there cannot be an equilibrium other
than (y∗, f) with f = 0 and y∗ defined by V1(y∗, y∗, n) = 0.
From now on I always set n > R. Suppose that the attention distribution function P
is still exogenously given but PA > 0 may be different for different A ∈ A. An interior
36See theorem 5.4.
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equilibrium (y1, ..., yn) of the pricing game satisfies

∑
A∈B1
PA
∂V 1(YA)
∂y1
...∑
A∈Bn
PA
∂V n(YA)
∂yn
 ≡ Dy (y1, ..., yn) = 0 (3.40)
The following proposition shows that under a further assumption the only interior equi-
librium price vector is symmetric and independent of the attention distribution.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose that n > R and PA > 0 for all A ∈ A. Then under assumption
3.7 and condition (3.18) there exists a single symmetric equilibrium y∗ that is independent
of the distribution of PA. Further, if for any feasible yg with g 6= j and any A′ ∈ Bj with
j, g ∈ A′ ∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
= 0⇒ −∂
2V j (YA′)
∂y2j
> (R− 1)
∣∣∣∣∂2V j (YA′)∂yj∂yg
∣∣∣∣ (3.41)
holds then y∗ is the unique equilibrium of the pricing game.
Proof: Appendix B (3.7.13)
Note that if the inequality in condition (3.41) holds even without the requirement
that
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
= 0 then uniqueness follows directly from the contraction mapping
theorem (see Vives (1999), p. 47).37
Now I return to the symmetric price-attention game from the main text.
Proposition 3.7 (Sufficient conditions for uniqueness). Suppose n > R and assumptions
3.4 and 3.7 as well as (3.41) and (3.19) are satisfied. If for all A ∈ Bj, f1, ..., fn ∈ (0,∞)
and any fixed player g 6= j the condition
−∂
2PA(F)
∂f 2j
+
∂2PA(F)
∂fj∂fg
> 0 (3.42)
holds then the symmetric equilibrium (y, f) determined by (3.16) is the unique equilibrium
of the symmetric price-attention game.
37In the CES example it can be shown by applying proposition (3.2) for e.g. σ = 2, R = 2 and n = 3
that in this case the joint best-response function is not a global contraction but condition (3.41) holds
resulting in a unique price-equilibrium.
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Proof: Appendix B (3.7.14)
Note that if all presuppositions of proposition 3.7 are satisfied for any n ≥ 2 and (3.27)
and (3.28) hold then there only is one equilibrium (y, f, n) in the free-entry game and the
equilibrium is symmetric.
From the main text we already know that the ACF does not generate multiple sym-
metric equilibria. But does the ACF also satisfy (3.42)?
Consider (3.14) and suppose firm j did not get the first draw. Then one of firm j’s
competitors must have succeeded in doing so. The aggregate mass of the balls remaining
in the urn has changed conditional on the ball drawn out. Suppose for example that
the ball of firm g 6= j has been drawn. Then conditional on this event firm j’s chance
of getting the next draw is
fj
n∑
k=1
fk−fg
. We can use such a line of reasoning to calculate
the probabilities PA for all A ∈ A. To illustrate this, suppose R = 2 and n = 3. Then
A = {{1, 2} , {1, 3} , {2, 3}}. Let A = {1, 2}. Then PA(F) = PA(f1, f2, f3) and
PA(f1, f2, f3) =
f1f2
f1 + f2 + f3
(
1
f2 + f3
+
1
f1 + f3
)
Corollary 3.3. Let R = 2. The ACF satisfies condition(3.42).
Proof: Appendix B (3.7.15)
Remark: The procedure of the proof of 3.3 can be applied to show that (3.42) is satisfied
also if R = 3. I conjecture that (3.42) holds for any R > 2 under the ACF.
3.6.2 An example
I now provide an example of a function V j that satisfies assumption 3.7 and condition
(3.41). Let j denote the representative firm. Then for any A ∈ Bj let
V j(YA) = (yj − c)xj(YA)
with
xj(YA) = max
{
0,
1
1 + (z − 1)γ
(
1− 1 + (z − 2)γ
1− γ yj +
γ
1− γ
∑
i∈A:i6=j
yi
)}
(3.43)
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where γ ∈ (0, 1) controls the degree of substitutability38 between perceived commodities
and z = min {R, n}. This demand function is often used in oligopolistic theory and IO
models and can be microfounded by assuming a quasilinear upper tier utility function
and quadratic subutility (see e.g. Vives (1999) p. 145-146). For simplicity, I set c = 0
and ∆ = 1.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose Sy = [0, 1]. Then with (3.43) the symmetric equilibrium y
∗ ∈
(0, 1) of the pricing game is unique and independent of the attention distribution.
Proof:
In step 1 I show that assumption 3.7 is satisfied. In step 2 I show that (3.41) is satisfied.
Step 1: Assume j ∈ A ∈ Bj.
a) Permutation-invariance is obvious. Let yj = yg = y ∈ (0, 1) for all g ∈ A. Then
V j(YA) =
(1−y)y
1+(z−1)γ > 0.
b) We have ∂
2V j(YA)
∂y2j
= −2 1+(z−2)γ
(1−γ)(1+(z−1)γ) < 0 because z > 1 and γ < 1. Hence V
j(YA)
is strongly concave and thus also strongly quasiconcave.
c) We have
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
∣∣∣∣
y=0
=
1 + γ
1−γ
∑
i∈A:i6=j
yi
1 + (z − 1)γ > 0
and
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
∣∣∣∣
y=1
= −
1 + (2z − 3)γ − γ ∑
i∈A:i6=j
yi
(1− γ) (1 + (z − 1)γ)
Thus ∂V
j(YA)
∂yj
∣∣∣
y=1
< 0 because 1 + γ(z − 2) > 0.
d) Because ∂
2V j(YA)
∂yj∂yg
= γ
(1−γ)(1+(z−1)γ) > 0 for any g 6= j with g ∈ A the game is strictly
supermodular in prices. Hence prices are strategic complements.
Step 2:
Assume g ∈ A. Then
−∂2V j(YA)
∂y2j
> (z − 1)
∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg ∣∣∣ ⇔ 2 1+(z−2)γ(1−γ)(1+(z−1)γ) > γ(z−1)(1−γ)(1+(z−1)γ)
⇔ 2 + γ (z − 3) > 0
38γ → 1 means that commodities are perfect substitutes whereas γ → 0 means that commodities are
independent.
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which holds as z > 1 and γ < 1. Hence condition (3.41) from proposition 3.6 holds and
so does condition (3.18). This implies the existence of a unique interior equilibrium for
any n,R > 1 that is independent of the attention distribution. Moreover, the equilibrium
is symmetric.

If R = 2 we know from corollary 4 that if we use the ACF to determine the attention
probability distribution the price-attention game only has a unique symmetric equilibrium.
3.6.3 Stability
This section provides conditions which imply that the symmetric equilibrium is a local
contraction.
Proposition 3.8. The symmetric equilibrium (y, f) of the price-attention game is locally
contraction-stable if V (y, y¯, R) is a local contraction at y (condition (3.39) holds) and for
n > R
∆
p1(f, f, n,R)V2(y, y, R) + |p12(f, f, n,R)|V (y, y, R)
− (p11(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y, R)− C ′′(f)) < 1 (3.44)
Proof: Follows from theorem 5.4.

Corollary 3.4. Suppose n > R and V2(y, y, R) = 0 and let C(f) = θf
η where η ≥ 2 and
p(f, f¯ , n, R) is given by the ACF. Then the symmetric equilibrium is locally contraction-
stable.
Proof: Appendix B (3.7.16)
Note that e.g. with η = 1 the contraction condition (3.44) need not hold generally for the
ACF. In any case we require V2(y, y, R) to be small. Intuitively, the contraction condition
rather holds with higher η as then attention competition is less elastic (see (3.36)) and
hence firms only respond weakly to small deviations around the symmetric equilibrium.
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3.7 Appendix B
3.7.1 Properties of the ACF
Lemma 3.6. There exists a continuously differentiable extension to (3.13) which is given
by
pC(f, f, n,R) = 1− Γ(n)
Γ(n−R)
Γ
(
f
f¯
+ n−R
)
Γ
(
f
f¯
+ n
) (3.45)
where Γ(x) denotes the Gammafunction evaluated at x and R and n are real numbers with
R < n.
pC1 (f, f, n,R) =
n−R
nf
(ψ (1 + n)− ψ (1 + n−R)) (3.46)
where ψ(.) is the digamma function. If R0 is an integer then
pC1 (f, f, n,R0) =
n−R0
nf
R0∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
and pC1 (f, f, n,R0) is strictly concave in R around R0.
Proof:
First note that
R∏
i=1
(
(n− i)f¯) = f¯R (n− 1)!
(n−R)!(n−R) (3.47)
The Gamma-function Γ(x), which is continuously differentiable on x ∈ R+, has the prop-
erties that n! = Γ(n + 1) if n is a positive integers and Γ(x + 1) = xΓ(x). Hence (3.47)
becomes
f¯R
Γ(n)
Γ(n−R)
Equivalently,
R∏
i=1
(
f + (n− i)f¯) = f¯R R∏
i=1
(
f
f¯
+ n− i
)
= f¯R
Γ
(
f
f¯
+n
)
Γ
(
f
f¯
+n−R
)
(3.48)
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Hence
pC(f, f, n,R) = 1− Γ(n)
Γ(n−R)
Γ
(
f
f¯
+ n−R
)
Γ
(
f
f¯
+ n
)
which is continous for R < n and P (f)
R→n−−→ 1 as Γ(n − R) R→n−−→ ∞. As the deriva-
tion makes clear we have p(f, f¯ , n, R) = pC(f, f¯ , n, R) whenever R and n are integers.
Differentiation of (3.45) at f = f¯ > 0 then yields (3.46). If R0 is an integer we have
ψ (1 + n) = ψ (1 + n−R0) +
R0∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
as also the digamma function is recursive with ψ(1 + x) = ψ(x) + 1
x
. Hence
pC1 (f, f, n,R0) =
n−R0
nf
R0∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
which corresponds to (3.20). But know is is formally possible to take the derivative and
pC14(f, f, n,R0) =
1
nf
(
(n−R0) 1
(1 + n−R0)2
−
∑ 1
1 + n− i
)
But
pC14(f, f, n,R0)−
pC1 (f, f, n,R0)
R0
=
n−R0
(1 + n−R0)2
− n
R0
R0∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
which is negative as n−R0
(1+n−R0)2 < 1 but
R0∑
i=1
1
1+n−i =
1
n
+ 1
n−1+ ...+
1
1+n−R0 >
1
n
+ 1
n
+ ...+ 1
n
=
R0
n
. Hence pC1 (f, f, n,R0) is strictly concave in R around R0.
39

Lemma 3.7. With the ACF based on (3.20) the following properties hold:
a) p1(f,f,n,R)
n
+ p13(f, f, n,R) > 0
b) p
′′(f,f,n,R)
p1(f,f,n,R)
< p13(f, f, n,R)
n2
R
c) p
′′(f,f,n,R)
p1(f,f,n,R)
< − n
R
p1(f, f, n,R)
39It is an easy numerical excersise to show that this result generalises for an arbitrary real-valued R0.
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d) p1(f, f, n,R) for given f > 0 is a hump-shaped function of n.
where p′′(f, f, n,R) ≡ ∂p1(f,f,n,R)
∂f
.
Proof:
a) As
p13(f, f, n,R) =
1
nf
(
R
n
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i − (n−R)
R∑
i=1
(
1
1 + n− i
)2)
(3.49)
we have
p1
n
+ p13 > 0 ⇔
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i − (n−R)
R∑
i=1
(
1
1 + n− i
)2
> 0 (3.50)
which holds because
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i − (n−R)
R∑
i=1
(
1
1 + n− i
)2
=
R∑
i=1
(
1 +R− i
(1 + n− i)2
)
> 0
b) From (3.20) we see that p
′′
p1
= − 1
f
. Then using (3.49) gives
p′′
p1
< p13
n2
R
⇔ −R
n2
<
R
n2
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i −
(n−R)
n
R∑
i=1
(
1
1 + n− i
)2
Reformulation gives
R
n
(
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i + 1
)
− (n−R)
R∑
i=1
(
1
1 + n− i
)2
> 0
or equivalently
R
n
(
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i + 1
)
−(n−R)
R∑
i=1
(
1
1 + n− i
)2
+
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i−
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i > 0
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But then because of (3.50) we only need to show
R
n
(
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i + 1
)
−
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i > 0
or
R−
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i (n−R) > 0 (3.51)
which is true because
R−
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i (n−R) =
R∑
i=1
(
1− n−R
1 + n− i
)
=
R∑
i=1
(
1 +R− i
1 + n− i
)
> 0
c) Because p
′′
p1
= − 1
f
we have
p′′
p1
< − n
R
p1 ⇔ 1 > n−R
R
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
or equivalently
R− (n−R)
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i > 0
which holds because of (3.51).
d) Let n > R and use (3.49) to find
sign (p13(f, f, n,R)) = sign
(
R∑
i=1
(
2R− n+ R
n
(1− i)))
= sign
(2R− n) + Rn − R(R + 1)2n︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ψ(n)

But n > R implies that ψ′(n) = −1− R
n2
+ R(R+1)
2n2
< 0. Moreover, we have ψ(R) =
R+1
2
> 0 and ψ(2R) = 1
2
− (R+1)
4
< 0 because R > 1. These findings imply that
p1(f, f, n,R) must be hump-shaped in n.

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3.7.2 Proof of proposition 3.1
Use (3.3) to find
∑
j∈I
pij =
∑
j∈I
(∑
A∈A
PiA 1 [j ∈ A]
)
=
∑
A∈A
PiA
∑
j∈I
1 [j ∈ A]
=
∑
j∈I
1 [j ∈ A] = z

3.7.3 Proof of lemma 3.1
The first part follows directly from (3.3). If R ≥ n then pj = 1 for any active firm because
there only is one attention set, namely I itself, which is perceived with probability one.
Now suppose n > R. Then (3.3) implies pj =
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F) which gives pj = pj(fj, f−j).
Now suppose that pj < 1. Then
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F) < 1 which by assumption 3.1 implies that
PA(F) increases in fj for all A ∈ Bj. But this implies that pj(fj, f−j) increases in fj.

3.7.4 Proof of lemma 3.2
Suppose n > R. Because fg = f¯ for any g 6= j we have PA(F) = PA′(F) for A,A′ ∈ Bj.
Let s ≡ |Bj| and suppose j ∈ A. Then
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F) = sPA(F) for A ∈ Bj. Lemma 3.1
and (3.3) imply that sPA(F) = p(f, f¯ , n, R). Hence
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F)V j(YA)∆ = V (y, y¯, R)∆
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F)
= p(f, f¯ , n, R)V (y, y¯, R)∆
If this is used in (3.5) we get (3.9). If R ≥ n then pj = 1 and V j(YA) = V (y, y¯, n) which
then implies (3.10).

Remark: Hence if we know p(f, f¯ , n, R) then we also know PA(F) for any A ∈ Bj.
But then we also can find PA′(F) for any A′ /∈ Bj. To see this let B−j ≡ {A′ ∈ A : j /∈ A′}.
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Then we have PA′(F) = PA′′(F) for any A′, A′′ ∈ B−j. Then
∑
A′∈B−j
PA′(F) = 1−
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F)
= 1− sPA(F) = 1− p(f, f¯ , n, R)
3.7.5 Proof of proposition 3.2
Let n > R. Define
G(f) ≡
R∏
i=1
g(f, i) (3.52)
with
g(f, i) ≡ (n− i)f¯
f + (n− i)f¯
a) Obviously G(f) ∈ [0, 1] for f, f¯ > 0. Hence p ∈ [0, 1]. b) Relativity is obvious. c) With
−∂G(f)
∂f
= −G(f)
R∑
i=1
∂g(f, i)
∂f
1
g(f, i)
and
∂g(f,i)
∂f
1
g(f,i)
= − (n−i)f¯
(f+(n−i)f¯)2
f+(n−i)f¯
(n−i)f¯
= − 1
f+(n−i)f¯
we get
p1(f, f¯ , n, R) = −∂G(f)
∂f
= G(f)
R∑
i=1
1
f + (n− i)f¯ > 0 (3.53)
The same reasoning gives
p2(f, f¯ , n, R) = −G(f)
R∑
i=1
∂g(f, i)
∂f¯
1
g(f, i)
But as
∂g(f, i)
∂f¯
=
f(n− i)(
f + f¯(n− i))2 > 0
we have p2(f, f¯ , n, R) < 0. Similarly, p3(f, f¯ , n, R) < 0 as
∂g(f, i)
∂n
=
ff¯(
f + f¯(n− i))2 > 0
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Suppose n ≥ R + 1. The (strong) monotonicity of p in R can be seen from
G(f,R + 1)−G(f,R) = −G(f,R)
(
f
f + f¯ (n− (R + 1))
)
< 0
Finally, I show that p11(f, f¯ , n, R) < 0.
p11(f, f¯ , n, R) = −∂2G(f)∂f2
= −
(
∂G(f)
∂f
R∑
i=1
∂g(f,i)
∂f
1
g(f,i)
+G(f)
R∑
i=1
(
∂2g(f,i)
∂f2
g(f, i)−
(
∂g(f,i)
∂f
)2)
1
g(f,i)2
)
= −G(f)
([(
R∑
i=1
∂g(f,i)
∂f
1
g(f,i)
)2
−
R∑
i=1
(
∂g(f,i)
∂f
1
g(f,i)
)2]
+
R∑
i=1
(
∂2g(f,i)
∂f2
g(f, i)
)
1
g(f,i)2
)
(3.54)
But as
(
R∑
i=1
ai
)2
>
R∑
i=1
a2i for ai > 0 and
∂2g(f,i)
∂f2
> 0 the result follows immediately.

3.7.6 The ACF-CES example: calculations
Part I:
In case of (3.11) V1(y, y¯, R) = 0 implies
yσ(R− 1)(σ − 1) = c (y¯σ−1 + yσ−1(R− 1)σ) (3.55)
which is equivalent to
yσ−1(R− 1) (y(σ − 1)− cσ) = cy¯σ−1
which for y¯ ≥ c implies that y > cσ
σ−1 and hence also y > c. Applying the Implicit Function
Theorem to (3.55) an rearranging gives
y′(y¯) = c
(yy¯)2−σ
σ(R− 1)(y − c) > 0
and
y′(R) = y
y(1− σ) + cσ
(R− 1)(σ − 1)σ(y − c) < 0
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Part II:
Suppose that n > R. Use y¯ = y in (3.55). This gives (3.29). Moreover,
V (y, y, R) = (y − c) v
yR
=
v
1 + (R− 1)σ (3.56)
Using this in (3.22) gives (3.30).
Part III:
y′(R) follows directly from (3.29). From proposition 3.9 (see 3.7.11) we can deduce
sign(f ′(σ)) = sign
(
V1σ(p13 +
p1
n
)
and thus with the ACF f ′(σ) < 0 follows because
of V1σ = − (y−c)v(R−1)R2y2 < 0. Similarly, we get sign(n′(σ)) = sign (−V1σ (np21 +Rp′′ − ω))
and because of the ACF we have n′(σ) < 0.
3.7.7 Proof of proposition 3.3
Because the function V (y, y¯, z) is twice continuously differentiable in y, y¯, the function
V1(y, y, z) must be continuous in y ∈ (c, ymax) for any z > 1. Because of the boundary
condition a) i) in assumption 3.5 the equation V1(y, y, z) = 0 must then have a solution
y = y(z) for any z > 1 and y ∈ (c, ymax). Moreover, because of (3.18) the solution to
V1(y, y, z) = 0 must be unique for any given z > 1 (this is an index theorem result; see
proposition 5.3 in chapter 5). Hence if R ≥ n then there exists exactly one symmetric
equilibrium (y, f) with f = 0 and y = y(n) ∈ (c, ymax).
If n > R repeating the previous argument shows that there exists a unique solution
y = y(R) ∈ (c, ymax) to V1(y, y, R) = 0. Because p1(f, f, n,R) is continuous for f ∈
(0,∞) (a consequence of assumption 3.4) and because of the boundary conditions a) ii)
in assumption 3.5, V (y, y, z) ∈ (0,∞) and (3.7) the equation
ψ(f) ≡ p1(f, f, n,R)V (y, y, R)∆− C ′(f) = 0
must have a solution f = f(n,R,∆) ∈ (0,∞). Condition (3.19) together with (3.7)
implies that ψ(f) is strictly decreasing in f ∈ (0,∞) which means that the solution must
be unique.
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Consequently, there exists a unique vector (y, f) that solves (3.17).
(Second-order conditions) If R ≥ n then V11(y, y, n) < 0 implies that second-order
conditions of the representative firm’s maximisation problem in (3.10) are satisfied at
y = y(n). Similarly, if n > R then the second-order conditions of (3.9) evaluated at
y = y(R) and f = f(n,R,∆) are satisfied because Π11 =
R
n
V11(y, y, R)∆ < 0, Π22 =
p11(f, f, n,R)V (y, y, R)∆− C ′′(f) < 0 and Π12 = p1(f, f, n,R)V1(y, y, R)∆ = 0.
Thus the existence of exactly one symmetric equilibrium has been proved.

3.7.8 Proof of lemma 3.4
Let n > R. If we set f = f¯ > 0 then (3.52) gives G(f) = n−R
n
. Using this in (3.53) gives
(3.20). Moreover, (3.20) shows that the ACF satisfies assumption 3.5. Note that
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i =
R−1∑
j=0
1
n− j = H(n)−H(n−R) (3.57)
whereH(x) is the x-th harmonic number. It is well known that the sequence (H(x)− Ln(x))x∈N+
is monotonically decreasing and converges to the Euler-Mascheroni constant γ. Hence
H(n)− Ln(n) = γ + e(n)
where e(n) is an error term with de
dn
< 0. Thus the maximal error occurs at n = 1 and
has e(1) = 1− γ < 1/2. Because of the subtraction in (3.57) the constant γ cancels out.
Further e(n − R) is large if R is close to n. Thus the overall numerical error in setting
H(x) = Ln(x)+ γ in (3.57), e = e(n)− e(n−R) is bounded in absolute value by one and
is small if n large and R small. Thus
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
∼= Ln(n)− Ln(n−R) = Ln
(
n
n−R
)
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By defining x ≡ R/n we have
Ln
(
n
n−R
)
= Ln
(
1
1− x
)
Applying a first-order Taylor expansion at x0 = 0 then gives
Ln
(
1
1− x
)
= x+ r1 (0, x)
with |r1 (0, x)| ≤ x21−x . Thus again if R is relatively small compared to n we can expect
our approximation to perform numerically well. Thus the suggested approximation (3.21)
is nummerically accurate whenever R/n is small.

3.7.9 Proof of proposition 3.4
Existence:
From (3.23) we see that profits are continuous in (y, f, n), because assumption 3.6 implies
that V (y, y, z) with z = min {R, n} is continuous in n. Further we have Π(yˆ, 0, 2) ≥ 0 by
presupposition. n→∞ implies n > R. Hence lim
n→∞
Π(y, f, n) = −F − C(f) < 0. From
proposition 3.3 we know that for any given n ≥ 2 a solution (y, f) to (3.24) - (3.25) exists.
Moreover, because of lemma 3.8 (see below) (y, f) = (y(n), f(n)) is a continuous function
of n. Hence Π(y(n), f(n), n) is a continuous function of n and consequently there must
exist n′ ∈ [2,∞) such that Π(y(n′), f(n′), n′) = 0 which proves existence.
Uniqueness:
Suppose n ≥> 2 is given exogenously. Let (y(n), f(n)) denote the solution to (3.17).
Because of proposition 3.3 and lemma 3.8 we now that (y(n), f(n)) is unique for any
given n and that the vector (y(n), f(n)) is a continuously differentiable function of n if
n 6= R. Define Π˜(n) ≡ Π(y(n), f(n), n) where the function Π is given by (3.23). Then
Π˜(n) is a continuously differentiable function of n if n 6= R. But by the definition of Π˜ the
vector (y(n′), f(n′), n′) is a symmetric equilibrium of the free entry game if and only if we
have Π˜(n′) = 0. If we have Π˜′(n) < 0 for all n 6= R that satisfy Π˜(n) = 0 (∗) then there
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can be at most one n ≥ 2 that solves Π˜(n) = 0. I now show that (3.28) is a sufficient
condition for (∗).
Let n < R. Then
Π˜′(n) = ∆
−V2(y, y, n)V13(y, y, n)∂
∂y
(V1(y, y, n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+V3(y, y, n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 < 0
where Π˜′(n) is evaluated at Π˜(n) = 0. Consequently, condition (∗) holds if n < R.
Now let n > R. Then
Π˜′(n) = −R
n2
− p1(f, f, n,R)f ′(n)
where Π˜′(n) is evaluated at Π˜(n) = 0. But (see 3.7.10)
f ′(n) = − p13(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y, R)
∂
∂f
(p1(f, f, n,R))∆V (y, y, R)− C ′′(f)
This implies
Π˜′(n) = −R
n2
+ p1
p13∆V
∂
∂f
(p1)∆V − C ′′
Then we have Π˜′(n) < 0 if
p13
n2
R
>
∂
∂f
(p1)
p1
− C
′′
∆V p1
(3.58)
Because C
′′
∆V p1
≥ 0 condition (3.28) is a sufficient condition for (3.58). Consequently,
condition (∗) also holds if n > R.
Thus there only is one vector (y, f, n) that solves (3.24)-(3.26). Hence there only is
one symmetric equilibrium.

Lemma 3.8. Let R, n > 1. Suppose assumptions 3.5 and 3.6 are satisfied. Then the
equilibrium vector (y, f) defined by (3.17) is a continuous function of n and continuously
differentiable in n except at n = R.
Proof: Because of proposition 3.3 ∃!(y, f) that solves (3.17).
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Case 1: n < R. Then f = 0 and hence f ′(n) = 0. Because of (3.18) the IFT tells us that
y(n) is continuously differentiable in n. Consequently, (y, f) is continuously differentiable
in n.
Case 2: n > R. Let J˜ denote the Jacobian of (3.16) with respect to (y, f):
J˜ =
(
∂
∂y
(V1(y, y, R)) 0
p1(f, f, n,R)∆
∂
∂y
(V (y, y, R)) ∂
∂f
(p1(f, f, n,R))∆V (y, y, R)− C ′′(f)
)
But then
Det(J˜) =
∂
∂y
(V1(y, y, R))
(
∂
∂f
(p1(f, f, n,R))∆V (y, y, R)− C ′′(f)
)
> 0
which by the IFT means that (y, f) is continuously differentiable in n.
Case 3: n = R. Because
y =
{
y(R) R < n
y(n) R ≥ n
y is continuous in n but not differentiable at n = R. I now show that f is continuous in
n also at n = R. We have
f =
{
f(n,R,∆) R < n
0 R ≥ n
Let
ψ(f) = p1(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y, R)− C ′(f)
Then the Kuhn-Tucker necessary condition corresponding to the representative firm’s
opimization problem with respect to f is
ψ(f) + λ = 0 λf = 0 f, λ ≥ 0
Suppose f > 0. Then
lim
n→R+
ψ(f) = −C ′(f) + λ
But then f > 0 implies C ′(f) > 0 which implies λ > 0, a contradiction to optimality.
Consequently, we must have lim
n→R+
f(n,R,∆) = 0. Hence f is continuous at n = R.

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3.7.10 Proof of proposition 3.5
The Jacobian J of (3.16) is given by
J =
(
V ′′ 0
p1∆V2 p
′′∆V − C ′′
)
where V ′′ ≡ ∂
∂y
(V1(y, y, R)) and p
′′ ≡ ∂
∂f
(p1(f, f, n,R)). HenceDet(J) = V
′′ (p′′∆V − C ′′) >
0. Let ψ ≡ p1(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y, R)− C ′(f, α). Then by Cramer’s rule we have
sign(y′(χ)) = sign
(−V1χ
V ′′
)
= sign (V1χ)
and
sign(f ′(χ)) = sign
(
p1∆V2V1χ − ψχV ′′
Det(J)
)
= sign (p1∆V2V1χ − ψχV ′′)
where χ ∈ {R, n,∆, F, α}. Then it is easy to see that y′(R) < 0, f ′(∆) > 0 and f ′(α) < 0.
If χ = R we get
sign(f ′(R)) = sign(p1V2V13︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− V ′′︸︷︷︸
<0
(p14V + p1V3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
)
If χ = n we get sign(f ′(n)) = sign(p13). Hence the sign of f ′(R) and f ′(n) can only be
determined under further assumptions.

3.7.11 Comparative statics under free entry: calculations
Assume parameter values such that an attention equilibrium (n > R) occurs endogenously.
The Jacobian of (3.24) - (3.26) with respect to (y, f, n) is
J =
 V ′′ 0 0p1∆V2 p′′∆V − C ′′ p13∆V
R
n
∆V2 −p1∆V − Rn2∆V
 (3.59)
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Then after some manipulation
sign (Det(J)) = sign
(
p′′
p1
− p13n
2
R
)
But then (3.28) implies that Det(J) < 0. Let χ ∈ {R,∆, F, α}.
Proposition 3.9. Suppose an attention equilibrium (n > R) occurs endogenously. Then
the comparative statics are given by
y′(χ) = V1χ∆
2V 2
Det(J)
(
R
n2
p′′ − p1p13 − ωn2
)
f ′(χ) = ∆V
Det(J)
(
V ′′
(
RΠfχ
n2
+Πχp13
)
− V1χ∆RV2n
(
p13 +
p1
n
))
n′(χ) = ∆V
Det(J)
(
V1χ∆V2
n
(np21 +Rp
′′ − ω)− V ′′
R
(Rp′′Πχ + p1RΠfχ − Πχω)
)
where Πχ ≡ ∂∂χ
(
R
n
V (y, y, R)− F − C(f, α)), Πfχ ≡ ∂∂χ (p1(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y, R)− C ′(f, α)),
ω ≡ C′′(f,α)R
∆V
≥ 0 and J is the Jacobian (3.59) with Det(J) < 0.
Proof:
Follows immediately by applying Cramer’s rule to
J
 y′(χ)f ′(χ)
n′(χ)
 = −
 V1χΠfχ
Πχ


3.7.12 Proof of lemma 3.5
First note that under assumption 3.7 and by the definition of V (y, y¯, z) (see 3.2.3.1) we
have a symmetric differentiable game that permits only interior equilibria and asserts the
existence of a symmetric equilibrium (see 5.2 from chapter 5). Any symmetric equilibrium
must satisfy V1(y
∗, y∗, z) = 0 with y ∈ Int(Sy). Strategic complementarity excludes
asymmetric equilibria (see theorem 5.2). Condition (3.18) corresponds to the condition
that rules out multiple symmetric equilibria (see 5.3).

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3.7.13 Proof of proposition 3.6
Let y1 = ... = yn = y. Then by the symmetry of V
j we have
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
=
∂V j(YA′)
∂yj
= V1(y, y, R)
for all A,A′ ∈ Bj. Hence
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
= V1(y, y, R)
∑
A∈Bj
PA
But lemma 3.5 implies the existence of a unique y∗ with V1(y∗, y∗, R) = 0. The inexistence
of multiple symmetric equilibria for any non-degenerate distribution of PA follows from
(3.40). Assumption 3.7 implies that no boundary equilibria exist. To proof the claim
of uniqueness I apply the index theorem (see Vives (1999), p. 48), which requires the
Jacobian of −Dy to have a positive determinant whenever Dy = 0 holds. The j-th row of
this Jacobian is
(
− ∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂yj∂y1
· · · − ∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂y2j
· · · − ∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂yj∂yn
)
I now show that (3.41) implies
−
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂y2j
>
∑
g 6=j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂yj∂yg
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (3.60)
The triangle inequality implies
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∑
g 6=j
∣∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg
∣∣∣∣ =∑
g 6=j
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∣∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg
∣∣∣∣ ≥∑
g 6=j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂yj∂yg
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Symmetry of V j(·) implies for any A ∈ Bj that ∃g(A) 6= j ∈ A such that
∑
g 6=j
∣∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (R− 1) ∣∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg(A)
∣∣∣∣
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Hence a sufficient condition for (3.60) to hold is
−
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂y2j
>
∑
A∈Bj
PA(R− 1)
∣∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg(A)
∣∣∣∣
which is equivalent to
∑
A∈Bj
PA
(
−∂
2V j(YA)
∂y2j
− (R− 1)
∣∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg(A)
∣∣∣∣) > 0 (3.61)
But (3.61) is obviously implied by condition (3.41). Symmetry further implies that when-
ever (3.60) holds then a similar statement holds for any other row of the n×n - Jacobian
of −Dy. But then −Dy must have a dominant diagonal whenever Dy = 0 and hence
−Dy must have a positive determinant40 if Dy = 0. But then by the index theorem we
conclude that the symmetric equilibrium must be unique.

3.7.14 Proof of proposition 3.7
Because (3.41) is required to hold the attention distribution does not affect the equilibrium
price by proposition 3.6. The equilibrium price is determined vy V1(y, y, R) = 0. Thus
we only need to show that for the equilibrium price y the attention competition does
not generate any asymmetric equilibria. Because Πfjfj =
∑
A∈Bj
∂PA(F)
∂f2j
V (YA)− C ′′(fj) and
Πfjfg =
∑
A∈Bj
∂PA(F)
∂fjfg
V (YA) condition (3.42) implies that −Πfjfj + Πfjfg > 0. But this
means that the slope of player j’s best resonse function with respect to fg must be larger
than −1:
∂fj(f1, ..., fn)
∂fg
= −Πfjfg
Πfjfj
> −1
But then there cannot be any asymmetric attention equilibria (see chapter 5). Condition
(3.19) rules out the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria. Consequently, there can
only be one equilibrium in the price-attention game, the symmetric equilibrium.

40This follows because Det(−Dy) = r1 · ... · rn and all eigenvalues rk must have positive real parts.
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3.7.15 Proof of corollary 3.3
For simplicity I set j = 1 and g = 2. The following argument obviously remains the same
if any different players were used.
I use the following decomposition of B1. Let Bˆ2 ≡ {A ∈ B1 : 1 ∈ A ∧ 2 ∈ A} and
Bˆ−2 ≡ {A ∈ B1 : 1 ∈ A ∧ 2 /∈ A}. Hence
Π1 =
∑
A∈Bˆ1
PAV (YA) +
∑
A∈Bˆ2
PAV (YA)− C(f1)− F
Thus according to proposition 3.7 we need to proof
−∂
2PA
∂f 21
+
∂2PA
∂f1∂f2
> 0 (3.62)
for f1, ..., fn ∈ (0,∞) and any A ∈ B1. Suppose A ∈ Bˆ−2. Then PA takes on the form
PA =
f1fh∑
fj
(
1∑
fj − f1 +
1∑
fj − fh
)
where 3 ≤ h ≤ n. Now suppose A′ ∈ Bˆ2. Then
PA′ =
f1f2∑
fj
(
1∑
fj − f1 +
1∑
fj − f2
)
In fact with R = 2 there can only be one such set: A′ = {1, 2}. Differentiation yields:
− ∂
2
∂f 21
PA +
∂2
∂f1∂f2
PA =
1
(
∑
fj − fh)2
− 1
(
∑
fj)
2 > 0
and
− ∂
2
∂f 21
PA′ +
∂2
∂f1∂f2
PA′ =
2 (
∑
fj − f1 − f2)
(
∑
fj − f2)3
> 0
Consequently, (3.62) is satisfied for any A ∈ B1.

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3.7.16 Proof of corollary 3.4
For C(f) = θfη we have
C ′′(f) =
(η − 1)
f
C ′(f) (3.63)
Using V2 = 0, (3.63) and (3.16) in (3.44) gives
|p12 (f, f, R, n)|
−
(
p11 (f, f, R, n)− (η−1)f p1(f, f, n,R)
) < 1 (3.64)
Further calculate
p12 (f, f, R, n) = G(f)
( R∑
i=1
1
f(1 + n− i)
)2
−
R∑
i=1
n− i
f 2(1 + n− i)2
 (3.65)
and from (3.54)
p11 (f, f, R, n) = −G(f)
( R∑
i=1
1
f(1 + n− i)
)2
+
R∑
i=1
1
f 2(1 + n− i)2
 (3.66)
With (3.20) and V2 = 0 condition (3.44) is equivalent to∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
( R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
)2
−
R∑
i=1
n− i
(1 + n− i)2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=K
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
<
((
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)
)2
+
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)2
)
+(η − 1)
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)
(3.67)
which obviously is rather satisfied for larger η. Thus I set η = 2. If K ≥ 0 then (3.67)
obviously holds. If K < 0 then (3.67) also holds because
0 < 2
(
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)
)2
+
R∑
i=1
1−n+i
(1+n−i)2 +
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)
= 2
(
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)
)2
+
R∑
i=1
1−n+i
(1+n−i)2 +
R∑
i=1
1+n−i
(1+n−i)2
= 2
(
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)
)2
+
R∑
i=1
2
(1+n−i)2
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4Applications and Extensions
In the first section of this chapter I introduce attention competition from chapter 3 to the
Salop model of circular product differentiation. Given their location on the unit circle the
firms simultaneously choose their price and their attention effort. I show that if we use the
ACF to determine the attention probabilities then the Salop model generates a symmetric
opponent form that is similar to the general symmetric opponent form of chapter 3. Hence
we can use the framework of chapter 3 to discuss existence and the comparative statics
of the equilibrium in the Salop model under limited attention. In this model the number
of active firms, n, has the nice interpretation of a measure of overall diversity. What we
additionally gain by the Salop model, compared to chapter 3, is the possibility to dicuss
welfare implications of limited attention. I show that under limited attention the usual
negative relationship between overall diversity n and average consumer transportation
costs is inverted. This implies that, under limited attention, average consumer utility
decreases in n whereas under unlimited attention the opposite holds. This explains why
a planning authorities’ primary object is to cut back diversity under limited attention.
In section 4.2 I combine the model of informative advertising from chapter 2 with at-
tention competition from chapter 3. This means that, other than in the Internet economy
from chapter 3, the information sets Ii of the consumers are heterogeneous and depend
on the information effort of the advertising firms. I show that limited attention implies
higher average transportation costs (a result from chapter 4.1) also in the case where
firms can choose the fraction of consumers they want to inform. Comparing the model
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with the conventional model of Grossman and Shapiro I provide some evidence that my
model may give a better fit to the development of the advertising-consumption shares as
reported in the introduction.
In the sections 4.3 and 4.4 I extend the theory of chapter 3. In section 4.3 I discuss
the implications of heterogeneity in the attention threshold R on market equilibrium and
consumer welfare in case of the Salop model. In section 4.4 I illustrate that unilateral
advantages in attracting attention of a firm can be instrumentalised by the firm to over-
come other technological inefficiencies. This may lead to a crowding-out of more efficient
firms, as measured by production technology, in the free-entry equilibrium if these firms
fail to get sufficient attention.
4.1 Attention competition in the Salop model
In this section I introduce attention competition, as developed in chapter 3, to the circular
model of ideal variety from chapter 2. The main difference to chapter 2 is, that I consider
the case of the Internet economy (see 3.2.1). Whereas in the model of chapter 2 the reach
of a firm, φj, was endogenously determined, I now impose φj = 1 for any firm that pays the
fixed cost F > 0. This means that the consumers receive information of all active firms.
However, perception is limited by R. If R ≥ n (consumers perceive all existing varieties)
then the model of this chapter coincides exactly with the conventional Salop model (Salop
(1979)). Consumers have the same utility1 as in chapter one: ui(j) = v − twi(j) − yj.
I now introduce limited attention to the model. For simplicity, I normalise population
size to one. As we will see, the Salop model generates a symmetric opponent form of the
profit function that matches the general specification of the last chapter.
1Unit demand makes the model as simple as possible. The basic results do not depend on the as-
sumption of unit demand as can be shown by solving the model e.g. with a Wong-type utility function
ui =
∑
j∈Ai
qji
1+twi
where qji is demand of consumer i for the commodity of firm j (see Wong (1995), p.
260). Intuitively, this is the case because different specifications for ui only affect Nk but not the way
how limited attention enters the profit function of the firm.
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4.1.1 Demand and profit for n > R
As in chapter 2 for a given price y of the representative firm and given y¯ I partition the set
of consumers into n groups, k = 1, ..., n where the k-th group is the subset of consumers
to whom the representative firm would offer the k-th highest net utility of the n firms
under unlimited attention. Under unlimited attention (if R ≥ n) consumers compare all
n varieties which induces a strong price competition and in equilibrium firms can only
sell to their prime segment k = 1 and consumers purchase from their ”closest” location
(in the sense of next to ideal variety). With limited attention consumers consider only a
subset of all available commodities. Hence from the viewpoint of the representative firm
it may be possible to make a sale to consumers far away if the firm is perceived but a
better firm (in terms of net utility) is not perceived. With this partitioning of the set of
all consumers into n favourite groups the expected demand function of the representative
firm is
E[Q,R] =
n∑
k=1
E [qk, R]Nk (4.1)
where E [qk, R] ∈ [0, 1] denotes expected demand from a member of group k and Nk is
the number of consumers in group k. Then by the law of total expectations we have
E [qk, R] = p(A)p (k|A) (4.2)
where p(A) denotes the probability of the representative firm (firm j) to be in the attention
set2 of a member of group k and p (k|A) is the conditional probability of offering the
highest net utility among all other perceived firms. I set yj = y and fj = f as well as
yg = y¯ and fg = f¯ for all g 6= j. By chapter 3 we then may set p(A) = p
(
f, f¯ , n, R
)
,
where p
(
f, f¯ , n, R
)
is the probability of being perceived (i.e. of being in an attention set).
Throughout the rest of chapter 4.1 I assume that p(f, f¯ , n, R) is given by the ACF. Then
p(A) = p
(
f, f¯ , n, R
)
= 1−
R∏
i=1
(
1− f
f + (n− i)f¯
)
(4.3)
2I always assume this probability to be independent of group identity k. This means that firms cannot
identify consumers and hence cannot direct their messages to a certain subset of consumers. Therefore
p(A) is the same for all consumers and independent of group identity k.
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Moreover, we have
p (k |A) =
R−1∏
i=1
(
1− (k − 1)f¯
(n− i)f¯
)
=
R−1∏
i=1
(
1 + n− k − i
n− i
)
(4.4)
This is the conditional probability that given the representative firm made it into the
attention set none of the k − 1 superior3 firms makes it into the attention set. Thus
E [qk, R] =
(
1−
R∏
i=1
(
1− f
f + (n− i)f¯
)) R−1∏
i=1
(
1 + n− k − i
n− i
)
(4.5)
Assuming c = 0 and n > R the profit function of the representative firm is
Π = yE [Q,R]− F − C(f)
= yp(f, f¯ , n, R)
n∑
k=1
p (k|A)Nk − F − C(f)
The group measures Nk are the same as in chapter one:
N1 =
y¯ − y
t
+
1
n
Nk =
1
n
2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 Nn = 1
n
− y¯ − y
t
(4.6)
4.1.2 Equilibrium
In this section I derive the symmetric equilibrium of the Salop model with attention com-
petition. First, I concentrate on the case where n is given exogenously and determine
(y, f) in the equilibrium. Then I move on to the free-entry equilibrium that determines
(y, f, n). Finally, I relate the comparative-statics of the Salop model with attention com-
petetion to the general results of chapter 3.4.
If R ≥ n then E[Q,n] = N1. As all n varieties are perceived it is only possible to
make a sale to the prime segment k = 1. The model then corresponds to the conventional
3As in chapter 2 all reference to ”superior” and ”inferior” are in terms of net utility and relative to
the representative firm.
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Salop model (Salop (1979)). Thus we have
Π(y, f) =

y p
(
f, f¯ , n, R
) n∑
k=1
p (k |A)Nk︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E[Q,R]
−F − C(f) R < n
yN1 − F R ≥ n
(4.7)
In the notation of the last chapter we have
V (y, y¯,min {R, n}) =
 y
n∑
k=1
p(k |A)Nk R < n
yN1 R ≥ n
Hence from (4.7) we see that the Salop-model with limited attention has a symmetric
opponent form similar to (3.9) from chapter 3.
Lemma 4.1. For y¯ = y ≤ v − t/2, f¯ = f > 0 and z = min {R, n} ≥ 2 we have
a) If n > R we have p (1 |A) = 1 and p (n |A) = 0
b) V (y, y, z) = y/z
c) E[Q, z] = 1/n
Proof: Appendix B (4.6.1)
Proposition 4.1. Suppose v ≥ t and R, n ≥ 2 and p(f, f¯ , n, R) is represented by the
ACF. Then a single symmetric equilibrium (y, f) exists
i) if n > R then
y = t/R (4.8)
p1(f, f, n,R)
t
R2
= C ′(f) (4.9)
Π =
t
Rn
− F − C(f) (4.10)
and f ∈ (0,∞)
ii) if n ≤ R then f = 0 and
y = t/n (4.11)
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Π =
t
n2
− F (4.12)
Proof: Appendix B (4.6.2)
I now turn to the case where n is determined endogenously by the zero-profit condition.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose p(f, f¯ , n, R) is represented by the ACF and R ≥ 2. If t ≥ 4F
the free entry game has a single SPE with 2 ≤ n < ∞. If
√
t
F
> R then (y, f, n) is
approximately determined by
y = t/R
n−R
n2f
t
R
= C ′(f)
t
Rn
= F + C(f)
(4.13)
If
√
t
F
≤ R then
y =
√
tF
f = 0
n =
√
t
F
(4.14)
Proof: Appendix B (4.6.3)
4.1.2.1 Comparative statics under free entry
In this section I assume that R <
√
t/F and use C(f) = θfη. Because with this ex-
ample we have V (y, y, R) = y/R the comparative static results from chapter 3.4.2.2
apply. Hence we unambiguously have f ′(R) < 0 for this example. Using lemma 4.1
we get εv = −1 because v˜(R) = V˜ (y(R)) = y(R) = t/R. Hence sign (n′(R)) =
sign (R + εv (R + n(η − 1))) = sign (−n(η − 1)) and n′(R) ≤ 0 with n′(R) = 0 if and
only if η = 1. Consequently, the Salop model predicts the number of active firms and
hence diversity to increase if consumers become more inattentive (R decreases) as the
revenue effect dominates. This occurs because in this models markups are inversely pro-
portional to the number of perceived firms (see (4.8) and (4.11))4. This is a different
result than in the ACF-CES example where both cases n′(R) > 0 and n′(R) < 0 are
4The result that n′(R) ≤ 0 for η ≥ 1 is also obtained if the Wong distance function is used with the
assumption of unit demand. However, if we allow for continuous demand then the condition for n′(R) ≤ 0
depends on η. Intuitively, this is the case because with elastic demand consumers can evade some price
competition which leads to a smaller value of εv.
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possible (see chapter 3.4.2.2). Because of the simple structure of the equilibrium equa-
tions it is possible to analytically investigate how limited attention affects the magnitude
of certain changes. Let nNL =
√
t/F . We can use (3.34) from the last chapter to find
t
Rn2η
(n(η − 1) +R) = F which can be solved for
nL =
t(η − 1) +
√
t2(η − 1)2 + 4tFR2η
2FRη
(4.15)
Comparing nL and nNL we see that a higher t increases equilibrium diversity in both cases.
Intuitively, as t increases the varieties become weaker substitutes which implies that a
higher equilibrium price can be sustained which, because of V2(y, y, R) = v
′(y) = 1 > 0,
translates into a higher equilibrium revenue. Define εt ≡ n′(t)tn(t) as well as εF ≡ n
′(F )F
n(F )
.
Then we get
εNLt = 1/2 ε
L
t =
1
2
+
√
t(η − 1)
2
√
t(η − 1)2 + 4FR2η
Hence εNLt < ε
L
t for η > 1. This means that the magnitude of change of n(t) is larger under
limited attention. Intuitively, this occurs because with unlimited attention equilibrium
prices depend negatively on n. Then the additional firms that enter the market reinforce
price competition and reduce markups which derates the initial gain and reduces entry.
In contrast, under limited attention equilibrium prices do not depend on n and hence the
deration effect is absent. Thus n reacts stronger to a change of t in an attention economy.
A similar argument holds for a change in F . We have
∣∣εNLF ∣∣ = 1/2 ∣∣εLF ∣∣ = 12 +
√
t(η − 1)
2
√
t(η − 1)2 + 4FR2η
Hence
∣∣εNLF ∣∣ < ∣∣εLF ∣∣ for η > 1. Thus a decrease of fixed costs means that the induced rate
of entry is higher under limited attention. The reason again is that with limited attention
equilibrium prices are independent of the actual market size n. Figure 4.1 illustrates these
results. In the figure we see that the difference between the curves increases as t increases
(F decreases) which reflects the magnitude effect of limited attention.
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Figure 4.1: F, t - effects under limited attention (solid) and unlimited attention
4.1.3 Welfare
In this section I investigate the implications of limited attention on welfare.
As Grossman and Shapiro show the average distance travelled by a consumer who
purchases his k-th favourite variety (for equal prices) is given by w¯k = (2k − 1)/4n
(Grossman and Shapiro (1984) p. 74). For n > R the probability that a consumer
purchases at his k-th best firm is E[qk, R] .
5 If R ≥ n then E[q1, n] = 1 and E[qk, n] = 0
for k > 1. The expected distance a consumer travels is given by
w¯ =

n∑
k=1
E[qk, R]w¯k R < n
1
4n
R ≥ n
(4.16)
Proposition 4.3. In the symmetric equilibrium (y¯ = y and f¯ = f) average transportation
distance is:
i) if n > R:
w¯L =
(n+ 1)
2n(R + 1)
− 1
4n
(4.17)
ii) if R ≤ n: w¯NL = 1/4n.
Hence w¯L > w¯NL, ∂w¯
NL
∂n
< 0 and ∂w¯
L
∂n
> 0.
Proof: Appendix B (4.6.4)
5The consumer purchases his k-th best variety if the other R−1 perceived varieties are inferior. There
are n− k inferior firms. But if n− k < R − 1 then at least one perceived firm must be superior. Hence
nobody consumes worse than the (1 + n−R)th variety.
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We can write average transportation distance as
w¯(n) =
{
n+1
2n(R+1)
− 1
4n
R < n
1
4n
R ≥ n (4.18)
We see from (4.18) that w¯(n) is continuous in n and lim
n→∞
w¯(n) = 1
2(R+1)
> 0 and w¯′′(n) =
− R−1
2n3(R+1)
< 0 if n > R. Hence the positive effect of n on average transportation distance
is strongest if n ≈ R and diminishes as n gets larger. This is illustrated in the next figure.
Under unlimited attention the relationship between average transportation distance and
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Figure 4.2: The function w¯(n) (solid) for R = 5
diversity is negative, but positive under limited attention. Why is this the case? The
answer to the question is not trivial. Let n = 5 and consider the k-th best variety for a
fixed consumer. If we add another firm to the circle and, as usually, assume that the firms
reallocate symmetrically around the circle then our fixed consumer still has k−1 superior
varieties but 6−k > 5−k inferior varieties. What this means is that for any given k if we
increase n then the consumer has a higher chance of picking an inferior variety relative to
k. On the other side a higher n means that firms move closer together, i.e. the distance
between two firms declines in n. This means that choosing an inferior variety (relative to
k) may lead to a less severe punishment in terms of additional transportation costs if n
is higher. Moreover, the consumer may benefit more by choosing a superior variety if n
is higher because then firms are closer together. The calculations of proposition 4.3 show
the choice probability effect (the chance of choosing an inferior variety) to dominate the
effect of the firms moving closer together. Hence in the Salop model with limited attention
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the ”confusion” of consumers by more information (more diversity) implies that consumer
on average choose a worse variety (in the sense that average transportation distance is
larger).6
This result is of considerable importance. Let T = tw¯ denote average transportation
costs of a consumer. Without limited attention the model predicts that if equilibrium
diversity increases (n increases) then the average consumer is better off because i) all
consumers pay a lower price and ii) the average consumer purchases a variety closer to his
ideal variety. Proposition 4.3 shows that under limited attention things are completely
different. The average consumer is worse off if diversity increases because i) prices do not
react to an increase of n but ii) the average consumer purchases a variety further away
from his ideal variety.
It has been argued that the introduction of the internet has reduced the fixed costs
F (see the discussion on page 39). In the conventional Salop equilibrium lower F , ceteris
paribus, means higher diversity n and lower prices (see (4.14)). But a lower F also
increases the chance that an attention equilibrium occurs. If this is the case a further
reduction of F has no effect on prices but increases average transportation costs T . This
is illustrated in figure 4.3. In the upper picture of figure 4.3 we see that under limited
attention a further reduction of F increases average transportation costs. This were not
the case under unlimited attention as the dashed line suggests. Limited attention then
implies average consumer utility to decrease in F because average transportation costs
increase and prices remain constant. This is depicted in the lower picture.
4.1.3.1 Socially optimal level of diversity
We know from the canonical Salop model that the market overprovides diversity. This
occurs because firms do not take into account their aggregate effect on transportation
costs whereas the planer weights the marginal cost of an additional firm (which is F )
against its social value (which is the average reduction in transportation costs). I now
show that this result extends to the case of limited attention. Moreover, I show that
the discrepancy between the market solution and the social optimal value of diversity is
enlarged under attention competition the more inelastic attention competition becomes.
6In Appendix A I investigate the result more thoroughly.
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Figure 4.3: Transportation costs and average consumer utility as a function of F
The welfare function is W = v − nF − T (n)− nC(f) with T (n) = tw¯(n) where T (n) are
average transportation costs of consumers. The planer chooses (f, n) in order to opimize
the welfare function W . Hence
T (n) =
{
t(n+1)
2n(R+1)
− t
4n
R < n
t
4n
R ≥ n (4.19)
Proposition 4.4. Suppose R <
√
t
F
. Then the optimal level of diversity nP is given by
nP =

1
2
√
t
F
√
t
F
≤ 2R
R
√
t
F
> 2R
(4.20)
Moreover, the planer always chooses fP = 0.
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Proof: Appendix B (4.6.5)
The planer always chooses fP = 0 because any other level of f is costly but does not
lead to a better match between firms and consumers.7 A similar result is obtained by
Falkinger (Falkinger (2008)). If we have R <
√
t
F
then by proposition 4.2 an attention
equilibrium occurs, i.e. we have n > R. From (4.20) we see that nP ≤ R. Thus the
market overprovides diversity also under limited attention.
The planer problem is illustrated in figure 4.4. In the figure the dashed line corresponds
to the welfare function under unlimited attention and the solid line corresponds to the
true welfare function of the planer. We never have nP > R simply because the only
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Figure 4.4: Planer solution nP (R)
socially relevant reason to increase diversity is that transportation costs decrease due to
a better match of consumer to variety. Under limited attention this effect does no longer
exist as attention constrained consumers cannot benefit from the increased diversity. If
the size of the attention set is sufficiently large then the planer chooses nP < R, the same
level of diversity that he had chosen in the case of unrestricted attention (left picture). If
however R is small then choosing nP < R may be socially too expensive (right picture)
because this implies very high transportation costs. Hence the best choice of the planer
then simply is nP = R.
Moreover, limited attention may sincerely increase the market inefficiency. Let ρ ≡
n− nP denote excessive diversity.
7This follows because, as the firms, the planer cannot discriminate between the consumers.
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Proposition 4.5. Under limited attention nP ≤ R < n. If consumers are less attentive
this implies higher excessive diversity as ρ′(R) ≤ 0. If η > 1 then ρ′(R) < 0. Moreover,
excessive diversity increases in η.
Proof: Appendix B (4.6.6)
Suppose we have η > 1. The intuition behind proposition 4.5 is that if R decreases
(consumers are less attentive) then because n′(R) < 0 market diversity increases. At
the same time we know from proposition 4.4 that the planer never chooses nP > R. As
n increases and nP does not increase (but may decrease) excessive diversity increases if
consumers become less attentive. Moreover, excessive diversity increases with η because
in the Salop model we must have n′(η) > 0 (see the discussion on page 97 of chapter
(3.36)) but nP does not depend on η because fP = 0. Taken together these facts imply
that if
√
t
F
> 2R (such that nP = R) then the larger the difference between n and R is,
the larger is the welfare loss due to limited attention in the economy.8
4.2 Attention competition and informative advertis-
ing
In this section I introduce attention competition into the model of informative advertising
from chapter 2 based on the approach of chapter 3. The model in this section basically
merges the model of chapter 2 with the model of section 4.1 of this chapter. Every firm
j simultaneously and non-cooperatively chooses its strategy, the vector (yj, φj, fj), where
φj corresponds to the fraction of consumers firm j wants to inform. As before, I restrict
myself to the case of symmetric firms and only discuss symmetric equilibria. Formally,
we have to deal with a three-dimensional static symmetric n-player game.
In section 4.2.1 I derive the symmetric opponent form of this game and present the
equilibrium equations in 4.2.2. I illustrate that the model of limited attention and infor-
mative advertising fits the US-data on advertising and consumption expenditures better
8This also is a conclusion in Falkinger’s model of limited attention (Falkinger (2008)). However, in my
model the number of firms (overall diversity) always exceeds the socially optimal level which is not the
case in his model. A further difference is that in my model the planer might eventually choose nP < R
whereas in his model optimal perceived diversity always corresponds to τ0.
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than the conventional model of informative advertising and unlimited attention in sec-
tion 4.2. Finally, I show in section 4.2.4 that the result from section 4.1.3 on average
transportation costs (limited attention implies higher transportation costs) extends to
the model of informative advertising.
4.2.1 The symmetric opponent form
Every consumer i is attributed an information set Ii which comprises all the commodities
the consumer is informed of. A completely uninformed consumers has Ii = ∅. If the
consumer is informed e.g. of commodity j then j ∈ Ii. As in the previous chapters
limited attention means that a maximum of 1 < R < ∞ items of the information set
Ii are perceived. In chapter 2 information sets Ii can be different among consumers as
Ii depends on advertising and is endogenously determined. I denote by A˜i the attention
set of consumer i. A˜i is the set of varieties the consumer effectively considers in making
his decision. We must have A˜i ⊂ Ii. If |Ii| ≤ R we have A˜i = Ii, but |Ii| > R implies
A˜i ( Ii. In case of an attention constrained consumer competition for this consumer’s
attention emerges if the firm can by some means influence the chance of being perceived,
i.e. the chance of being contained in the attention set of the consumer. In the model of
this section a firm has two strategic information variables it can choose. A firm decides
i) what fraction of the population to inform (φ) and ii) how salient its messages should
be (f). To illustrate the difference between these two information instruments suppose
a firm with a fixed advertising budget plans a newspaper advertising campaign. Then
this firm faces a trade-off between in how many newspapers to place an ad versus the
placement or size of the ad in a given newspaper. I take firm j as the representative firm
and set yj = y, φj = φ and fj = f as well as yg = y¯, φg = φ¯ and fg = f¯ for any g 6= j.
The remainder of this section is devoted to deriving the symmetric opponent form of the
symmetric game.
In chapter 2.2.1.2 I showed that the representative firm’s expected demand from a
member of favourity group k given that this member received information from the rep-
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resentative firm9 has the form (see (2.7))
E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] = B1 +B2
In this expression B1 corresponds to the firm’s conditional demand if the consumer has
limited information (if he receives ads of less than R opponents). B2 corresponds to the
firm’s conditional demand if the consumer has limited attention (if he receives ads of at
least R opponents). If a consumer receives an ad from the representative firm and less
than R ads from the opponents of the representative firm then this consumer considers all
ads he receives. Hence the relative salience of the messages plays no role for perception.
This means that B1 = B1(φ¯, n, R) as determined in (2.7). Limited attention, and the
competition for attention, only matters for expected demand if the consumer receives ads
of at least R opponents. In such a case the consumer is not capable of considering his
entire information set and the relative salience of the messages determines the probability
with which an item is perceived. Hence we have B2 = B2(φ¯, n, R, f, f¯). In the appendix
(see 4.6.7) I show that, under the ACF, the conditional probability to make a sale to a
member of group k who received ads of exactly z ≥ R opponents is
Pk(S(z) |z ≥ R, j ∈ Ik ) =
k−1∑
s=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
k − 1
s
)(
n− k
z − s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
G1
p(A)︷ ︸︸ ︷
p
(
f, f¯ , 1 + z, R
)
p(k|A )︷ ︸︸ ︷
R−1∏
i=1
1 + z − i− s
(1 + z − i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
G2
(4.21)
Suppose a member of group k receives information of z ≥ R opponents. Then G1 is the
probability to be in an information set with s superior firms and z− s inferior firms10. G2
is the probability to be the best perceived firm given an information set with z opponents
and s superior firms. This probability depends positively on f , as the chance of perception,
p(A), depends positively on f . By a similar argument the probability depends negatively
9This means that j ∈ Ik. E.g. the consumer buys a newspaper in which the firm has acquired an
advertising slot.
10Note that for φ¯ > 0 we have G1 > 0 only if s ≤ z.
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on f¯ . Expected conditional demand from a member of group k then is
E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] = B1(φ¯, n, R) +B2( ¯φ, n,R, f, f¯) (4.22)
where
B1(φ¯, n, R) =
R−1∑
z=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
n− k
z
)
and B2(
¯φ, n,R, f, f¯) is given by
B2(φ¯, n, R, f, f¯) =
n−1∑
z=R
P (S(z) |z ≥ R, j ∈ Ik )
Suppose advertising costs are given by θr∆m + mγC(f). This means that the cost of
acquiring m channels depends on the base cost θr∆ of a channel but also on the cost
of attention effort per channel. Intuitively, this captures the idea that a firm can buy
a better ”slot” in a given channel, e.g. by purchasing a larger space in a newspaper to
place its ad in, or by acquiring a position on the front page. Then, setting c = 0 and
defining A(φ) = θr∆m(φ) where φ(m) is given by (2.5) (see chapter 2.1.2), the symmetric
opponent form of the profit function is (see (2.8))
Π(y, φ, f) = φy∆
((
y¯−y
t
+ 1
n
)
E [q1, R |j ∈ I1 ] + 1n
n−1∑
k=2
E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ]
)
+φy∆
(
1
n
− y¯−y
t
)
E [qn, R |j ∈ In ]− F − A(φ) (1 + κC(f))
(4.23)
where κ ≡ γ/(θr∆).
4.2.2 The symmetric equilibrium
The parameters of the game are {∆, F, n,R, t, θ, r, a}. In a symmetric equilibrium all
active firms choose the same strategy, the vector (y, φ, f). As in chapter 2 I say that an
attention equilibrium occurs if nφ > R, where nφ corresponds to the average size of an
information set11. If nφ ≤ R, i.e. a conventional equilibrium occurs, then f = 0 and y
and φ are determined by (2.21) and (2.22).
Assuming the existence of a symmetric equilibrium with nφ > R the three equilib-
11That is, on average a consumer is informed of nφ different varieties.
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rium equations for (1− φ)n ≈ 0 can be derived from the first-order conditions of (4.23),
evaluated at y¯ = y, f¯ = f and φ¯ = φ:
Πy = 0 ⇒ y = t
R
(4.24)
Πφ = 0 ⇒ y∆
nφ
= A′(φ) (1 + κC(f)) (4.25)
Πf = 0 ⇒ φy∆
n
n∑
k=1
∂E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ]
∂f
− A(φ)κC ′(f) = 0 (4.26)
It should be clear that equation (4.24) must corresponds exactly to (2.21) (for c = 0 and
R < nφ). Moreover, equation (4.25) must correspond to (2.22) (for c = 0) up to the factor
(1 + κC(f). This factor appears as the marginal cost of extending the campaign by a
further channel also depends on attention costs incurred per channel. The major problem
is to determine
n∑
k=1
∂E[qk,R|j∈Ik ]
∂f
in (4.26). I show in the appendix (4.6.8) that a good
approximation to this expression can be obtained by assuming that the firm competes for
consumer attention with |I| = nφ firms. Then using the model of section 4.1 we get
n∑
k=1
∂E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ]
∂f
∼= nφ−R
(nφ)2f
n (4.27)
Using the approximation (4.27) and setting C(f) = fη (4.26) becomes
y∆
nφ−R
n2φA(φ)η
= κC(f) (4.28)
Applying (4.28) to (4.25) and using (4.24) gives a single equation that determines φ for
given n:
t∆
Rnφ
(
1− nφ−R
nη
A′(φ)
A(φ)
)
= A′(φ) (4.29)
Thus assuming an interior solution the equilibrium φ is approximately determined by
ψ(φ) = 0 where
ψ(φ) ≡
 t∆Rnφ
(
1− nφ−R
nη
A′(φ)
A(φ)
)
− A′(φ) R < nφ
t∆
(nφ)2
− A′(φ) R ≥ nφ (4.30)
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where the second expression follows from (2.21) and (2.22) (chapter 2.3.1).
Let ε ≡ φA′′(φ)
A′(φ) and ν ≡ φA
′(φ)
A(φ)
.
Proposition 4.6. Suppose n > R > 1, A(0) < ∞, A′(1)/A(1) ≥ 0, A′(1) = ∞ as
well as ν − ε ≤ 1.12 Then the equation ψ(φ) = 0 has a unique solution φ ∈ (0, 1). If
t∆/R2 − A′(R/n) > 0 then nφ > R.
Proof: Appendix B (4.6.9)
The condition ν−ε ≤ 1 can be shown to hold for the advertising technology from chap-
ter 2.1.2 (see 4.6.9 in the appendix). Henceforth I take the presuppositions of proposition
4.6 to be satisfied and assume nφ > R.
The zero profit condition is Π = yE [Q,R]−F −A(φ) (1 + κC(f)). Concentrating on
the case where nφ > R arises endogenously13 and with (1 − φ)n ≈ 0 we get (use lemma
2.1 from chapter 2.2.2 and (4.24))
t∆
Rn
= F + A(φ) (1 + κC(f)) (4.31)
Using (4.28) in (4.31) gives
t∆
Rn
(
η − 1
η
+
R
nφη
)
= F + A(φ) (4.32)
Then equations (4.24), (4.25), (4.29) and (4.31) together determine (y, φ, f, n) in case
of a free-entry equilibrium with nφ > R. How does attention competition, i.e. the possi-
bility to choose the salience of ones messages, alter the results from chapter 2? Looking
at the equilibrium equations we see that the one parameter of attention competition that
matters is η. I now compare the model of chapter one, M1 (limited attention under infor-
mative advertising but without attention competition) to the model of this section (M2).
Let M3 be the benchmark model of Grossman and Shapiro where limited attention is
excluded by assumption. Figure 4.5 plots the equilbrium φ, n and f as a function of the
attention cost elasticity η for all three models. In figure 4.5 the solid line corresponds to
12These requirements are satisfied for the CRIR advertising technology of chapter 2.
13The conditions for this are similar to those in chapter 2.3.2.
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Figure 4.5: The models M1 (dashed), M2 (solid) and M3 (dotted)
the solution from M2. We see that n increases in η. We obtain a similar result in chapter
3.4.2 if the value function V (y, y, R) is of the type V (y, y, R) = V˜ (y)/R. We know from
section 4.1 that the Salop model implies this type of value function. The possibility to
continuously choose the reach φ does not change how the equilibrium n depends on η.
Moreover, we note a positive relationship between φ and η but a negative relationship
between f and η. This makes sense intuitively, because attention effort f and φ are some-
what substitutive: a lower f decreases the marginal costs of φ (see (4.25)). Comparing
the solid line to the dashed line in the left picture we see that attention competition
reduces equilibrium information provision. This occurs because some funds are invested
into a higher salience among selected channels instead of into new channels. As attention
competition imposes additional costs on firms this reduces profits compared to M1 which
explains why the level of diversity in M2 is lower than in M1.
4.2.3 Advertising and consumption expenditure
In the model of section 4.2 advertising expenditure consists of two components: the expen-
diture on reach φ and the expenditure on attention effort f . The Grossman and Shapiro
model recognises only the expenditure on reach as variable advertising costs because un-
limited attention is assumed. Since the model also predicts consumption expenditure y∆
we can construct the same ratio of advertising expenditure to consumption expenditure
as was depicted in figure 1.4 of chapter 1. Let this ratio be denoted by ρ. Then
ρLA ≡ n
LA
(
A
(
φLA
) (
1 + κC
(
fLA
)))
yLA∆
ρGS ≡ n
GS
(
A
(
φGS
))
yGS∆
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where the superscript LA indicates the model of section 4.2 and GS refers to the original
model of Grossman and Shapiro. As ∆ is exogenous to the model we can depict ρLA and
ρGS as functions of ∆. From the data we know that the number of consumers in the U.S.
doubled from 1950 to 2005. For fixed R we have ρLA = ρGS as long as nGSφGS ≤ R.
Figure 4.6 compares the predictions of ρ by the two models to the data.14 I normalised
0.5%
1.5%
2.5%
3.5%
1.0 1.5 1.9
Consumers (Delta)
S h
a r
e  
( r
h o
)
True Share
GS
LA
Figure 4.6: Comparison of advertising data to model predictions
initial population size to one and simulated the doubling of consumers as suggested by the
data. The figure shows that the GS model as well as the LA model predict ρ to increase
with ∆ but at a decreasing rate. We further see that the LA model implies the share to
increase at a higher rate if the attention constraint gets binding (nφ > R) which leads
to a much better match of the model with the data compared to the GS model. This is
the case because limited attention implies more active firms and attention competition
implies an additional advertising cost per firm. Moreover, this result is outstanding as the
other candidate which we could expect to be important, namely advertising technology,
cannot explain the remarkable increase of ρ. It can be shown that in the GS model
14I implemented a parameter constellation quite similar to the simulations of Grossman and Shapiro:
I used the CRIR-technology with r = 0.1, θ = 0.01, t = 40, η = 1, R = 8 and F = 0.8.
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an increase of per channel reach r as well as a decrease of channel costs θ (both are
compatible with advances in advertising technology) implies that ρGS declines. Hence the
conventional model of GS has considerable difficulties to explain the significant increase
of the advertising - consumption ratio that we observe in the data.
4.2.4 Transportation costs and informative advertising
In this section I discuss the effect of attention competition on transportation costs T in
the model with informative advertising. Set φ¯ = φ, y¯ = y and f¯ = f as well as R ≥ 2
and n ≥ 2. Let E[qk, R] denote the probability that a consumer consumes his k-th best
variety.
Lemma 4.2. Average transportation costs conditional on being informed are
T =
t
1− (1− φ)n
n∑
k=1
2k − 1
4n
E[qk, R] (4.33)
Proof: Appendix B (4.6.10)
Note that (4.33) is valid for the model of chapter 2 as well as for the model of section 4.2.
Take φ < 1 and n > 2 as given and fixed. For simple reference let TL ≡ T (R < n) and
TNL ≡ T (R ≥ n). I now compare average transportation costs between an economy with
limited attention and an economy with unlimited attention, holding all parameters other
than R fixed. I prove that for given φ and n limited attention unambiguously implies
higher average conditional transportation costs.
Proposition 4.7. Assume φ ∈ (0, 1) and n > 2. Then TL > TNL.
Proof: Appendix B (4.6.11)
Hence we get the same result regarding transportation costs in the model with informative
advertising as in the model of section 4.1, where φ = 1 was imposed exogenously. This
occurs as limited attention implies the probability of consuming at the best locations to
be lower than in the case of unlimited attention and higher at less favourable locations,
which is illustrated in figure 4.7.15 In the figure we see that E[qk, R], the probability that
a consumer purchases his k-th best variety, in case of limited attention (solid line) is lower
15The figure has R = 2, n = 10 and φ = 1/2.
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Figure 4.7: E[qk, R] for limited (solid) and unlimited attention.
for k = 1, 2 than in the case of unlimited attention. What is the effect of information φ
and diversity n on transportation costs T? From Grossman and Shapiro (Grossman and
Shapiro (1984), p. 74) we know that more information (a higher φ) or more diversity
means that the average distance, w¯, between the ideal variety and the purchased variety
declines. This means that average transportation costs T = tw¯ also decline. If consumers
are informed about more varieties (higher nφ) then they have a higher chance of finding a
close to ideal variety. Figure 4.8 illustrates average consumer transportation costs T from
(4.33) for R = 2, R = 4 and R =∞ in dependence of φ and n. The lower set of pictures
(n = 5 left and n = 20 right) shows that under limited attention more information at
the firm level (higher φ) decreases average transportation costs too, but the effect only
matters at low levels of φ. The upper set of pictures in figure 4.8 show that for moderate
information (φ = 1/2 in left picture, φ = 0.99 in right picture) an increase of diversity
first reduces T also in the case of limited attention and that T converges to some value
that is strictly above the average distance compared to the case of unlimited attention.
Moreover, if φ is large we observe the familiar result from section 4.1.3 that increasing
diversity increases T .
These pictures help to understand the following result. It turns out that by using
4.2. ATTENTION COMPETITION AND INFORMATIVE ADVERTISING 149
Out[10]=
5 10 15 20 25 30
n
0.1
0.2
T
5 10 15 20 25 30
n
0.1
0.2
T
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Φ
0.1
0.2
T
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Φ
0.1
0.2
T
Figure 4.8: Average transportation costs: R = 2 (solid), R = 4 (dashed) and unlimited
attention (dotted).
(1− φ)n = 0 in expression (4.22) we get16
E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] ∼= R
nφ
R−1∏
i=1
1 + n− k − i
n− i (4.34)
The intuition of this approximation is clear. A consumer is informed of about nφ varieties.
But a consumer who is aware of nφ > R varieties has the probability p(A) = R/(nφ) of
choosing a particular variety and
R−1∏
i=1
1+n−k−i
n−i is the probability to choose the k-th best
firm. For φ = 1 we get E [qk, R] from (4.5). Using E [qk, R] = φE [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ] from
(4.34) and (1− φ)n = 0 in (4.33) gives (also see lemma 4.3)
T ∼= t
n∑
k=1
2k − 1
4n
φ
R
nφ
R−1∏
i=1
1 + n− k − i
n− i = t
(
n+ 1
2n(R + 1)
− 1
4n
)
(4.35)
Hence we have T = tw¯L where w¯L is given by (4.17). This means that transportation costs
16These calculations are not trivial. Using Mathematica I obtained the approximation (4.34) for (1−
φ)n = 0 in the cases R = 2, 3, 4, 5 and conjecture that (4.34) holds for any number R > 1.
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tw¯L as determined in section 4.1.3 are a reasonable approximation to the transportation
costs under informative advertising whenever (1− φ)n is close to zero (i.e. nφ is large).
From figure 4.5 we know that the effect of attention competition on the equilibrium
φ, n are strongest if η is close to one. n and φ take on lower equilibrium values compared
to the model of chapter 2. From figure 4.8 we know that lower φ ceteris paribus means
higher T and lower n can mean both lower or higher T . Simulation results show that
average transportation costs of the model of this chapter (M2) are very similar to the
transportation costs of chapter 4.8 under limited attention (M1). Figure 4.9 illustrates
such a simulation.17 Moreover, transportation costs are higher compared to the case
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Figure 4.9: Average transportation costs for M1 (dashed), M2 (solid) and M3 (dotted)
of the conventional Grossman-Shaprio model (M3). This means that the main welfare
conclusion from section 4.1.3, limited attention increases transportation costs (consumer-
firm mismatch) compared to the conventional model, is not only valid in the Internet
economy but also when firms can continuously choose the reach of their information
campaign.
17This particular figure has R = 2, t = v = 30, θ = 0.01, F = 0.3 and uses the CRIR-technology with
r = 1/3. All simulations that I have conducted reveal a similar picture.
4.3. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY OF LIMITED ATTENTION AMONGCONSUMERS?151
4.3 Negative externality of limited attention among
consumers?
Up to now I have assumed Ri = R for all consumers. Suppose now there are two types
of consumers with respect to the size of their attention set. A fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of
all consumers has RL and a fraction of 1 − λ has RH with RL < RH . Then R¯ =
λRL + (1− λ)RH is the average attention threshold in the economy. We can think of the
L-types as very inattentive shoppers whereas the H-type represents a more careful type
of consumer who considers more varieties in making his decision. In the model of section
4.1 (attention competition in the Salop model) the profit function of the representative
firm becomes
Π = y
(
λp(f, f¯ , n, RL)
n∑
k=1
p (k,RL |A)Nk + (1− λ)p(f, f¯ , n, RH)
n∑
k=1
p (k,RH |A)Nk
)
−F − C(f)
(4.36)
where p (k,Rς |A) denotes the conditional probability of offering the highest net utility
among all perceived alternatives to a ς-type member of group k. We can use proposition
4.2 to conclude that if
√
t/F > R¯ then an equilibrium with n > R¯ occurs. Assuming an
interior equilibrium with RL < R¯ < RH < n, using the ACF and proceeding as in section
4.1.2 the following three equilibrium conditions can be derived from (4.36):
y =
t
R¯
(4.37)
t(n− R¯)
R¯n2f
= C ′(f) (4.38)
t
R¯n
= F + C(f) (4.39)
We see that only average attention R¯ matters for the equilibrium. Comparing these
equations with (4.13) we note that the comparative statics of (y, f, n) are similar to those
of section 4.1.2.1. With C(f) = θf η and by using (4.38) in (4.39) we get a quadratic
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equation in n which has the positive solution
n =
(η − 1)t+
√
t2(η − 1)2 + 4tF R¯2η
2FR¯η
(4.40)
Equilibrium utility of the H-type is
UH = v − t
R¯
− tTH (4.41)
where TH are average transportation costs that an H-type incurs. Now suppose that
18
dRL < 0 such that dR¯ < 0. What is the effect of such a change on UH? First, we
see that the price increases (y′(R¯) < 0) which decreases UH . If RH < n then, because
T ′H(n) > 0 and n
′(R¯) < 0, TH increases as RL decreases. This means that UH decreases if
RL decreases. Less attention of the L-type ceteris paribus hurts the H type (who is also
attention constrained as n > RH because of higher prices and higher transportation costs.
Suppose now that in equilibrium we have RL < R¯ < n < RH . Then we have TH(n) =
t/(4n) and T ′H(n) < 0 (follows from section 4.1.3). The H type perceives the entire
market. Hence if diversity increases marginally (so that the H type ex post still perceives
the entire market) then the H-type will benefit from this because his transportation costs
unambiguously decrease in n. However, equilibrium prices are higher if dRL < 0. The
question is whether the increase in prices can be at least compensated by the decrease in
transportation costs. Suppose that λ is close to one. Hence there are only few H-types
and their impact on equilibrium is negligible so that equations (4.37) - (4.39) remain valid.
Using (4.41) and (4.40) we have
(η − 1)2 ≤ (η − 9)
√
(η − 1)2 + 4FR¯
2η
t
But as R¯ < n requires that F < t/R¯2 we have
(η − 9)
√
(η − 1)2 + 4FR¯
2η
t
< (η − 9)
√
(η − 1)2 + 4η = (η − 9)(η + 1)
18Equivalently, we could also set dλ > 0.
4.4. ADVERSE EFFECTS OF ATTENTIONAL ADVANTAGES? 153
As (η − 1)2 > (η− 9)(η+1) we get a contradiction. Hence also in the case where RH > n
we have that the utility of the H-type decreases if RL decreases, at least in the case
with few H-types. The L-type exhibits an indirect negative externality on the H-type
because prices are determined by average attention and are higher as if only the H-type
was present. Moreover, if there are only few H-types with RH > n there is not enough
diversity to compensate the H-type for the higher prices the have to pay.
4.4 Adverse effects of attentional advantages?
As we have seen under limited attention there is an interaction between the competition
for attention and the economic competition within an attention set. Up to now firms have
been symmetrically endowed both with production and attention technology.
An interesting question is to explore what happens if we allow for asymmetry in both
types of technologies. To illustrate possible implications of this kind of asymmetry I use
the ACF and the linear demand function from section 3.6.2 in case of R = 2. I introduce
asymmetry as simply as possible by assuming that firm j = 1 is different from all other
active firms. I consider firm j = 2 to be a representant of this other class.I assume
constant unit costs of production cj and Cj(fj) = θjf
η. Firm j = 1 differs from the other
firms in unit costs c1 and attention costs θ1. We can write the reduced form of the profit
functions of this problem as
Π1 =
(
1−
2∏
i=1
f2(n− i)
f + f2(n− i)
)
(y1 − c1)
(
1− y1 − γ(1− y2)
1− γ2
)
− θ1fη1
Π2 = (y2 − c2)
(
Pa
1− y2 − γ(1− y1)
1− γ2 + Pb
1− y2 − γ(1− y˜)
1− γ2
)
− θ2fη2
where
Pa =
f1f2
f1+f2+(n−2)f˜
(
1
f1+(n−2)f˜ +
1
f2+(n−2)f˜
)
Pb =
f2f˜
f1+f2+(n−2)f˜
(
n−2
f1+(n−2)f˜ +
n−2
f1+f2+(n−3)f˜
)
are the probabilities of firm j = 2 to be in an attention set with either j = 1 or with any
other firm (all other firms set (y˜, f˜)). The equilibrium values of (y1, y2, f1, f2) are then
given by the two sets of FOC’s evaluated at y˜ = y2 and f˜ = f2. The first figure illustrates
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the equilibrium as a function of n with γ = 1/2, F = 0.01, θ1 = θ2 = 1/4, η = 1, c1 = 0.2
and c2 = 0.1. In figure 4.10 we see that the cost advantages (c2 < c1) of the firms of type
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Figure 4.10: Firm j = 1 (solid) and firm j = 2: c2 < c1 and θ1 = θ2
j = 2 imply that these firms can sustain a lower price in equilibrium. This implies a higher
marginal return on attention and thus f2 > f1 and also Π2 > Π1. The cost advantage
of the other firms implies that firm j = 1 has a lower chance of getting attention as it
cannot afford the required high attention costs because it earns less revenue from every
set it is in. Thus under free-entry such a firm would not survive.
The story may change entirely if c2 < c1 but θ1 < θ2, i.e. firm j = 1 has lower cost of
attention effort f . The next figure is obtained by setting θ1 = 1/10. The other parameters
have the same value as before. Firm j = 1 still is less efficient in production which implies
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Figure 4.11: Firm j = 1 (solid) and firm j = 2: c2 < c1 and θ1 < θ2
that it must set higher prices to cover production costs. At the same time the firm has
lower costs of maintaining a certain level of attention, e.g. because of better knowledge
of marketing instruments, which means that such a firm exhibits more attention effort.
Despite being more expensive such a firm may achieve to be in many more attention sets
which compensates for the loss of demand due to higher prices. Hence under free entry
such a firm survives and to some extent crowds-out firms with more efficient production
methods. Also note that in this example the higher attention effort of the firm does not
imply its offers to be superior - in fact they are more expensive than other comparable
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offers. Nelson argues that with experience goods ”advertised brands are better buys”
and moreover that ”heavily advertised brands are likely to provide a lower P ∗” (price
per unit of utility) because these firms can afford higher advertising expenditure due
to lower production costs (Nelson (1974), p. 732). This negative association between
advertising and pricing is reflected19 in figure 4.10. However, as figure 4.11 shows there
can be positive association between advertising expenditure at the firm level and price
because under limited attention a firm may effectively suppress the perception of other
potentially cheaper firms to some degree which makes a higher price sustainable. Hence
in contrast to Nelson’s conjecture more advertising by a firm need not signal a superior
product. Figure 4.12 shows that such an advantage in advertising technology may act
as an entry barrier that crowds out potentially superior producers. The figure depicts
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Figure 4.12: Firm j = 1 (solid) and firm j = 2
the equilibrium variables under endogenous n as a function of θ1. All other parameters
take on the same values as before. If θ1 is sufficiently low then firm j = 1 survives. An
advantage in marketing implies that the firm can sustain a higher level of f . This makes
the firm present in more attention sets and compensates for the necessity to set higher
19As in this example all commodities symmetrically enter the utility function changes of yj also reflect
changes of utility adjusted prices.
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prices because of higher production costs. Moreover, the other firms are urged to increase
their attention efforts which increases their costs and reduces profits such that some firms
must leave the market. Finally, under the assumption that all potential entrants to the
market are of type j = 2 firm j = 1 manages to earn a positive rent also under free entry.
By taking two snapshots of a subset of the web Cho and Roy (2004) investigate how the
popularity of the pages measured by the number of incoming links in that subset evolves
over a period of seven months. They find that the top 20 percent of the pages with most
incoming links collect 70 percent of the new links throughout the 7 months while the
bottom 60 percent of the pages obtained practically no new links (p. 22). The basic
explanation of this observation presented by the authors is that the use of search-engines
dominates the browsing behaviour of web clients. Moreover, they estimate that a new and
hence initially unpopular page of high quality (a page which most users like if they find
it) takes 66-times longer to become popular if clients use a search-engine instead of just
following links. The reason for this is that search engines based on a PageRank algorithm
direct only little traffic to unpopular pages (p. 27). In the light of the previous result on
asymmetric capabilities to attract attention this empirical finding strongly suggest not to
underestimate the implications of attention competition: limited attention and the strong
usage of search engines imply that established firms with the possibility to achieve higher
attention by means of a better linkage may effectively avoid some economic competition.
Firms with cheaper offers that are less established are less perceived and, different from
the standard economic prediction, cannot translate there cost advantages into revenues.
This in the end might hurt the consumers.
4.5 Appendix A
4.5.1 More on transportation costs
Section 4.1.3 formally establishes a positive relationship between transportation costs
(transportation distance) and the degree of diversity n under limited attention and pro-
vides an intuition for the result. In this section I dig deeper and illustrate that this result is
caused because under limited attention the entire distribution function of transportation
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distance over the population tends to shift downwards under limited attention.
Consider the n-sequence of intervals
O(n) =
{[
k − 1
2n
,
k
2n
)}n−1
k=1
∪
[
n− 1
2n
,
1
2
]
Let Ok(n) denote the kth element of O(n) and let w ∈ [0, 1/2) denote travel distance.
Then because O(n) forms a partition of [0, 1/2] we have ∃!k˜ ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} such that
w ∈ Ok˜(n). Hence 2nw < k˜ ≤ 2nw + 1. Because consumers are uniformly distributed
over the circle the density g(w) of travel distance w ∈ [0, 1/2) is given by
g(w) = E[qk, R]γ(w) w ∈ Ok(n)
where E[qk, R] is the probability to consume the k-th favourite variety and γ(w) is the
density of w for w ∈ Ok(n). Because consumers are uniformly distributed over the circle
we have γ(w) = 1k
2n
− k−1
2n
= 2n for k = 1, ..., n. Hence the fraction of people who travel a
distance of less than w ∈ [0, 1/2) is
Gn(w) =
1/(2n)∫
0
E[q1, R]2n ds+
1/n∫
1/(2n)
E[q2, R]2n ds+ ...
+
k/(2n)∫
(k−1)/(2n)
E[qk, R]2n ds+ ...+
[2wn]/(2n)∫
([2wn]−1)/(2n)
E[q[2wn], R]2n ds+
w∫
[2wn]/(2n)
E[q[2wn]+1, R]2n ds
=
[2wn]∑
k=1
E[qk, R] +
w∫
[2wn]
2n
E[q[2wn]+1, R]2n ds
(4.42)
where [x] ≤ x denotes the next lower integer to x. To see how Gn(w) depends on n let
n′ = 2n and n ≥ 2. Suppose first that n′ ≤ R. Then
Gn(w) =
{
2nw w ∈ [0, 1/(2n))
1 w ∈ [1/(2n), 1/2] Gn′(w) =
{
4nw w ∈ [0, 1/(4n))
1 w ∈ [1/(4n), 1/2]
Hence Gn(w) first-order stochastically dominates Gn′(w): This means that in the absence
of limited attention the fraction of people travelling at most a certain distance w can never
increase (but decreases over a certain range) if diversity is increased. This finding is a
158 4. Applications and Extensions
Out[9]=
1
8
1
4
3
8
1
2
w
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
GnHwL
Figure 4.13: G3(w) (solid) and G6(w) with R > n
′
reinforcement of the fact that T ′(n) < 0 if n < R as stochastic dominance always implies
mean dominance. As figure 4.14 illustrates the opposite is true if R < n < n′ = 2n. As
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Figure 4.14: G3(w) (solid) and G6(w) with R = 2
the figure suggests doubling diversity under limited attention implies that the fraction of
consumers that travel at most a certain distance w is never larger under limited attention
but sometimes smaller. Transportation costs are given by T (w) = tw ∈ [0, t/2]. For
example, from figure 4.14 we see that for n = 3 approximately 80% of the consumers
incur transportation costs of t/4 or less. For n = 6 only about 75% of the population
has costs of t/4 or less, the other 25% have higher costs. Hence the figure suggests that
average transportation costs T = tw¯ increase under limited attention if diversity increases
because this shifts at least a part of the distribution function G(n) downwards.
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4.6 Appendix B
4.6.1 Proof of lemma 4.1
Note that v − t/2 − y ≥ 0 for y¯ = y ≤ v − t/2 implies that all consumers purchase
somewhere as 1/2 is the maximal distance a consumer must travel.
a)
p (1 |A) =
R−1∏
i=1
n− i
n− i = 1
p (n |A) =
R−1∏
i=1
1− i
n− i = 0
b) For n > R we have Nk = 1/n for k = 1, ..., n as y = y¯. Use use (4.4) and lemma 4.3
(see below) to get
V (y, y, R) = y
n∑
k=1
p (k |A)Nk = y 1
n
n∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
1 + n− k − i
n− i =
y
n
n
R
=
y
R
For R ≥ n we have V (y, y, n) = yN1 = yn
c) For f = f¯ > 0 and n > R we have p(A) = R/n (see lemma 3.3). Hence
E [Q, z] =
 Rn
n∑
k=1
p (k |A)Nk R < n
N1 R ≥ n
Hence if n > R we have (use (4.4), lemma 4.3 below)
E [Q,R] = R
n
n∑
k=1
p (k |A)Nk = Rn
n∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
1+n−k−i
n−i
1
n
= R
n2
n∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
1+n−k−i
n−i =
R
n2
n
R
= 1
n
If R ≥ n then E [Q,n] = N1 = 1n .

160 4. Applications and Extensions
Lemma 4.3. For n > R we have
n∑
k=1
p (k |A) =
n∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
(
1 + n− k − i
n− i
)
=
n
R
(4.43)
Proof: The proof is by induction over n. Take an arbitrary R > 1. For the base step
set n = R + 1. Then
R−1∏
i=1
2 +R− k − i
R + 1− i = 0
for k > 2 since there is i ∈ {1, ..., R− 1} so that i = 2 +R− k. Hence
R+1∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
2+R−k−i
R+1−i =
2∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
2+R−k−i
R+1−i
= 1 + 1
R
= 1+R
R
because
R−1∏
i=1
R− i
R + 1− i =
R− 1
R
R− 2
R− 1 · .... ·
2
3
· 1
2
=
1
R
This proves the base step. Now assume (4.43) is true. Hence
n∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
(1 + n− k − i) = n
R
R−1∏
i=1
(n− i)
Then
n+1∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
2+n−k−i
1+n−i =
R−1∏
i=1
1
1+n−i
(
n+1∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
(2 + n− k − i)
)
=
R−1∏
i=1
1
1+n−i
(
n∑
k=0
R−1∏
i=1
(1 + n− k − i)
)
=
R−1∏
i=1
1
1+n−i
(
n∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
(1 + n− k − i) +
R−1∏
i=1
(1 + n− i)
)
=
R−1∏
i=1
1
1+n−i
(
n
R
R−1∏
i=1
(n− i) +
R−1∏
i=1
(1 + n− i)
)
=
(
n
R
R−1∏
i=1
(n−i)
1+n−i + 1
)
= n
R
1+n−R
n
+ 1 = 1+n
R
(4.44)
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
4.6.2 Proof of proposition 4.1
Note that the formulas for Nk from chapter 2 are valid as long as all consumers consume
somewhere. This is the case if his net utility from consumption is non-negative, i.e. if
u ≥ 0. As R, n ≥ 2 we see from (4.8) and (4.11) that v ≥ t implies that ui ≥ 0 because
maximal transportation distance is 1/2. Let n > R. Assuming an interior solution we
can evaluate Πy = 0 and Πf = 0 at y¯ = y > 0 (derived from (4.7)) and f¯ = f > 0 which
gives (use lemmata 4.3 and 4.1 and (4.6))
Πy = 0 ⇒ E[Q,R] + yRn
(−1
t
)
= 0
⇔ 1
R
= y
t
⇔ y = t/R
and
Πf = 0 ⇒ p1(f, f, n,R)V (y, y, R) = C ′(f) ⇔ p1(f, f, n,R) t
R2
= C ′(f)
where I used y = t/R in the last part. Second-order conditions are satisfied at the
equilibrium because
∂2Π
∂y2
=
2R
nt
(p (n |A)− p (1 |A)) = −2R
nt
∂2Π
∂f 2
= p11(f, f, n,R)
t
R2
− C ′′(f) < 0
∂2Π
∂y∂f
= p1(f, f, n,R)
(
1
R
− y
t
)
= 0
Obviously, equilibrium prices are uniquely determined in the symmetric equilibrium and
(4.9) has a solution with f ∈ (0,∞) by the properties of the ACF (see chapter 3.3.1). If
R ≥ n then we get the conventional Salop equilibrium. (4.10) and (4.12) are obvious.

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4.6.3 Proof of proposition 4.2
Because the symmetric opponent form in (4.7) is a special case of (3.9) (or (3.10)) we
can apply proposition 3.4 (chapter 3). As we use the ACF we need only verify whether
assumptions 3.5 and 3.6 are satisfied. Because we can explicitely calculate y (see (4.8)
and (4.11)) assumption 3.5 is trivially satisified. Because V (y, y, z) = y/z assumption 3.6
is also satisfied. As yˆ = t/2 and V (yˆ, yˆ, 2) = t/4 and ∆ = 1 condition (3.27) becomes
t
4F
≥ 1 which is a presupposition of proposition 4.2. Consequently, we may conclude that
a single symmetric SPE (y, f, n) exists with n ≥ 2 by proposition 3.4. According to (3.32)
(see chapter 3.4.2) and (4.14) a conventional equilibrium requires that n˜ =
√
t
F
≤ R.
Thus if
√
t
F
≤ R then the equilibrium (y, f, n) is determined by
(√
tF , 0,
√
t/F
)
. If we
have
√
t
F
> R then an attention equilibrium occurs and (y, f, n) is determined by (4.13).
The second equation of (4.13) follows from using the approximation (3.21) in(4.9).

4.6.4 Proof of proposition 4.3
Let n > R. Note that
n∑
k=1
E[qk, R]w¯k =
n∑
k=1
E[qk, R]
2k − 1
4n
=
1
4n
(
2
n∑
k=1
E[qk, R]k −
n∑
k=1
E[qk, R]
)
For f¯ = f (4.5) becomes
E[qk, R] =
R
n
R−1∏
i=1
(
1 + n− k − i
n− i
)
But (use lemma 4.3 (4.6.1))
n∑
k=1
E[qk, R] =
R
n
n∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
(
1 + n− k − i
n− i
)
=
R
n
n
R
= 1
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Step 1:
I first prove that
n∑
k=1
E[qk, R]k =
(n+ 1)
(R + 1)
(4.45)
by induction over n. For base step set n = 1 +R. We need to show that
R+1∑
k=1
E[qk, R]k =
R + 2
R + 1
But
R+1∑
k=1
E[qk, R]k =
R
R + 1
R+1∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
(2 +R− k − i)k
1 +R− i
It is not hard to see that
R−1∏
i=1
(2+R−k−i)k
1+R−i = 0 for k > 2. Hence
R+1∑
k=1
E[qk, R]k =
R
R + 1
2∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
(2 +R− k − i)k
1 +R− i =
R
R + 1
(1 +
2
R
) =
2 +R
R + 1
which completes the base step. Suppose (4.45) is true. Then
n∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
(1 + n− k − i)k = n(1 + n)
R(R + 1)
R−1∏
i=1
(n− i) (4.46)
Now
n+1∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
(2+n−k−i)k
1+n−i =
R−1∏
i=1
1
1+n−i
(
n+1∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
(2 + n− k − i)k
)
=
R−1∏
i=1
1
1+n−i
(
n∑
k=0
R−1∏
i=1
(1 + n− k − i)(k + 1)
)
=
R−1∏
i=1
1
1+n−i
(
n∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
(1 + n− k − i)k +
n∑
k=0
R−1∏
i=1
(1 + n− k − i)
)
= n(1+n)
R(R+1)
R−1∏
i=1
(n−i)
1+n−i +
n∑
k=0
R−1∏
i=1
(1+n−k−i)
1+n−i
= n(1+n)
R(R+1)
1+n−R
n
+ 1+n
R
= (1+n)(2+n)
R(R+1)
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where the last line uses (4.44).
Step 2:
Hence
n∑
k=1
E[qk, R]
2k−1
4n
= 1
4n
(
2
n∑
k=1
E[qk, R]k −
n∑
k=1
E[qk, R]
)
= 1
4n
(
2(n+1)
(R+1)
− 1
)
= (n+1)
2n(R+1)
− 1
4n
The other claims are obvious.

4.6.5 Proof of proposition 4.4
Suppose T (n) = t/(4n) for all n ≥ 1. In this case the solution of the planer problem is
given by n˜ = 1
2
√
t
F
Hence if n˜ ≤ R then nP = n˜. If n˜ > R then by (4.19) n˜ cannot be
a solution to the planer problem. Because T ′(n) > 0 for n > R the planer would never
choose nP > R. But nP < R could not be optimal because then W ′(nP ) > 0. Hence we
must have nP = R.

4.6.6 Proof of proposition 4.5
For the first claim see the main text. Now assume η = 1. In this case we have n =
√
t/F
which corresponds to the conventional Salop solution. Then if np = 1
2
√
t/F we have
∂nP/∂R = 0 and hence ρ′(R) = 0. Thus excessive diversity in this case is the same with
or without limited attention. If however nP = R we have ρ′(R) = −1 < 0. If η > 1 we
always have ρ′(R) < 0 because n′(R) < 0 and ∂nP/∂R ≥ 0. See the main text for the
last claim.

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4.6.7 Deriavtion of (4.21)
Suppose a member of group k is informed about the representative firm and z ≥ R
opponents. Hence |Ik| = 1 + z > R. Suppose that Ik contains exactly s ≤ min {k − 1, z}
superior firms (and hence z − s inferior firms). The probability that this event occurs
is exactly given by G1 in (4.21) (see also 2.5.3 in the appendix of chapter 2). Let Pk,s,z
denote the probability, conditional on j ∈ Ik, to make a sale to a member of group k if
s superior firms are in Ik and the consumer received information of z opponents. Using
(4.2) - (4.4) we see that for given k, z and s we have
Pk,s,z = p
(
f, f¯ , 1 + z, R
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p(A)
R−1∏
i=1
(
1− sf¯
(1 + z − i)f¯
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
p(k|A )
= p
(
f, f¯ , 1 + z, R
) R−1∏
i=1
1+z−i−s
(1+z−i)
(4.47)
where p(A) is the representative firm’s probability to be in the attention set and p(k |A)
is the probability to be the superior perceived firm. Note that if s ≤ 1 + z − R we
have p(k |A) > 0. A consumer who perceives the representative firm ignores 1 + z − R
other firms. If s ≤ 1 + z − R then there is a positive probability that the consumer
overlooks precisely the s superior firms. If however s > 1+ z−R then this is not possible
and p(k |A) = 0. By taking the sum over s = 0, ..., k − 1 we calculate the conditional
probability that the representative makes a sale to a member of group k given that this
consumer has received information from z ≥ R opponents:
Pk(S(z) |z ≥ R) =
k−1∑
s=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
k − 1
s
)(
n− k
z − s
)
Pk,s,z
=
k−1∑
s=0
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z
(
k − 1
s
)(
n− k
z − s
)
p
(
f, f¯ , 1 + z, R
) R−1∏
i=1
1+z−i−s
(1+z−i)
Note that if k − 1 ≥ s > z then G1 = 0.
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4.6.8 Deriavtion of (4.27)
Suppose that in the model of section (4.27) the representative firm competes for consumer
attention with nφ− 1 competitors. Then (4.3) - (4.5) give
E[qk, R] = p
(
f, f¯ , nφ,R
)
p (k |A) = p (f, f¯ , nφ,R) R−1∏
i=1
1 + n− k − i
n− i (4.48)
Hence for f¯ = f (3.21) implies
∂E[qk, R]
∂f
∼= nφ−R
(nφ)2f
R
R−1∏
i=1
1 + n− k − i
n− i
This suggests to set
n∑
k=1
∂E [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ]
∂f
∼= nφ−R
(nφ)2f
R
n∑
k=1
R−1∏
i=1
1 + n− k − i
n− i =
nφ−R
(nφ)2f
n
where the second equality follows from lemma 4.3 (see 4.6.1).
To illustrate the quality of the approximation I compare (4.27) to the true formulation.
Using (4.22) we get
∂E[qk,R|j∈Ik ]
∂f
=
n−1∑
z=R
k−1∑
s=0
φz(1− φ)n−1−z
(
k − 1
s
)(
n− k
z − s
)
p1
(
f, f¯ , 1 + z, R
) R−1∏
i=1
1+z−i−s
(1+z−i)
= R
f
n−1∑
z=R
k−1∑
s=0
φz(1− φ)n−1−z
(
k − 1
s
)(
n− k
z − s
)
1+z−R
(1+z)2
R−1∏
i=1
1+z−i−s
(1+z−i)
(4.49)
where the last line uses the ACF and (3.21). As expected the suggested approximation
works numerically very well if n is large (compared to R) or φ is close to one. This is
illustrated in figure 4.15. In the figure I compare (4.27) (the dashed line) to
n∑
k=1
∂E[qk,R|j∈Ik ]
∂f
where ∂E[qk,R|j∈Ik ]
∂f
is given by (4.49). We see that the curves are close together and have a
very similar shape. All simulations I have conducted show that if we use the approximation
(4.27) in the equilibrium equations the comparative statics are always the same as if (4.49)
were used instead.
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Figure 4.15: Quality of approximation (dashed) for R = 3, n = 10, n = 30 and φ = 1/2
4.6.9 Proof of proposition 4.6
Note that lim
φ→0
ψ(φ) = +∞ and lim
φ→1
ψ(φ) = −∞. Further ψ(φ) is continuous on φ ∈ (0, 1)
and ψ′(φ) exists unless φ = R/n. For φ < R/n we have ψ′(φ) = − 2t
n2φ3
− A′′(φ) < 0. For
φ > R/n we have ψ′(φ) < 0 if g(φ) ≡
(
1− nφ−R
η
R
n
A′(φ)
A(φ)
)
decreases in φ. But g′(φ) < 0
holds if (R − nφ)(ε − ν) < nφ. But as (ν − ε) ≤ 1 holds by assumption the condition
is satisfied. This proves the existence of a unique interior φ that solves ψ(φ) = 0. If
ψ(R/n) = t∆/R2 − A′(R/n) > 0 then because ψ′(φ) < 0 for φ > R/n we must have
φ˜ > R/n at ψ(φ˜) = 0.

I show that φA
′(φ)
A(φ)
− φA′′(φ)
A′(φ) < 1 holds with the cost function A(φ) = θrφ(m) based on
(2.5). We have
A(φ) = θr
Ln
(
1− (1−a)φ
r
)
Ln(a)
which requires r > (1− a)φ.Then differentiation yields
Ω ≡ φA
′(φ)
A(φ)
− φA
′′(φ)
A′(φ)
=
(a− 1)φ
(
1 + Ln
(
1− (1−a)φ
r
))
(r + (a− 1)φ)Ln
(
1− (1−a)φ
r
)
Then
Ω < 1 ⇔ (a− 1)φ
(
1 + Ln
(
1− (1−a)φ
r
))
> (r − (1− a)φ)Ln
(
1− (1−a)φ
r
)
⇔ (a− 1)φ > rLn
(
1− (1−a)φ
r
)
⇔ (a−1)φ
r
> Ln
(
1 + (a−1)φ
r
)
⇔ x > Ln (1 + x)
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where x ≡ (a−1)φ
r
> −1. But x > Ln (1 + x) is true for x > −1.
4.6.10 Proof of lemma 4.2
As before the average distance travelled by a consumer who consumes his k-th favourite
variety is given by w¯k = (2k− 1)/4n. Then the probability to consume the k-th favourite
variety is given by E [qk, R] = φE [qk, R |j ∈ Ik ]. Hence
n∑
k=1
2k−1
4n
E[qk, R] is average trans-
portation distance of a consumer. The probability to be informed at least by one firm
is given by 1 − (1 − φ)n. Thus (4.33) is the average transportation cost of a consumer
conditional on being informed of at least one variety.

4.6.11 Proof of proposition 4.7
For simplicity I set E[qk] ≡ E[qk,∞]. Let k∗ ≡ 2 + n − R. Then for any j ≥ k∗ we
have E[qj] = E[qj, R]. To see this suppose the consumer is informed of his k-th best firm
where k ≥ k∗. Note that for any k ≥ k∗ there are less than R − 2 inferior firms. Hence
even if the consumer ignores all inferior firms he will have at least one superior firm in
his attention set and hence does not consume at the k-th best firm. Thus a consumer
will only consume from his k-th best firm if he receives no information of a superior firm
which is E[qj]. Note that lemma 2.1 from chapter 2 implies
k∗∑
k=1
E[qk] =
k∗∑
k=1
E[qk, R] (4.50)
Next assume that (
EL1 , ..., E
L
w
)
<
(
ENL1 , ..., E
NL
w
)(
ELw+1, ..., E
L
k∗
) ≥ (ENLw+1, ..., ENLk∗ ) (4.51)
where w < k∗ and ELk ≡ E[qk, R] as well as ENLk ≡ E[qk]. Thus we assume that the first w
expectations under limited attention are strictly smaller than without limited attention.
Next note that
k∗∑
k=w+1
ELk =
k∗∑
k=1
ENLk −
w∑
k=1
ELk (4.52)
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The claim is that TL > TNL. To proof the claim note that it suffices to proof that
k∗∑
k=1
(2k − 1))ELk >
k∗∑
k=1
(2k − 1))ENLk (4.53)
Start with
k∗∑
k=1
(2k − 1))ELk =
w∑
k=1
(2k − 1))ELk +
k∗∑
k=w+1
(2k − 1))ELk
=
w∑
k=1
(2k − 1))ELk + (2w + 1)
k∗∑
k=w+1
ELk +
k∗∑
k=w+2
2 (k − (1 + w))ELk
= (2w + 1)
k∗∑
k=1
ENLk +
w∑
k=1
2 (k − (1 + w))ELk +
k∗∑
k=w+2
2 (k − (1 + w))ELk
= (2w + 1)
k∗∑
k=1
ENLk +
k∗∑
k=1
2 (k − (1 + w))ELk
where I used (4.52) in the third line. Then (4.53) becomes
(2w + 1)
k∗∑
k=1
ENLk +
k∗∑
k=1
2 (k − (1 + w))ELk >
k∗∑
k=1
(2k − 1)ENLk
which is equivalent to
k∗∑
k=1
2 ((1 + w)− k)ENLk +
k∗∑
k=1
2 (k − (1 + w))ELk > 0
and can be further reduced to
k∗∑
k=1
((1 + w)− k)ENLk >
k∗∑
k=1
((1 + w)− k)ELk (4.54)
Expand (4.54) and rearrange:
w∑
k=1
((1 + w)− k)ENLk +
k∗∑
k=w+1
(k − (1 + w))ELk >
w∑
k=1
((1 + w)− k)ELk +
k∗∑
k=w+1
(k − (1 + w))ENLk
(4.55)
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But (4.55) holds under (4.51). Thus we only need to show that (4.51) is satisfied. For
k < k∗ and fixed R we have
ENLk − ELk =
n−1∑
z=R
φz(1− φ)n−1−z
(
n− k
z
)
−
n−1∑
z=R
φz(1− φ)n−1−z
k−1∑
s=0
(
k − 1
s
)(
n− k
z − s
)
ξ(z, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A
(4.56)
where ξ(z, s) ∈ [0, 1]. Hence
A(k) =
(
n− k
z
)
ξ(z, 0) +
(
k − 1
1
)(
n− k
z − 1
)
ξ(z, 1) + ... (4.57)
For k = 1 we see from (4.56) that ENLk − ELk > 0 because ξ(z, 0) < 1. I now show that
there exists kˆ ∈ [2, 2 + n−R) such that
(
k − 1
1
)(
n− kˆ
z − 1
)
ξ(z, 1) >
(
n− kˆ
z
)
(4.58)
holds for any R ≤ z ≤ n − 1. In this case we must have A(kˆ) >
(
n− k
z
)
and hence
ENLj − ELj < 0 for all kˆ ≤ j < 2 + n−R. Using the definition of the binomial coefficient
condition (4.58) can be simplified to
(k − 1)R(1 + z −R)
(1 + z)
> (n− k − z + 1)
which is equivalent to
(n− z) < (k − 1)
(
(1 + z) (R + 1)−R2
(1 + z)
)
(4.59)
But setting z = R makes the LHS of (4.59) as large as possible and also the RHS as small
as possible. Hence
(n−R) 1 +R
2R + 1
+ 1 < k (4.60)
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But as (n−R) 1+R
2R+1
< n−R there must exist a kˆ ∈ [2, n−R] such that (4.59) is true for
any R ≤ z ≤ n− 1. Hence (4.51) must be true.


5Differentiable Symmetric Games:
Uniqueness and Stability
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I develop a comparably simple approach to verify whether a differentiable
symmetric game has a unique equilibrium and the equilibrium is symmetric. The main
applications of the results in this chapter can be found in chapter 3 of this book but the
approach to uniqueness presented here has a substantial stand-alone value.
My approach to uniqueness is different from the literature as I distinguish between
multiple symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria. By taking explicit advantage
of the symmetry in the game I derive two criteria that, if both are satisfied, assert that
only one equilibrium, the symmetric equilibrium, exists. One criterion rules out the
possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria and the other criterion rules out the possibility
of asymmetric equilibria.
Standard criteria of uniqueness such as the contraction, univalence or the index ap-
proach have the drawback that even in symmetric games they are not evaluated easily,
notably when there are many players. The method presented in this chapter shows that
the complexity of examining uniqueness in a general N -player game can be reduced to
the case of a two-player game. Moreover, the index theorem, commonly accepted as the
most general approach to uniqueness, is only applicable under the assumption of severe
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boundary conditions - a requirement that can be loosend as this chapter reveals.
This chapter is structured as follows. After building up the required notation and
stating a sufficient condition for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium I derive and
discuss the two criteria, that together assert uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium in
case of one- and two-dimensional strategy spaces1. As an interesting application I can
discuss non-existence of asymmetric equilibria in case of two-dimensional supermodular
symmetric games. To my knowledge this is the first contribution that provides a sim-
ple and intuitive characterisation of the scope of asymmetric equilibria in such games. I
demonstrate the generality of my approach by showing that these two condition, when
applied to the Cournot game, correspond exactly to the two general conditions of unique-
ness that have been recognized by the literature. My approach enhances these conditions
with a new interpretation. In section 5.4 I discuss the important relationship between
stability of a symmetric equilibrium, uniqueness and comparative-static results. As was
pointed out by Dixit there generally is a close and non-negligible link between stability
and the comparative-static predictions of a game (Dixit (1986)). In symmetric games it
turns out that the condition which rules out the existence of multiple symmetric equilibria
also asserts stability under symmetric adjustments and crucially determines the sign of
the comparative-statics. Finally, I derive a condition that asserts whether a symmetric
equilibrium is a local contraction, which is simple to check, and yet more general than
the usual requirement of a dominant diagonal.
5.2 Existence of symmetric equilibria
In this section I build up the notation and then derive a sufficient condition for the
existence of a symmetric equilibrium.
5.2.1 Notation and assumptions
The notation follows Topkis (Topkis (1998)). Consider a non-cooperative game of 2 ≤
N <∞ identical players. Players are indexed by a number 1, ..., N and all players have the
same strategy space. Throughout the chapter strategies are defined to be pure strategies.
1I also illustrate that the method extends in a straightforward way to higher dimesnional games.
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Let xg ≡ (xg1, ..., xgk) ∈ S(k) denote a feasible strategy of player g where S(k) ⊂ Rk+
denotes the strategy space of the player. Let S ≡ S(k) be the product space S = ×ki=1Si
where Si =
[
0, S¯i
] ⊂ R+ with S¯i > 0 for all i = 1, ..., k. Thus S is a nonempty, compact
and convex subset of an Euclidian space. Further x = (x1, ..., xN) ∈ SN ⊂ RkN+ denotes a
strategy profile and SN = S×...×S also is compact and convex. For a player g and a given
strategy profile x the vector x−g ∈ SN−1 denotes the vector of strategies of all (N − 1)
players except player g. Sometimes I simply write x = (xg, x−g). The payoff function
of player g is a real-valued and differentiable function Πg(x) defined on SN . Following
Dasgupta and Maskin symmetry means permutation-invariance of the payoff functions
(Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)):
Πg (x1, ..., xg, ..., xN) = Π
σ(g)
(
xσ(1), ..., xσ(g), ..., xσ(N)
)
(5.1)
for g = 1, ..., N where σ is a permutation of the set {1, ..., N}. This especially implies
that
Πg (x1, ..., xg, ..., xN) = Π
g
(
xµ(1), ..., xg, ..., xµ(N)
)
for g = 1, ..., N where µ is a permutation of {1, ..., N} \ {g}. For simple reference I set
Π (xg, x−g) ≡ Πg (x1, ..., xg, ..., xN) g = 1, ..., N
The non-cooperative k-dimensional symmetric game is the triple
(
N,S(k)N ,Π
)
. Through-
out this chapter I shall maintain the following assumption on Π:
Assumption 5.1. For g ∈ {1, ..., N} the payoff function Π(xg, x−g) ∈ C2
(
SN ,R
)
satis-
fies (5.1) and is strictly quasiconcave in xg ∈ S for any x−g ∈ S(N−1).
The property of permutation-invariance implies2
∂Πg (x1, ..., xg, ..., xN)
∂xg
=
∂Πg
(
xµ(1), ..., xg, ..., xµ(N)
)
∂xg
2Note that the following expression is a vector derivative.
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For simple reference I set
Πi (xg, x−g) ≡ ∂Π
g (x1, ..., xg, ..., xN)
∂xgi
1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ g ≤ N
In a non-cooperative game every player g solves
max
xg∈S
Π(xg, x−g) (5.2)
I denote the best response function of player g by
ϕg : SN−1 → S , x−g 7→ ϕg(x−g)
and use ϕ(x−g) ≡ ϕg(x−g) for simple reference. Similarly,
ϕgi : S
N−1 → Si , x−g 7→ ϕgi (x−g)
is the i-th component (1 ≤ i ≤ k) of ϕg and I set ϕi(x−g) ≡ ϕgi (x−g).
To find a symmetric equilibrium in specific symmetric games usually a simplified
approach, the symmetric opponents form approach (SOFA), is used (e.g. Dixit (1986), p.
116 or Grossman and Shapiro (1984) or Salop (1979)). The SOFA takes player g = 1 and
sets x−1 = x¯−1 ≡ (x¯, ..., x¯) where x¯ ∈ S and Π˜ (x1, x¯) ≡ Π1 (x1, x¯−1) and then solves
max
x1∈S
Π˜ (x1, x¯) (5.3)
Let ϕ˜(x¯) ≡ ϕ(x¯−1) ∈ S denote the set of maximisiers of (5.3). A symmetric equilibrium
of
(
N,SN ,Π
)
then is a point x∗ ∈ SN with x∗1 = ... = x∗N and x∗1 ∈ ϕ˜(x∗1).
5.2.2 An existence result
It is well-known that the set of all pure-strategy equilibrium points of a non-cooperative
game is identical to the set of fixed points of the joint best response correspondence (see,
e.g. Topkis (1998), p. 179). The following proposition is easy to prove.
Proposition 5.1. Assumption 5.1 implies the following two facts for the symmetric game
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(
N,SN ,Π
)
:
(i) There exists a continuous joint best-response function
φ : SN → SN , x 7→
 ϕ(x−1)...
ϕ(x−N)
 (5.4)
(ii)
(
N,SN ,Π
)
has a symmetric equilibrium x∗ ∈ SN
Proof: Appendix (5.6.2)
A question frequently asked is, when do only interior equilibria exist. Let
∇F (x) ≡

∇Π1(x1, ..., xN)
∇Π2(x1, ..., xN)
...
∇ΠN(x1, ..., xN)
 (5.5)
denote the pseudogradient (a Nk vector; Rosen (1965)) of
(
N,SN ,Π
)
at x where
∇Πg (x1, ..., xN) for g = 1, ..., N is the gradient (a k-vector) of the payoff function of player
g with respect to xg. Let Eˆ ≡
{
x ∈ SN : φ(x) = x} denote the set of all fixed points of
φ. The set E of all interior equilibria (which might be empty) is
E ≡ {x ∈ Int(SN) : ∇F (x) = 0} (5.6)
where Int(SN) denotes the interior of SN . Let J(x) denote the Jacobian (a Nk × Nk
matrix) of ∇F (x) with respect to x. The following assumption asserts that only interior
equilibria exist.
Assumption 5.2 (Boundary condition). The gradient field
∇F : SN → RNk , x 7→ ∇F (x) (5.7)
points into the interior of SN at all boundary points.
Proposition 5.2. The following two properties characterise the set of equilibria of
(
N,SN ,Π
)
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i) Under assumption 5.2 only interior equilibria exist: Eˆ = E
ii) If all equilibrium points are regular, i.e. the Jacobian J(x) has Det(J(x)) 6= 0 for
all x ∈ E, then E is a finite set.
Proof: Appendix (5.6.3)
Intuitively, i) is true because if assumption 5.2 holds but there also were a boundary
equilibrium this would contradict the Kuhn-Tucker necessary and sufficient conditions.
ii) holds because the regularity condition implies that all equilibrium points are locally
isolated and a compact and ”discrete” set must be finite. Note that assumption 5.2 is
sufficient (but not necessary) for ruling out boundary equilibria.
When dealing with asymmetric equilibria I will require the best response function
ϕ(x−g) to be differentiable at certain points. As the following corollary states, assumption
5.1 asserts that ϕ(x−g) is differentiable in x−g if ϕ(x−g) ∈ Int(S).
Corollary 5.1. If ϕ(x−g) ∈ Int(S) then ϕ(x−g) is differentiable at x−g.
Proof: Appendix (5.6.4)
5.3 Uniqueness
This section first summarises the main two approaches to uniqueness: the univalence
approach and the index approach. Then I develop the condition which excludes asym-
metric equilibrira in case of one-dimensional strategy spaces first for the case of two
players and then for the case of N players. Afterwards, I extend the results to the case
of two-dimensional strategy spaces and N ≥ 2. Then I introduce the condition for the
inexistence of multiple symmetric equilibria. The section concludes with an application
of these criteria to the Cournot game and a brief discussion of super- and submodular
games.
5.3.1 Review: criteria for uniqueness
In order to determine whether or not a game has a unique equilibrium the literature has
come up with three general approaches:
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i) the contraction approach
ii) the univalence approach
iii) the Poincare-Hopf index theorem approach
I will first provide a short summary of the univalence approach and the index approach
in the context of symmetric games and ignore the restrictive3 contraction approach. Note
that generally nothing detains us from applying these methods to a symmetric game but
these methods have in common that they rely on boundary conditions and usually are
impractical in the context of particular applications as the matrices involved can be very
large.
5.3.1.1 The Univalence Approach
The univalence approach developed by Gale and Nikaido (Gale and Nikaido (1965)) pro-
vides sufficient conditions under which a mapping is globally univalent (i.e. one-to-one).
The following is a reformulation of the univalence theorem from Gale and Nikaido (p. 89)
in the context of a symmetric game.
Theorem 5.1 (Gale-Nikaido). If all principal minors of (−J(x)) are positive for all
x ∈ SN then at most one interior equilibrium can exist and this equilibrium must be
symmetric.
The obvious shortcomings of the theorem are i) it says nothing about boundary equi-
libria, ii) it is impractical as determining the signs of all principal minors of a Nk ×Nk-
matrix is very tedious and iii) it is quite easily violated in applications as the following
example shows:4 Let k = 1 and N = 2 and suppose that Π1(x1, x2) = x1
√
x2− 1/2x21 and
Π2(x1, x2) = x2
√
x1 − 1/2x22. Then we have
∇F (x) =
( √
x2 − x1√
x1 − x2
)
S = [1/5, 2] (5.8)
3It is straightforward to show that the contraction approach is a special case of the univalence approach
(see Vives (1999)).
4Although Rosen’s version includes boundary equilibria (Rosen (1965)), the requirements of the payoff-
function Π are stronger (concavity), it involves checking the definitness of a large matrix and also fails
to establish uniqueness in the example below.
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Then
−J(x) =
(
1 − 1
2
√
x2
− 1
2
√
x1
1
)
and |−J(x)| = 1 − 1
4
√
x1x2
which is not positive for all (x1, x2) ∈ [1/5, 2]2. Nevertheless,
the symmetric equilibrium (1, 1) obviously is the only equilibrium.
5.3.1.2 The index theorem approach
The index theorem declares that, under assumption 5.2, we only need information about
the sign of Det (−J(x)) at critical points instead of investigating all principal minors of
−J(x). Suppose all equilibria points are regular and interior. The index of a zero of the
vector field ∇F (x) is then defined by (see Vives (1999), p.48):
I(x) =
{
+1 if Det(−J(x)) > 0
−1 if Det(−J(x)) < 0 (5.9)
It is known that if the strategy space forms a rectangle in some Euclidian space then
I ≡ ∑
x∈E
I(x) = 1 where I(x) is the index of a zero (see Simsek et al. (2007)). Hence if the
boundary condition (assumption 5.2) holds and all equilibria points are regular then if
∇F (x) = 0 ⇒ Det (−J(x)) > 0 (5.10)
holds the symmetric equilibrium is unique. Note that in example (5.8) the index theorem
obviously implies (1, 1) to be the unique equilibrium.5 The index approach may still be
hard to verify in applications as the matrix involved can be very large. Moreover, in the
case of boundary equilibria or non-regular equilibria6 the (standard) index theorem is not
applicable7.
5The index approach is more general as univalence because condition (5.10) is implied if all principal
minors of −J(x) are found to be positive. Nevertheless, the Gale-Nikaido theorem is often invoked in
applied work as it asserts the global invertibility of inverse demands (Vives (1999), p. 76).
6In such a case the zeroes of the gradient field are not locally isolated which violates a prerequisite of
the index theorem (Vives, 1999, p. 362).
7Note that a generalised version of the index theorem has been proven (Simsek et al. (2007)), that
can deal with boundary equilibria. However, this approach still requires to calculate the determinant of
a large matrix, and further side conditions (non-degeneracy and complementarity) of what the authors
term a generalised critical point must be verified separately.
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In the next two sections I develop the two criteria that together assert uniqueness of
the symmetric equilibrium. I begin by discussing the possibility of multiple symmetric
equilibria using the SOFA and then move on to the possibility of asymmetric equilibria.
5.3.2 Multiplicity of symmetric equilibria
In this section, based on the SOFA, I use the index theorem to establish a criterion that
rules out the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria. The set Es of interior symmetric
equilibria is given by
Es ≡
{
(x1, ..., x1) ∈ SN : ∇Π˜ (x1) = 0
}
where ∇Π˜ (x1) is the gradient of Π˜(x1, x¯) with respect to x1, evaluated at x¯ = x1 and
∇Π˜ (x1) : S → Rk , x1 7→ ∇Π˜ (x1) (5.11)
is a vector field over S. Let J˜(x1) denotes the Jacobian of ∇Π˜(x1).
Assumption 5.3 (Symmetric boundary and regularity). Let ∇Π˜ be the vector field as
defined by (5.11). Then
i) ∇Π˜ points inwards on the boundary of S
ii) Det
(
−J˜(x1)
)
6= 0 if ∇Π˜(x1) = 0
Proposition 5.3. Suppose assumption 5.3 is satisfied. Then all symmetric equilibria are
interior and their number is odd. Further, if and only if
∇Π˜(x1) = 0 ⇒ Det
(
−J˜(x1)
)
> 0 x1 ∈ Int(S) (5.12)
then there is only one symmetric equilibrium.
Proof: Follows directly from the index theorem as ∇Π˜ : S → Rk, x1 7→ ∇Π˜(x1) defines
a vector field on S.

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Let Π˜i(x1) be the i-th component of ∇Π˜. The boundary condition in proposition 5.3
then means that Π˜i (x11, ..., 0i, ..., x1k) > 0 and Π˜i
(
x11, ..., S¯i, ..., x1k
)
< 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Obviously, if assumption 5.2 is satisfied then also assumption 5.3 i) holds. But assumption
5.2 is unnecessarily restrictive8 because we can restrict ourselves to ∇Π˜ (rather than ∇Π1)
which obviously reduces the complexity of the task. All points that violate the boundary
condition in proposition 5.3 are candidates for symmetric boundary equilibria. If the
boundary condition in proposition 5.3 fails to hold and it is known that interior symmetric
equilibria exist we may apply the univalence approach to J˜(x1): if all principal minors
of −J˜(x1) are found to be positive for all x1 ∈ S and an interior symmetric equilibrium
exists, this is the only interior symmetric equilibrium of the game. As we will see in
section 5.4.1 there is an intimate relationship between (symmetric) stability of symmetric
equilibria and the multiplicity of such equilibria which makes the comparative statics
problematic in case of multiple symmetric equilibria. Thus from this perspective it makes
sense, as a modelling advice, to impose boundary conditions as stated by proposition 5.3
directly on the symmetric opponent form of the game.
5.3.3 Inexistence of asymmetric equilibria
In this section I develop a sufficient criterion that excludes asymmetric equilibria from the
equilibrium set. I start with the simple case where k = 1 and then generalise the result
to the case k = 2. Finally, I illustrate how to extend the criterion to k ≥ 3.
5.3.3.1 The case k = 1
Suppose k = 1 and N ≥ 2. Let ϕ(x2;X) ≡ ϕ1(x2;X) where X ≡ (x3, ..., xN). Note
that because of corollary 5.1 the partial derivative ∂ϕ(x2;X) ≡ ∂∂x2ϕ1(x2;X) exists if
ϕ(x2;X) ∈ (0, S¯).
Theorem 5.2. If for all x2 ∈ (0, S¯) and any given X ∈ SN−2 for which ∂ϕ(x2;X) exists
we have that ∂ϕ(x2;X) > −1 then no asymmetric equilibrium exists.
Proof: Appendix (5.6.5)
8If assumption 5.2 is satisfied the index theorem can be used to obtain a counting rule that reveals
more regularities of the equilibrium set E (see 5.6.1 in the appendix).
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Note that the shape of ϕ(x2;X) is not restricted by theorem 5.2 up to the slope
condition for those points (x2;X) which imply that ϕ(x2;X) ∈ (0, S¯). Hence, other than
the index theorem, we do not require any boundary conditions to hold nor do we need
to exclude the possibility of non-isolated asymmetric equilibria (i.e. theorem 5.2 does not
require assumption 5.2). Moreover, to exclude asymmetric equilibria from the equilibrium
set by theorem 5.2 we can focus on a two-player version of the game where the vector X
of strategies of the other player enter as exogenous parameters and the slope condition
in theorem 5.2 is much simpler to work with than the determinant of a N × N -matrix.
A straightforward application of the IFT gives the following sufficient condition for the
inexistence of asymmetric equilibria:
Corollary 5.2. If for all x1, x2 ∈ (0, S¯) and any given X ∈ SN−2 we have that
Π1 (x1, x2;X) = 0 ⇒ Π12 (x1, x2;X)
Π11 (x1, x2;X)
< 1 (5.13)
then no asymmetric equilibrium exists.
Note that corollary 5.2 means that we can exclude asymmetric boundary equilibria by
considering only interior points in a two-player game.
In the remainder of this section I provide the simple geometric intuition behind the-
orem 5.2. In essence, it is an application of the Mean Value Theorem and the idea is
illustrated in figure 5.1. Suppose the point A = (xa1, x
a
2) corresponds to an asymmetric
equilibrium of the game, as depicted in the figure. By symmetry its reflection, the point
A′ = (xa2, x
a
1), must then also be an asymmetric equilibrium. As is depicted in the figure
the line that connects A and A′ must have a slope of −1. The best response function
of player one, ϕ(x2), remains in the interior of S =
[
0, S¯
]
which according to corollary
5.1 means that this function must be differentiable for any x2 ∈ (0, S¯). But then the
Mean Value Theorem tells us that there must be a point x˜2 ∈ (xa2, xa1) such that we have
∂ϕ(x˜2) = −1. Theorem 5.2 then states that if we cannot find such a point (x˜2) we may
conclude that no asymmetric equilibrium exists.9
9The complete proof (see appendix) is complicated by the fact that ϕ(x2) may be on the boundary
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Figure 5.1: Theorem 5.2
5.3.3.2 The case k = 2 and N ≥ 2
I now turn to the case where k = 2. To ease notation I introduce the four symbols α, β, γ, δ
which denote the partial derivatives of the best response function of g = 1 with respect
to a strategy of player g = 2 for given (x21, x22;X) where X = (x31, x32, ..., xN1, xN2).
α ≡ ∂ϕ1(x21,x22;X)
∂x21
β ≡ ∂ϕ1(x21,x22;X)
∂x22
γ ≡ ∂ϕ2(x21,x22;X)
∂x21
δ ≡ ∂ϕ2(x21,x22;X)
∂x22
(5.14)
Theorem 5.3. If for all x2 ∈ Int(S) and any given X ∈ SN−2 for which the corresponding
partial derivatives as defined by (5.14) exists we have that
α > −1 δ > −1
α+ δ + αδ − βγ > −1 (5.15)
then no asymmetric equilibrium exists.
Proof: Appendix (5.6.6)
and hence not differentiable everywhere.
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Note that corollary 5.2 extends in a straightforward way to the case where k = 2.
Theorem 5.3 is not only a useful tool in order to exclude asymmetric equilibria (interior
or boundary) from the equilibrium set but it also permits to get some economically inter-
esting insights in case of two-dimensional (supermodular) games (see section 5.3.5.2). In
the appendix (see 5.6.6) I illustrate that theorem 5.3 can be extended in a straightforward
way to the case where k > 2.
5.3.4 Discussion
If the conditions of proposition 5.3 and of theorem 5.2 or 5.3 (or the higher dimensional
analogue) are satisfied, then the game only has one equilibrium, the interior symmetric
equilibrium. Especially note that we only need to examine those boundary points that
could be part of a symmetric boundary equilibrium and not the entire boundary - which
is a clear practical advantage over the index theorem approach. Moreover, the slope
condition of theorem 5.2 (or theorem 5.3) are simpler to evaluate than the index or the
univalence condition as they depend only on the slope of the response function of an
individual player with respect to a single other player and not on the Jacobian matrix
of the entire game. Similarly, the condition of proposition 5.3 is simple to work with as
it builds on the symmetric opponent form. Finally, as my approach to uniqueness finds
two criteria which have a functional interpretation (one excludes asymmetric equilibria,
one excludes multiple symmetric equilibria) we can also use these conditions to discuss
economically interesting equilibrium features of a particular application.
5.3.5 Examples
To demonstrate the generality of the separation approach develop so far I show in the
next section that its application to the Cournot model generates two conditions asserting
uniqueness which are weaker than the main conditions of uniqueness as worked up by the
literature. The implications of theorem 5.3 for two-dimensional (supermodular) games
are discussed afterwards.
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5.3.5.1 The Cournot game
The Cournot model is one of the most analysed economic models. Let
Π1 = q1P (Q)− c(q1) Q =
N∑
i=1
qi
and qi ∈ [0, S¯] ≡ S. In accordance with assumption 5.1 I take P (Q), c(q1) to be twice
continuously differentiable for Q ∈ [0, NS¯] and q ∈ S with P ′(Q) < 0 as well as c′(q1) > 0
and c′′(q1) ≥ 0 and assume strong quasiconcavity10. Then we have
∇Π˜(q) = P (Nq) + qP ′(Nq)− c′(q) (5.16)
The following assumption11 rules out symmetric boundary optima12
Assumption 5.4 (Cournot boundary conditions). The following symmetric boundary
conditions are imposed:
i) ∇Π˜(0) = P (0)− c′(0) > 0
ii) ∇Π˜(NS¯) = P (NS¯) + S¯P ′(NS¯)− c′(S¯) < 0
Proposition 5.4 (Uniqueness in Cournot). Under assumption 5.4 and
i) if for q ∈ (0, S¯) we have that
qP ′(Nq) + P (Nq)− c′(q) = 0 ⇒ − (qNP ′′(Nq) + P ′(Nq)(1 +N)− c′′(q)) > 0
(5.17)
then only one symmetric equilibrium exists, and it is an interior equilibrium,
ii) if for q1 ∈ (0, S¯) and any given Q ∈
(
0, NS¯
)
we have that
P (Q) + q1P
′(Q)− c′(q1) = 0 ⇒ P ′(Q)− c′′(q1) < 0 (5.18)
10P ′(Q)q1 + P (Q)− c′(q1) = 0 ⇒ P ′′(Q)q1 + 2P ′(Q)− c′′(q1) < 0.
11Note that this is the only boundary assumption required by the separation approach!
12If lim
q→0
P (Nq) + qP ′(Nq) > 0 and lim
q→∞ P (Nq) + qP
′(Nq) ≤ 0 hold and the function ξ(q) ≡ P (Nq) +
qP ′(Nq) is differentiable on (0,∞) we can always find S > 0, S¯ <∞ such that ∇Π˜(S) > 0 and ∇Π˜(S) < 0
holds and hence proposition 5.3 is applicable (as taking zero to be the lower bound of the strategy space
obviously can be relaxed in proposition 5.3).
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then no asymmetric equilibrium exists.
iii) If (5.17) and (5.18) are both satisfied, then the Cournot game only has one equilib-
rium, the symmetric interior equilibrium
Proof: Appendix (5.6.7)
Note that by ii) we may restrict ourselves to interior points of Q in order to exclude
asymmetric (boundary) equilibria. Note that quasiconcavity does not imply that both
conditions (5.17) and (5.18) need to hold but vice-versa if the two conditions hold then
the payoff-function must be (srictly) quasiconcave at interior points.
How general are the conditions generated by the separation approach in case of the
Cournot game? The condition of uniqueness13 as worked up by Gaudet and Salant are
widely accepted as very general conditions of uniqueness (Gaudet and Salant (1991), p.
401). Usually, the requirements that
(P ′ + q1P ′′) < 0
c′′(q1)− P ′ > 0 (5.19)
hold is invoked in applied work (see e.g. Vives (1999), p. 98). It is not hard to see that
these conditions imply the Gaudet-Salant condition as well as the separation conditions in
proposition 5.4. Moreover, as P ′(Q)− c′′(q1) < 0 is an exogenous assumption of Gaudet-
Salant (which is not necessarily required by the assumptions of the separation approach!),
we see that precisely this assumption excludes the possibility of asymmetric equilibria in
the symmetric game (on and off the boundary). The separation conditions obviously are
a lot simpler to evaluate than the Salant-Gaudet condition. Finally, we can give the two
inequalities in (5.19) a new interpretation as they rule out different types of equilibria.
Note that P ′′(Q) does not occur in (5.18). This means that, under quasiconcavity, the
curvature of P (Q) plays no role for determining whether there are asymmetric equilibria or
not. However, the curvature of P (Q) (the elasticity of P ′(Q) with respect to q1) influences
13If ∑
i∈M(QE)
P ′(QE) + qEi P
′′(QE)
c′′(qEi )− p′(QE)
< 1
holds, where M(QE) is the set of players for which a candidate equilibrium qEi has q
′
iE(Q
E) > 0, then
only one equilibrium exists. Note that the Gaudet-Salant condition and the separation conditions depend
on different (boundary) assumptions.
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if there are multiple symmetric equilibria. In case of constant unit costs (c′′ = 0) it is
easy to see that the possibility of asymmetric equilibria in the symmetric Cournot game
is rather special: a necessary condition for the existence of asymmetric equilibria in this
game is that −P ′ ≤ 0 is possible - which is contrary to the standard economic presumption
of the model.
The fact that in the Cournot N -player game we may restrict ourselves to interior
points of the aggregate quantity Q is not a coincidence but stems from the fact that the
strategies of the other players affect the payoff-function as a sum:
Corollary 5.3. If Π(x1, ..., xN) = Πˆ (x1, Q), where Q ≡
N∑
j=1
xj, and Πˆ11 (x1, Q)+Πˆ12 (x1, Q) <
0 holds for any x1 ∈ (0, S¯) and Q ∈ (0, NS¯) with Πˆ1 (x1, Q) + Πˆ2 (x1, Q) = 0, then no
asymmetric equilibrium exists.
Proof:
In such a game we have Π1(x1, ..., xN) = Πˆ1 (x1, Q) + Πˆ2 (x1, Q), Π12 = Πˆ12 + Πˆ22 and
Π11 = Πˆ11 + 2Πˆ12 + Πˆ22. Thus the claim follows directly from corollary 5.2.

Note that the Cournot condition (P ′ − c′′ < 0) is just a special case of corollary 5.3.14
5.3.5.2 Super- and submodular games
If k = 1 and N ≥ 2 a supermodular symmetric game has Π12(xj, x−j) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ SN
whereas a submodular game has Π12(xj, x−j) ≤ 0. Thus with theorem 5.2 and proposi-
tion 5.3 we can easily replicate the result that supermodular games can never have any
asymmetric equilibria15 but can have multiple symmetric equilibria whereas submodular
games never have multiple symmetric equilibria but there can be asymmetric equilibria.
It is known that the inexistence result of asymmetric equilibria in supermodular games
does not extend to the case of multi-dimensional strategy spaces. That two-dimensional
symmetric supermodular games may have asymmetric equilibria has been shown to hold
14Corollary 5.3 does not generally extend to the case of a general aggregative game (see Alos-Ferrer
and Ania (2005), p.500, for a definition of such games).
15Note that example (5.8) is a supermodular game. Hence the failure of the univalence approach in
this example is only driven by the fact that there could be multiple symmetric equilibria.
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by means of (non-differentiable) examples (e.g. Amir et al. (2008), p. 311). Let N = 2.
From (5.15) we see that a necessary condition for asymmetric equilibria to occur is
that β = ∂ϕ1(x21,x22)
∂x22
and γ = ∂ϕ2(x21,x22)
∂x21
are large compared to α = ∂ϕ1(x21,x22)
∂x21
and
δ = ∂ϕ1(x21,x22)
∂x21
. This result is intuitive as β and γ refer to cross-over effects (e.g. how
does a change of advertising intensity of my competitor affect my pricing decision) of
the strategies whereas α and δ capture the direct effects (e.g. how does a price change
of my competitor affect my pricing decision). Hence weak direct complementarity but
strong cross-over complementarity is necessarily required to generate asymmetric equilib-
ria. Suppose that two players play a supermodular price-advertising game as indicated
above with the property that there is a very strong cross-over but a weak direct comple-
mentarity. Now assume that player two increases his price. This induces player one also
to increase his price and advertising but, because of the strong cross-over complementar-
ity, he increases advertising by more. This in turn means that player two continues to
increase his price. Hence this type of ”dynamic” reinforcement intuitively explains the
economically interesting result why asymmetric ”specialisation” equilibria in symmetric
two-dimensional supermodular games may in fact occur.
However, if the game is supermodular (k > 1) and proposition 5.3 holds (such that
there only is one symmetric equilibrium) then no asymmetric equilibrium can exist.16
Hence for supermodular games proposition 5.3 is necessary and sufficient for uniqueness
of the (symmetric interior) equilibrium.
In the case of a submodular game an evaluation of (5.12) shows that already for k = 2
such a game can possibly generate multiple symmetric equilibria.
Many economically interesting applications involve the case of two-dimensional strat-
egy spaces. We can extract some modelling advice from theorem 5.3 to exclude asymmetric
equilibria from the equilibrium set. Suppose that α, δ > −1 is known to hold. Especially,
games were the strategies are nested in the sense that β, γ 6= 0 are interesting as such
games cannot be solved independently for each strategy. The following properties then
assert inexistence of asymmetric equilibria (on and off the boundary) of such games:
16This is a consequence of the fact that in supermodular symmetric games the extremal equilibria must
always be symmetric; Vives (2005), p. 448.
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• Either β or γ is zero at least at equilibrium candidates.17
• α, δ > 0 and |β| , |γ| ≤ 1.
• β ≥ 0 and γ ≤ 0 (or vice-versa).
Finally, it is not hard to see by using the implicit function theorem that if
Π1 (x11, x12, x21, x22;X) = 0
Π2 (x11, x12, x21, x22;X) = 0
⇒ |Πii| >
∑
j 6=i,j≤4
|Πij| i = 1, 2
holds for any (x1, x2) ∈ Int(S2) and any given X ∈ SN−2 then α, δ > −1 as well as
1 + α, 1 + δ > β, γ and the game cannot have any asymmetric equilibria18.
5.4 Stability
In this section I discuss the connection between (local) stability and symmetric equilibria.
For example, Dastidar shows that in case of the symmetric Cournot game uniqueness of
the equilibrium and its local stability are intimately related (Dastidar (2000), p.213). By
introducing the concept of symmetric stability I show for one-dimensional games satisfying
assumption 5.3 that local stability and the inexistence of multiple symmetric equilibria are
in fact the same properties. However, for higher dimensional games stability is a stronger
requirement than non-multiplicity of symmetric equilibria. Finally, by extensively exploit-
ing the SOFA, I derive a condition that asserts whether an interior symmetric equilibrium
of a k-dimensional game is a local contraction which is more general than the usual ar-
gument of local diagonal dominance.
5.4.1 Comparative statics and symmetric stability
As we consider static games, stability conditions are in any case ”without foundation”
(Dixit (1986), p. 107). Nevertheless, as Dixit highlights, there is a close link between the
sign of a comparative-static prediction and the local stability of an equilibrium. It turns
17E.g. if the best-response subfunction ϕ1 (x2, ..., xN ) depends only on the sub-strategy vector
(xj1)2≤j≤N then no asymmetric equilibrium can exist - independent of how ϕ2 depends on x−1.
18Hence if the Jacobian matrix J(x) of ∇F (x) as defined by (5.5) has a dominant diagonal then
condition (5.14) is trivially implied.
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out that a modification of Dixit’s concept of local myopic stability provides a fundamen-
tal link between stability under symmetric deviations and the (in)existence of multiple
symmetric equilibria.
To illustrate the importance of such a consideration I reexamine the Cournot example
from section 3.4.1. I assume that assumption 5.3 is satisfied and work with linear costs
for simplicity: c(q1) = cq1. Let q ∈ (0, S¯) denote a symmetric interior equilibrium. Then
by the implicit function theorem:
q′(c) =
1
NP ′′(Q)q + (1 +N)P ′(Q)
(5.20)
We immediately recognize NP ′′(Q)q + (1 +N)P ′(Q) as the relevant term in (5.17) that
determines whether or not there are multiple symmetric equilibria. Thus in the case of
multiple symmetric equilibria we can get19 q′(c) > 0 at a particular equilibrium point.
In such a case we must have that strategic effects are of first-order importance, i.e. they
reverse the direction of the comparative-statics as suggested by the direct effect. To
see this consider an exogenous, symmetric change of unit costs c. Assuming that all
competitors choose the same initial response dq¯, the change of strategy of firm one, dq1, can
be determined by using the total differential of the first-order condition of the symmetric
opponents form:
(N − 1) (P ′′(Q)q1 + P ′(Q))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
dq¯ + (P ′′(Q)q1 + 2P ′(Q))︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
dq1 − dc = 0 (5.21)
From section 3.4.1 we know that P ′′(Q)q1 + P ′(Q) > 0 is necessary for multiple interior
symmetric equilibria to exist and B < 0 follows from strong quasiconcavity. The direct
effect of the c-shock on q1,
dqD1
dc
can be found by holding the competitors’ reaction fixed,
i.e. dq¯ = 0. Then
dqD1
dc
= 1/B and thus
dqD1
dc
< 0. The strategic effect is dq1
dq¯
= −A/B and
corresponds to the slope of the best-response function q1(q¯) as defined by the FOC of the
symmetric opponent form. From (5.21) we get that dq1
dc
= 1
B
− A
B
dq¯
dc
. Hence in equilibrium
19Because proposition 5.3 is an index theorem result, in the case of multiple symmetric regular equilibria
we must have NP ′′(Q)q + (1 +N)P ′(Q) > 0 for at least one equilibrium point q
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(dq1 = dq¯ = dq):
dq
dc
=
1
B
B
A+B
=
1
A+B
Thus we have sign
(
dq
dc
)
= sign
(
dqD1
dc
)
if and only if −B > A which is equivalent to the
slope of q1(q¯) being less than one at an equilibrium point. Thus if only one symmetric
equilibrium exists then we must have that sign
(
dq
dc
)
= sign
(
dqD1
dc
)
, i.e. strategic effects
are of second-order importance (they influence only the magnitude of the change). Note
that this condition is independent of whether there are asymmetric equilibria or not. Al-
though (local) stability under symmetric adjustments is a restricted version of general
myopic stability20 this analysis uncovers that symmetric stability is a minimal consis-
tency requirement for the comparative statics of a game and the inexistence of multiple
symmetric equilibria asserts symmetric stability in the Cournot example.
I now establish the link between symmetric stability and multiplicity of symmetric
equilibria more formally.
Following Dixit’s approach to stability I define the myopic adjustment process by
x˙11 = s1
∂
∂x11
Π(x1, x−1)
...
x˙1k = sk
∂
∂x1k
Π(x1, x−1)
...
x˙Nk = sk
∂
∂xNk
Π(xN , x−N)
(5.22)
where s1, ..., sk > 0 are arbitrary adjustment speeds (Dixit (1986)). A solution to (5.22)
has the form x(t) = (xj(t))1≤j≤N , where xj(t) = (xj1(t), ..., xjk(t)) is the vector trajectory
of player j. The symmetric myopic adjustment process is a restricted version where we
require the initial values x(0) to be symmetric, i.e. xj(0) = xi(0), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N . Under
this restriction the time path xj(t) must be the same for all players and is the solution to
x˙11 = s1Π˜1(x1)
...
x˙1k = skΠ˜k(x1)
(5.23)
20A symmetric equilibrium that is stable under symmetric adjustments need not be stable under general
myopic adjustments.
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Let Jˆ(x1) denote the Jacobian corresponding to (5.23) and suppose that x = (x1, ..., x1)
is an interior symetric equilibrium. A sufficient condition for x to be symmetrically stable
(i.e. stable under symmetric adjustments) is that Jˆ(x1) only has negative eigenvalues (or
eigenvalues with negative real parts). The following proposition reveals the relationship
between symmetric stability and (non)-multiplicity of symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 5.5 (Symmetric stability and uniqueness). Suppose that assumption 5.3 is
satisfied. Then the following statements hold:
i) If for k ≥ 1 multiple symmetric equilibria exist, then there must be unstable sym-
metric equilibria.
ii) If for k = 2 we have that
∇Π˜(x1) = 0 ⇒ Π˜11(x1), Π˜22(x1) < 0, Det
(
J˜(x1)
)
> 0 (5.24)
then there only is one symmetric equilibrium and it is locally symmetrically stable.
iii) For k = 1 the following statements are equivalent:
(a) All symmetric equilibria are locally symmetrically stable
(b) There only exists one symmetric equilibrium
(c) Strategic effects are of second-order importance at symmetric equilibrium points:
sign (x′1(c)) = sign
(
∂
∂c
Π˜1(x1, c)
)
Moreover, if x is a symmetrically stable equilibrium with Π11(x) < Π12(x) then x is
a stable equilibrium.
Proof: Appendix (5.6.8)
We see that symmetric stability and non-multiplicity of symmetric equilibria are the
same properties of one-dimensional games. In such games, instability of an equilibrium
can be caused only by dominant aggregate strategic effects. This close connection between
non-multiplicity and stability generally breaks down in higher dimensions, although non-
multiplicity is a necessary condition for symmetric stability (and hence also for general
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myopic stability). Hence stability is a stronger concept as uniqueness (see proposition 5.6
below) and not much can be said in general concerning the relationship between stability
and the strength of strategic effects.
The following condition is sufficient for symmetric stability and uniqueness21 for any
k ≥ 1:
Proposition 5.6 (Sufficient condition for symmetric stability). If the symmetric matrix
Mˆ(x1) ≡ −
(
Jˆ(x1) + Jˆ(x1)
T
)
is positive definite for any choice of s1, ..., sk > 0 then
x = (x1, ..., x1) is a locally symmetrically stable equilibrium. Further, if
∇Π˜(x1) = 0 ⇒ Mˆ(x1) positive definite
then there only is one symmetric equilibrium and it is locally symmetrically stable.
Proof: Appendix 5.6.9
In the case of supermodular games the sufficient condition for stability becomes par-
ticularly simple:
Proposition 5.7 (Symmetric stability in supermodular games). If the game is supermod-
ular and for ∇Π˜(x1) = 0 we have that all principal minors of −J˜(x1) are positive then
x = (x1, ..., x1) is a locally symmetrically stable equilibrium point.
Proof: Appendix 5.6.10
5.4.2 Local contraction stability
In the literature on stability also discrete (or iterative) adjustment processes have been
considered. I present a condition for an equilibrium to be a local contraction that depends
only on the symmetric opponent form which should provide useful in applications and is
more general than the requirement of diagonal dominance if k > 1.
21In the literature many different sufficient conditions for stability have been proposed. See Tang et al.
(2007) for a modern survey on matrix stability.
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Let ϕ˜i(x¯) denote the i-th component of the k-vector ϕ˜(x¯) as introduced in section
5.2.1 and x¯ = (x¯1, ..., x¯k) ∈ S.
Theorem 5.4. Suppose x∗ ∈ Es. If
max
1≤i≤k
{
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂ϕ˜i(x¯∗)∂x¯j
∣∣∣∣
}
< 1 (5.25)
then there exists ε > 0 such that φ(x) is a contraction on V ≡ B¯(x, ε).
Proof: Appendix (5.6.11)
In words, condition (5.25) means that, for any subfunction i, the sum of the absolute values
of the partial derivatives22 with respect to the symmetric opponent k-vector x¯ must be
less than one. It should be noted that this approach to stability puts no restriction on the
initial deviations of the players other than they must be in the contraction basin V (i.e.
close to the equilibrium). In particular, initial deviations need not be symmetric. This is
somewhat remarkable as condition (5.25) only makes use of the symmetric opponent form,
i.e. we do not have to work with the entire payoff-function which considerably simplifies
the analysis for higher dimensional games or games with complicated payoff-functions.
The usual sufficient condition for φ to be a contraction is that the Jacobian J(x) has
a dominant diagonal (e.g. Vives (1999), 1999, p. 47). For k = 1 diagonal dominance and
(5.25) are the same requirement. If k > 1 then it is not hard to find an example (see 5.6.11
in the appendix) that shows condition (5.25) to be more general than the requirement of
a dominant diagonal.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I developed a comparably simple approach to uniqueness by deriving
two criteria which together assert uniqueness of the interior symmetric equilibrium of a
differentiable symmetric game with compact strategy space. One criterion excludes the
possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria and one criterion excludes the possibility of
asymmetric equilibria. I demonstrated the generality of my approach by applying it to the
22In applications, these derivatives can be calculated directly from the equilibrium condition
∇Π˜(x1, x¯) = 0 by a direct application of the Implicit Function Theorem.
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Cournot game. Further, I have used the criterion that deals with asymmetric equilibria
to discuss the scope of asymmetric equilibria in two-dimensional symmetric supermodular
games. The connection between comparative static predictions, multiplicity of symmetric
equilibria and symmetric stability has been discussed. Finally, a condition for an interior
symmetric equilibrium to be a local contraction was developed that is more general than
the standard requirement of a dominant diagonal.
5.6 Appendix
5.6.1 A counting rule
Suppose assumption 5.2 is satisfied (so that only interior equilibria exist) and all equi-
librium points are regular. If xa is an asymmetric equilibrium then by the permutation-
invariance property of ∇F for every possible alignment x˜a of the vectors (xa1, ..., xaN) of xa
we must have that x˜a also is an asymmetric equilibrium. Thus it makes sense to introduce
the notion of a distinct asymmetric equilibrium. Let (x1, x2, ..., xN) , (x1
′, x2′, ..., x′N) ∈ SN
denote two asymmetric equilibria. Then these are distinct asymmetric equilibria if they
are not permutations of each other.
Proposition 5.8. Suppose assumption 5.2 is satisfied and all equilibria points are regular.
Let Is denote the sum of the indices of all symmetric equilibria on the field of ∇F defined
in (5.7).
1) If Is = 1, then if there are asymmetric equilibria
i) if N ≥ 2 there must be more than one distinct asymmetric equilibrium
ii) if N = 2 there must be an even number of distinct asymmetric equilibria
2) If Is 6= 1 and N ≥ 2 then asymmetric equilibria exist. If especially N = 2 then
i) if Is = 3+4z for z ∈ Z then there must be an odd number of distinct asymmetric
equilibria
ii) if Is = 5 + 4z for z ∈ Z\ {−1} then there must be an even number of distinct
asymmetric equilibria
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Proof:
Because all equilibrium points are regular every equilibrium point has a well defined index
which is either +1 or −1 (see (5.9)). Let ω ≥ 1 be the number of symmetric equilibria
which is odd by proposition 5.3. Then Is must be a number from {±1,±3,±5, ...,±ω}.
Let Ia denote the index sum of all asymmetric equilibria. Then we must have Is +
Ia = 1 because SN is a rectangle23. If Is = 1 but there are asymmetric equilibria then
Ia = 0 which requires at least two distinct asymmetric equilibria because all non-distinct
asymmetric equilibria must have the same index. This proves 1) i). If Is 6= 1 we must
have Is 6= 0 which proves that asymmetric equilibria must exist.
To see the rest set N = 2 and note that with N = 2 non-distinct asymmetric equilibria
can only appear pairwise. Let n1 denote the number of distinct asymmetric equilibria with
index−1 and n2 those with index +1. Then the index theorem implies that n2−n1 = 1−Is2 .
Now, if Is is a number 3+4z the RHS of this equation is an odd number which means that
either n1 or n2 must be odd and the other number must be even or zero. Consequently,
n1+n2 must be odd. For Is = 5+4z with z ∈ Z\ {−1} the RHS must be even and hence
n1 + n2 must be even. Finally, if Is = 1 we must have n2 = n1 = n. If n > 0 then this
implies n1 + n2 = 2n which always is even.

5.6.2 Proof of proposition 5.1
Let ϕ (x−g) denote the set of maximisers of player g from problem (5.2). Then ϕ(x−g)
is non-empty by the continuity of Π and the compactness of S . Moreover, ϕ(x−g) is
single-valued for each feasible x−g because of the strict quasiconcavity of Π in xg and
the convexity of S. Finally, the continuity of Π implies the continuity of ϕ(x−g) which,
by symmetry, implies the continuity of φ. For the second claim note that Π˜ (x1, x¯) is
continuous and strongly quasiconcave in x1 by the properties of Π
1. Hence the best-
response function ϕ˜(x¯) ≡ ϕ (x¯−1) exists, is continuous and a mapping from S to itself.
The result then follows from the Brouwer FPT.
23A rectangle has an Euler characteristic of one which must correspond to the index sum of the vector
field on the rectangle (see Simsek et al. (2007)).
198 5. DIFFERENTIABLE SYMMETRIC GAMES

5.6.3 Proof of proposition 5.2
First note that because Πg is C2 for g = 1, ..., N the gradient field ∇F is well-defined.
Because of symmetry we can concentrate on player g = 1 without loss of generality. Let
x = (x1, x−1) and suppose x1 ∈ ∂S, i.e. for at least one x1i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k we have that
x1i ∈
{
0, S¯i
}
. If x1i = 0 then the boundary condition implies Πi(x1, x−1) > 0 as otherwise
the gradient field would not point inwards at x. Similarly, if x1i = S¯i then Πi(x1, x−1) < 0.
Suppose now that x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
−1) is an equilibrium with x
∗
1 ∈ ∂S. Hence for at least one
1 ≤ i ≤ k we must have x∗1i ∈
{
0, S¯i
}
. If x∗1i = 0 then by the Kuhn-Tucker necessary
conditions we must have Πi
(
x∗1, x
∗
−1
) ≤ 0 which contradicts the boundary condition. If
x∗1i = S¯i then Πi
(
x∗1, x
∗
−1
) ≥ 0, a contradiction. Hence only interior equilibria exist
which proves i). For ii) note that E is bounded and because of the continuity of φ (see
proposition 5.1 i)) also closed. Because Det(J(x)) 6= 0 at every x ∈ E all equilibrium
points are locally unique by the inverse function theorem. As E is compact and discrete
(all points locally isolated) E must be finite.

5.6.4 Proof of corollary 5.1
Suppose that ϕ(x−g) ∈ Int(S). Then we must have ∇Πg (x1, ..., ϕ(x−g), ..., xN) = 0.
Strong quasiconcavity of Πg and the fact that Πg ∈ C2 imply
∇Πg (x1, ..., ϕ(x−g), ..., xN) = 0 ⇒ Det
(
D2xg (Π
g (x1, ..., ϕ(x−g), ..., xN))
)
6= 0
whereD2xg denotes the Jacobian of∇Πg with respect to xg. Hence by the Implicit Function
Theorem we may conclude that ϕ(x−g) is differentiable at x−g.

5.6.5 Proof of theorem 5.2
The proofs of theorems 5.2 and 5.3 require the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.1. Let ψ ∈ C ([0, 1], [0, S¯]) with ψ(0) 6= ψ(1) and
ψ(t) ∈ (0, S¯) ⇒ ψ differentiable at t
Then:
(i) if ψ(0) > ψ(1) ∃t′ ∈ (0, 1) such that −ψ′(t′) ≥ ψ(0)− ψ(1)
(ii) if ψ(0) < ψ(1) ∃t′′ ∈ (0, 1) such that ψ′(t′′) ≥ ψ(1)− ψ(0)
Proof: I first proove (i).
Suppose that ψ(0) > ψ(1). Hence ψ(0) > 0 and ψ(1) < S¯. Define T ≡ ψ−1 ({0, S¯}).
Case 1: T = ∅
As ψ is differentiable on (0, 1) and continuous on [0, 1] the MVT implies that ∃t ∈ (0, 1)
such that −ψ′(t) = ψ(0)− ψ(1).
Case 2: T 6= ∅
Obviously, T is bounded. Because
{
0, S¯
}
is closed and ψ is continuous T also is closed
and thus a compact subset of R. Hence the min and max of T exist and are denoted by
t, t¯. The proof now is a case-by-case examination.
(a) ψ(t) = 0. Then ψ is continuous on the perfect interval [0, t] and differentiable on
(0, t). Thus by the MVT ∃t ∈ (0, t) such that
ψ′(t) =
ψ(0)− ψ(t)
−t ≤
ψ(0)− ψ(1)
−1
(b) ψ(t) = S¯ and ψ(t¯) = S¯. Then ψ is continuous on the perfect interval [t¯, 1] and
differentiable on (t¯, 1). By the MVT ∃t ∈ (t¯, 1) such that
ψ′(t) =
ψ(t¯)− ψ(1)
t¯− 1 ≤
ψ(0)− ψ(1)
−1
(c) ψ(t) = S¯ and ψ(t¯) = 0. Define A ≡ ψ−1 ({S¯}), which is a non-empty and compact
set. Hence tˆ = maxA exists. Consider B ≡ [tˆ, 1] ∩ ψ−1 ({0}), which also is non-
empty and compact. Let tˇ = minB. Hence ψ is continuous on the perfect interval
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[tˆ, tˇ] and differentiable on (tˆ, tˇ). Thus by the MVT ∃t ∈ (tˆ, tˇ) such that
ψ′(t) =
ψ(tˆ)− ψ(tˇ)
tˆ− tˇ ≤
ψ(0)− ψ(1)
−1
Hence (i) is true and (ii) follows from (i) by setting ρ(z) ≡ ψ(1− t).

Proof of theorem 5.2
Step 1: N = 2
Suppose that xa1, x
a
2 are asymmetric equilibria with the property that ϕ(x
a
2) = x
a
1 and
ϕ(xa1) = x
a
2. Let ψ(t) ≡ ϕ1 (xa1 + t(xa2 − xa1)) for t ∈ [0, 1]. Then ψ(0) = xa2 and ψ(1) = xa1.
Because ψ(0) 6= ψ(1) lemma 5.1 together with proposition 5.1 (i) and corollary 5.1 asserts
that there exists t′ ∈ (0, 1) such that either ψ′(t′) ≤ ψ(1)− ψ(0) or ψ′(t′) ≥ ψ(1)− ψ(0).
In the first case we get (by the chain rule) that ∂ϕ · (ψ(0)− ψ(1)) ≤ ψ(1) − ψ(0) where
ψ(1) − ψ(0) < 0, which implies ∂ϕ(x2) ≤ −1 for some x2 ∈ (0, S¯). In the second case
we get ∂ϕ · (ψ(0)− ψ(1)) ≥ ψ(1) − ψ(0) where ψ(1) − ψ(0) > 0. Consequently, again
∂ϕ(x2) ≤ −1 for some x2 ∈ (0, S¯).
Step 2: N > 2
Suppose xa ∈ SN is an asymmetric equilibrium. Because of symmetry we can set xa =
(xa1, x
a
2, x
a
3, ..., x
a
N) with x
a
1 6= xa2. Suppose players g = 1 and g = 2 play a parametrised
two-player game where X = (x3, ..., xN) ∈ SN−2 is an exogenous vector of parameters. If
we choose X = (xa3, ..., x
a
N) then (x
a
1, x
a
2) as well as (x
a
2, x
a
1) must be asymmetric equilibria
of the parametrised two-player game. Thus, by step 1, if an asymmetric equilibrium exists
we can always find X ∈ SN−2 and x2 ∈ (0, S¯) such that ∂ϕ(x2;X) ≤ −1 - which is the
contraposition of theorem 5.2.

5.6.6 Proof of theorem 5.3
The proof will make use of the following fact: If r1, r2, s1, s2 ∈ R with r1 ≤ s1 ≤ 0 and
r2 ≤ s2 ≤ 0 then r1r2 ≥ s1s2.
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Let N = 2 and suppose an asymmetric equilibrium xa1 = (x
a
11, x
a
12) ∈ S exists. Then
because of symmetry xa2 = (x
a
21, x
a
22) also is an asymmetric equilibrium where ϕ(x
a
2) =
xa1 and ϕ(x
a
1) = x
a
2 and x
a
1 6= xa2. Define ψ1(t) ≡ ϕ11 (xa1 + t(xa2 − xa1)) and ψ2(t) ≡
ϕ12 (x
a
1 + t(x
a
2 − xa1)) for t ∈ [0, 1]. Then ψ1(0) = ϕ11(xa1), ψ1(1) = ϕ11(xa2), ψ2(0) = ϕ12(xa1)
and ψ2(1) = ϕ
1
2(x
a
2). Moreover, ψi ∈ C
(
[0, 1], [0, S¯i]
)
for i = 1, 2 and also
ψi(ti) ∈
(
0, S¯i
) ⇒ ψi differentiable at ti for i=1,2
by corollary 5.1. Then, assuming that the corresponding partial derivative exist, by the
chain rule we have for i = 1:
ψ1
′(t1) = α (xa1 + t1(x
a
2 − xa1)) (ψ1(0)− ψ1(1)) + β (xa1 + t1(xa2 − xa1)) (ψ2(0)− ψ2(1))
and for i = 2:
ψ2
′(t2) = γ (xa1 + t2(x
a
2 − xa1)) (ψ1(0)− ψ1(1)) + δ (xa1 + t2(xa2 − xa1)) (ψ2(0)− ψ2(1))
Case 1: ϕ1i (x
a
1) = ϕ
1
i (x
a
2)
Suppose that ϕ11(x
a
1) = ϕ
1
1(x
a
2). Hence ψ1(0) = ψ1(1). Then ϕ
1
2(x
a
1) 6= ϕ12(xa2). Ac-
cording to lemma 5.1 there exists t′ ∈ (0, 1) such that either ψ2′(t′) ≤ ψ2(1) − ψ2(0) or
ψ2
′(t′) ≥ ψ2(1)− ψ2(0). In the first case we get δ · (ψ2(0)− ψ2(1)) ≤ ψ2(1)− ψ2(0) where
ψ2(1) − ψ2(0) < 0, which implies that ∃(x21, x22) ∈ Int(S) such that δ(x21, x22) ≤ −1.
In the second case we get δ · (ψ2(0)− ψ2(1)) ≥ ψ2(1) − ψ2(0) where ψ2(1) − ψ2(0) > 0.
Consequently, again ∃(x21, x22) ∈ Int(S) such that δ(x21, x22) ≤ −1. Finally, if instead
ϕ21(x
a
1) = ϕ
2
1(x
a
2) then a similar argument gives that α ≤ −1 for some (x21, x22) ∈ Int(S).
From now on suppose that ϕ1i (x
a
1) 6= ϕ1i (xa2) for i = 1, 2 and define m ≡ ψ2(0)−ψ2(1)ψ1(0)−ψ1(1) .
Case 2.1: ϕ1i (x
a
1) > ϕ
1
i (x
a
2) for i = 1, 2.
Then we have ψi(0) > ψi(1) for i = 1, 2 and ∃ti ∈ (0, 1) such that ψi′(ti) ≤ ψi(1)− ψi(0)
which implies
α+mβ ≤ −1
γ 1
m
+ δ ≤ −1
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Suppose that α, δ ≥ −1 ∀ (x21, x22) ∈ Int(S) for which the corresponding derivative
exists. Then
mβ ≤ −(1 + α) ≤ 0
γ 1
m
≤ −(1 + δ) ≤ 0
and the above fact implies that ∃(x21, x22), (x′21, x′22) ∈ Int(S) such that
β(x21, x22)γ(x
′
21, x
′
22) ≥ (1 + α(x21, x22))(1 + δ(x′21, x′22))
Case 2.2: ϕ1i (x
a
1) < ϕ
1
i (x
a
2) for i = 1, 2.
Then we have ψi(0) < ψi(1) for i = 1, 2 and ∃ti ∈ (0, 1) such that ψi′(ti) ≥ ψi(1)− ψi(0)
which implies
α+mβ ≤ −1
γ 1
m
+ δ ≤ −1
and a similar argument as in case 2.1 shows that βγ ≥ (1 + α)(1 + δ) must be true if
α, δ ≥ −1.
Case 2.3: ϕ11(x
a
1) < ϕ
1
1(x
a
2) and ϕ
1
2(x
a
1) > ϕ
1
2(x
a
2)
Hence ψ1(0) < ψ1(1) and ψ2(0) > ψ2(1) and there exist t1, t2 ∈ (0, 1) such that ψ1′(t1) ≥
ψ1(1)− ψ1(0) and ψ2′(t2) ≤ ψ2(1)− ψ2(0). Consequently, we get
mβ ≤ −(1 + α) ≤ 0
γ 1
m
≤ −(1 + δ) ≤ 0
and a similar argument as in case 2.1 shows that βγ ≥ (1 + α)(1 + δ) must be true if
α, δ ≥ −1.
Case 2.4: ϕ11(x
a
1) > ϕ
1
1(x
a
2) and ϕ
1
2(x
a
1) < ϕ
1
2(x
a
2) is treated similarly to case 2.3.
Thus if an asymmetric equilibrium exists we can always find interior points such that
α ≤ −1, δ ≤ −1 or (1 + α)(1 + δ) ≥ βγ and the statement of theorem 5.3 simply is the
contraposition of this result.
The proof is concluded by noting that for N > 2 if condition (5.15) holds for any
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given parameter vector X ∈ SN−2 then, by the proof of theorem 5.2, there cannot be any
asymmetric equilibrium in the game.

Remark: By defining
A ≡
(
1 +
∂ϕ11
∂x21
∂ϕ11
∂x22
∂ϕ12
∂x21
1 +
∂ϕ12
∂x22
)
condition (5.15) of theorem 5.3 can be compactly written as the requirement that all
principal minors of A be equal or greater than zero. Theorem 5.3 extends to the case
where k > 2: Let
A =

1 +
∂ϕ11
∂x21
∂ϕ11
∂x22
· · · ∂ϕ11
∂x2k
∂ϕ12
∂x21
1 +
∂ϕ12
∂x22
· · · ∂ϕ12
∂x2k
...
...
. . .
...
∂ϕ1k
∂x21
· · · · · · 1 + ∂ϕ1k
∂x2k

If all principal minors of A are greater or equal than zero no asymmteric equilibrium
exists. To illustrate this suppose that N = 2 xa1 and x
a
2 are two asymmetric equilibria
with ϕ(xa1) = x
a
2 and ϕ(x
a
2) = x
a
1 and x
a
2 6= xa1. For simplicity, assume that ϕ(xa1 +
t(xa2 − xa1)) ∈ Int(S) for t ∈ (0, 1). Then the mean value theorem asserts the existence of
x12, ..., x
k
2 ∈ Int(S) such that
A˜
 ∆1...
∆k
 = −
 ∆1...
∆k
 (5.26)
where A˜ is a k × k-matrix with aij = ∂ϕ
1
i (x
i
2)
∂x2j
and ∆i ≡ xa2i − xa1i. But (5.26) is equivalent
to (
I + A˜
) ∆1...
∆k
 = A
 ∆1...
∆k
 = 0 (5.27)
Because xa1 and x
a
2 are asymmetric equilibria we must have ∆i 6= 0 for at least one i.
Consequently, we must have rank(A) < k in (5.27) and hence Det(A) = 0. Now suppose
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that ∆k = 0. Then (5.27) implies that
Ak−1
 ∆1...
∆k−1
 = 0
where Ak−1 is formed from A by cancelling the kth row and column. HenceDet(Ak−1) = 0,
where Det(Ak−1) is a principal minor of order k − 1 of A. Obviously, if ∆j = 0 for any
j = 1, ..., k then the corresponding principal minor of order k − 1 of A must be zero.
This argument may be continued to the case up to the case that k − 1 of the k ∆i’s
are zero and we find that this corresponds to the fact that at least one principal minor
of A is equal to zero if an asymmetric equilibrium exists. Consequently, if we can show
that all principal minors of A are positive we may conclude that no interior asymmetric
equilibria nor asymmetric equilibria on the boundary with ϕ(xa1 + t(x
a
2 − xa1)) ∈ Int(S)
for t ∈ (0, 1) can exist. A somewhat tedious case-by-case examination as in the proof of
theorem 5.3 shows that if ϕ(xa1 + t(x
a
2 − xa1)) /∈ Int(S) for t ∈ (0, 1) we can always find
x12, ..., x
k
2 ∈ Int(S) such that at least one principal minor of A is equal or less than zero.
5.6.7 Proof of proposition 5.4
(a) Applying (5.12) to (5.16) gives (5.17).
(b) From
Π1 (q1, q2; q3, ..., qN) = P
(
q1 +
n∑
j=2
qj
)
+ q1P
′
(
q1 +
n∑
j=2
qj
)
− c′(q1) = 0
we get
Π12
Π11
=
P ′(Q) + q1P ′′(Q)
2P ′(Q) + q1P ′′(Q)− c′′(q1)
and the claim follows from corollary 5.2.
(c) Obvious.

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5.6.8 Proof of proposition 5.5
(a) Let E1 ≡
{
x1 ∈ Int(S) : ∇Π˜(x1) = 0
}
and suppose that E1 is multi-valued. Then
because of proposition 5.3 there must exist x1 ∈ E1 such that Det(−J˜(x1)) < 0.
Because Det
(
−Jˆ(x1)
)
= s1 · ... ·sk ·Det
(
−J˜(x1)
)
we also have Det
(
−Jˆ(x1)
)
< 0.
Let λ1, ..., λk denote the eigenvalues of −Jˆ(x1). Then
k∏
i=1
λk < 0, which implies that
there must exist at least one negative eigenvalue. Consequently, Jˆ(x1) must have
at least one positive eigenvalue which means that x = (x1, ..., x1) is an unstable
equilibrium.
(b) Inexistence of multiple symmetric equilibria is obvious. Let λ1, λ2 denote the eigen-
values of Jˆ(x1). Then, because s1, s2 > 0, (5.24) implies:
λ1 + λ2 = Trace
(
Jˆ(x1)
)
= s1Π˜11 + s2Π˜22 < 0
λ1λ2 = Det
(
Jˆ(x1)
)
= s1s2Det
(
J˜(x1)
)
> 0
which implies that λ1, λ2 must either be negative or have negative real parts.
(c) (a)⇔ (b) follows asDet
(
Jˆ(x1)
)
, Det
(
J˜(x1)
)
< 0 holds iff Π˜11(x1) < 0 for x1 ∈ E1.
To see (b) ⇔ (c) note that from Π˜1(x1, x¯, c) = 0 we have that
x1
′(c) = −
∂
∂c
Π˜1
Π11
− Π12(N − 1)
Π11
x¯′(c)
where the first term is the direct effect and the second term the strategic effect.
Because in equilibrium (x′1(c) = x¯
′(c))
x1
′(c) = −
∂
∂c
Π˜1
Π11
Π11
Π11 + (N − 1)Π12 = −
∂
∂c
Π˜1
Π˜11
we see that sign (x1
′(c)) = sign
(
∂
∂c
Π˜1
)
, i.e. strategic effects are of second-order
importance, iff Π˜11(x1) < 0.
To see the last claim note that a symmetric equilibrium point x is locally stable
206 5. DIFFERENTIABLE SYMMETRIC GAMES
under (general) myopic adjustments iff the symmetric N ×N -matrix
J(x) =

Π11 Π12 Π12 Π12
Π12 Π11 Π12 · · · Π12
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Π12 Π12 · · · Π12 Π11

is negative definite. This is the case iff
Π11(x) < Π12(x)
and
Π11(x) + (N − 1)Π12(x) = Π˜11(x1) < 0
which holds by presupposition.

5.6.9 Proof of proposition 5.6
Suppose that x1 ∈ E1. If Mˆ(x1) is positive definite ∀ s1, ..., sk > 0 then i) all eigenvalues
of −Jˆ(x1) must be positive or have positive real part (see e.g. Tang et al. (2007)) and
ii) −Jˆ(x1) is a P -matrix (see e.g. Gale and Nikaido (1965), p. 84). But i) implies
that Jˆ(x1) only has negative eigenvalues or eigenvalues with negative real parts. Hence
x = (x1, ..., x1) must be a symmetrically stable equilibrium. Further, ii) implies that
Det(−Jˆ(x1)) > 0 and the second claim follows fromDet(−Jˆ(x1)) = s1 ·...·skDet(−J˜(x1)).

5.6.10 Proof of proposition 5.7
The supermodularity together with the positivity of the principal minors and s1, ..., sk > 0
imply that −Jˆ(x1) is an M-Matrix (a matrix with non-positive off diagonal elements,
positive diagonal elements and positive principal minors) for any choice of s1, ..., sk > 0.
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But as all eigenvalues of an M-Matrix are known to be positive or have positive real part
(see Tang et al. (2007)) the claim follows immediately.

5.6.11 Proof of theorem 5.4
The proof of theorem 5.4 requires the following two lemmata. The norm in use is ‖·‖ ≡
‖·‖∞. Let B¯ (x∗, ε) denote a closed ε-ball about x∗.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose x∗ ∈ Es and let φ be the joint best-response function (5.4) and
V ≡ B¯ (x∗, ε) ⊂ SN . Then φ : V → SN is a contraction on V if ϕi : U¯1 → Si for
U¯1 ≡ B¯
(
x∗−1, ε
) ⊂ SN−1 is a contraction on U¯1 for i = 1, ..., k.
Proof:
Because of symmetry we need only regard player g = 1. Suppose that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k
ϕi is a contraction on U¯1 for a given ε > 0. Hence there exists qi ∈ [0, 1) with
x−1 ∈ U¯1 ⇒
∣∣ϕi (x∗−1)− ϕi (x−1)∣∣ ≤ qi ∥∥x∗−1 − x−1∥∥
Let q ≡ max {qi} and x−1 ∈ U¯1. Then∥∥ϕ(x∗−1)− ϕ(x−1)∥∥ = max
1≤i≤k
{∣∣ϕi(x∗−1)− ϕi(x−1)∣∣}
≤ q ∥∥x∗−1 − x−1∥∥
Hence ϕ is a contraction on U¯1. By symmetry ϕ(x−g) is a contraction on U¯g ≡ B¯(x∗−g, ε)
for g = 2, ..., N . Suppose x ∈ V and hence x−g ∈ U¯g. Then
‖φ(x∗)− φ(x)‖ ≤ q ∥∥x∗−g − x−g∥∥ g = 1, ..., N
≤ q ‖x∗ − x‖
which shows that φ(x) is a contraction on V .

Lemma 5.3. Suppose that
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∂ϕi(x∗−1)∂x2j ∣∣∣ < 1N−1 and x∗ ∈ Es. Then there exists a closed
ball U¯i ⊂ SN−1 about (x∗−1) such that ϕ1i is a contraction on U¯i.
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Proof:
Define σi(x−1) ≡
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∂ϕi(x−1)∂x2j ∣∣∣ and q ≡ (N − 1)σi(x∗−1). Then q ∈ [0, 1). As σi(x−1) is
continuous on SN−1 we have that for all ε ∈ (0, 1−q
N−1 ] there exists a δ(ε) > 0 such that
∥∥x∗−1 − x−1∥∥ ≤ δ ⇒ ∣∣σi(x∗−1)− σi(x−1)∣∣ < ε
Hence if σi(x
∗
−1) > σi(x−1) then σi(x−1) <
q
N−1 <
1
N−1 . If σi(x
∗
−1) ≤ σi(x−1) then
σi(x−1) < ε+ σi(x∗−1) = ε+
q
N − 1 ≤
1
N − 1
Let δ ≡ δ ( 1−q
N−1
)
and U¯i ≡ B¯
(
(x∗−1), δ
)
. Hence
x−1 ∈ U¯i ⇒ σi(x−1) < 1
N − 1
Because of symmetry we have
x−1 ∈ U¯i ⇒
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂ϕi(x−1)∂xnj
∣∣∣∣ < 1N − 1 ∀n = 2, ...., N (5.28)
By the mean value theorem:
|ϕi(x−1′)− ϕi(x−1)| ≤ ‖x−1′ − x−1‖ sup
0≤t≤1
‖x˜−1‖=1
∣∣∣∇ϕi (x−1′ + t (x−1 − x−1′)) · (x˜−1)T ∣∣∣
where x−1, x′−1 ∈ U¯i imply that also x−1 + t
(
x′−1 − x−1
) ∈ U¯i for t ∈ [0, 1] as the closed
ball U¯i is a convex set. Let x(t) ≡ x−1′ + t(x−1 − x−1′). Then
Q ≡ sup
0≤t≤1
‖x˜−1‖=1
|∇ϕi(x(t)) · (x˜−1)|
= sup
0≤t≤1
‖x˜−1‖=1
∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂x21 (x(t))x˜21 + ∂ϕi∂x22 (x(t))x˜22 + ...+ ∂ϕi∂xNk (x(t))x˜Nk∣∣∣
= sup
0≤t≤1
{∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂x21 (x(t))∣∣∣+ ...+ ∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂x2k (x(t))∣∣∣+ ...+ ∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂xN1 (x(t))∣∣∣+ ...+ ∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂xNk (x(t))∣∣∣}
=
∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂x21 (t∗)∣∣∣+ ...+ ∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂x2k (x(t∗))∣∣∣+ ...+ ∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂xN1 (x(t∗))∣∣∣+ ...+ ∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂xNk (x(t∗))∣∣∣
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where the last step follows from the continuity of the partial derivatives and t ∈ [0, 1].
But (5.28) then implies
Q <
N − 1
N − 1 = 1
As a consequence
|ϕi(x−1′)− ϕi(x−1)| ≤ Q ‖x−1′ − x−1‖
for all x−1, x′−1 ∈ U¯i and Q ∈ [0, 1). Hence ϕ1i is a contraction on U¯i.

Proof of theorem 5.4:
Because of permutation-symmetry it does not matter which player marginally changes his
strategy at a symmetric equilibrium. Then for j = 1, ..., k∣∣∣∣∂ϕ˜i(x¯∗)∂x¯j
∣∣∣∣ = (N − 1) ∣∣∣∣∂ϕi(x∗−1)∂x2j
∣∣∣∣
Hence
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂ϕ˜i(x¯∗)∂x¯j
∣∣∣∣ = (N − 1) k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂ϕi(x∗−1)∂x2j
∣∣∣∣
and thus by presupposition
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂ϕi(x∗−1)∂x2j
∣∣∣∣ < 1N − 1
By lemma 5.3 there exists ε > 0 such that ϕ1i is a contraction on U¯i ≡ B¯i(x∗−1, εi). By the
proof of lemma 5.2 ϕ(x−1) is a contraction on U¯ ≡ B¯(x∗−1, ε) where ε ≡ min {εi}. But
then by lemma 5.2 φ is a contraction on V ≡ B¯(x∗, ε).

I now present a numerical example that violates the condition of a dominant diagonal
but satisfies the contraction condition (5.25). Suppose k = N = 2 and x∗ is an interior
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symmetric equilibrium. Let the Jacobian J(x∗) be given by
J(x∗) =

Π111 Π
1
12 Π
1
13 Π
1
14
Π121 Π
1
22 Π
1
23 Π
1
24
Π231 Π
2
32 Π
2
33 Π
2
34
Π241 Π
2
42 Π
2
43 Π
2
44
 =

−1 1/2 1/2 0
1/2 −1 1/8 1/8
0 1/2 −1 1/2
1/8 1/8 1/2 −1

As can be seen from the first row diagonal dominance fails to hold. However, us-
ing the implicit function theorem the partial derivatives are ∂
∂x21
ϕ1(x21, x22) = 9/12,
∂
∂x22
ϕ1(x21, x22) = 1/12,
∂
∂x21
ϕ2(x21, x22) = 1/2 and
∂
∂x22
ϕ2(x21, x22) = 1/6. Hence (5.25)
is satisfied.
6Summary
6.1 Summary
This thesis has integrated two stylized facts from marketing and perceptual psychology
- the fact that people only consider a subset of all available alternatives and the fact
that the salience of an alternative matters for its chance of perception - into oligopolistic
models of competition. The basic implication of limited attention - the first fact - is that
perceived and not effective market structure matters. I show that in an attention economy
equilibrium prices generally depend on the intensity of competition between the firms
which e.g. is determined by the degree of substitutability but also on the psychological
attention threshold. This leaves firms with considerably more market power and implies
that higher equilibrium prices can be maintained than suggested by conventional economic
theory.
The second fact - the possibility to influence the chance of perception - implies the
existence of a further type of competition - attention competition - that interacts with
conventional economic competition. The fact that paid search has become the dominant
part of online advertising expenditure clearly provides evidence for the importance of
this type of competition in a digital economy. The theory of informative advertising
recognises limited consumer information - because of scarce information - as a major
source of inefficiency and market power. My contribution shows that it is of considerable
importance for policy implications whether limited consumer information is caused by
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scarce information or by superabundant information and scarce attention. Depending
on the intensity of price competition and the intensity of the competition for scarce
attention firms may be able to transform the increased revenues into higher profits which
under free entry implies larger markets. The Salop model provides an example where the
revenue effect dominates which results in a higher equilibrium degree of diversity under
limited attention. This is especially worrisome as under limited attention the conventional
negative relationship between transportation costs and diversity is inverted.
6.2 Outlook
I hope of successfully having convinced the reader that the joint examination of psycho-
logical limitations on perception and economic competition is essential to understand and
discuss many contemporaneous economic phenomena. It is also clear that this thesis is
far from answering many intriguing questions that may be evoked in an attentive reader’s
mind. In this spirit I now provide a very brief description of two research questions which
in my opinion deserve high attention.
As this thesis is of a theoretical nature maybe the most central concern is to find direct
and indisputable empirical evidence that certify the validity of my claims. As Mondria et
al. put it ”empirical evaluation [...] of attention allocation models remains a challenge”
(Mondria et al. (2010), p. 85). Fortunately, there exists a way to achieve such a goal by
conducting a laboratory experiment. The main advantage of the laboratory over field data
is the possibility to directly measure how many alternatives are perceived by participants
(e.g. by recording their on-screen clicks) and also how much money information senders
invest if they can influence their chance of perception and how their investment is related
to the price they set if they are simultaneously engaged in some type of price-attention
competition. I believe it is possible to construct a direct experimental test of the model
in the third chapter of this thesis.
The second question is concerned with the assumption of separability imposed in
chapter three. While this assumption is analytically very convenient as it generates a
highly tractable structure there are cases where it seems inappropriate. An important
example is the case of online pricing filters. Such websites draw together price information
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of different brands and list these informations in ascending order of their prices. Hence,
different from the Google example, if such a filter is used by consumers then the on-screen
ranking cannot be influenced by other means than the price itself. In my view this issue
still can be addressed appropriately by the basic approach of chapter three by recognising
that under limited attention the price must play a double role. On one hand, the price
determines sales and revenues given the attention set of the consumer in the traditional
way: lowering the price shifts up demand. On the other hand, given that people focus
especially on the upper part of the list firms have an additional incentive to lower their
price as this increases their chance of entering the upper part. Formally, this means that
the model of chapter three is still applicable by letting attention effort f be a function
of the price: f = f(y). At first glance it appears that, propelled by their double role,
prices should quickly converge to marginal costs as market power collapses. However, if
the model is extended by a further dimension, e.g. quality, which is not measured by the
pricing filter a quite different picture may be obtained. In such a case prices still decline
but at the same time quality also drops because costs otherwise could not be covered. It
turns out that in equilibrium such a price filter may imply a lower equilibrium effective
quality than if the firms had to choose f directly. At an abstract level this example can
illustrate the dangers of complacency about the preselection of information by digital
filters. If such filters cannot identify all relevant criteria with respect to a specific request
then blind reliance on the results may lead to bad conclusions. The inability of banks to
understand their systemic risks or the deficient system used to identify potential terrorists
by the U.S. government are two examples.
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